General Printing Corp. v. Umback
Decision Date | 20 April 1935 |
Docket Number | 14,755 |
Parties | GENERAL PRINTING CORPORATION v. UMBACK, ADMINISTRATRIX |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Allen Superior Court; George W. Leonard, Judge.
Action by Lillian R. Umback, administratrix of the estate of Frank J. Umback, deceased, against the General Printing Corporation under the Employer's Liability Act. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed.
Affirmed.
James M. Barrett, Jr., Phil M. McNagny, and Leigh L. Hunt, for appellant.
Guy Colerick, and Samuel D. Jackson, for appellee.
Appellee, as administratrix of the estate of her husband Frank J. Umback, deceased brought suit against the appellant by her complaint, the third paragraph of which is the only one in the record, to recover damages sustained because of his death, as the result of alleged negligent conduct on behalf of appellant.
This paragraph of complaint was predicated upon the "Employer's Liability Law," Acts 1911, p. 145, § 40-1101, Burns 1933, § 10100-1, Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934. The material part thereof charging negligence of appellant is in the following language:
Appellant challenged this complaint by demurrer, alleging two causes therefor: First, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; second, that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the alleged cause of action. These two causes of demurrer were supported by several paragraphs of memoranda. This demurrer was overruled.
Appellant filed an answer is three paragraphs, the first was a general denial, the second pleaded the two-year statute of limitation, the third alleged that the decedent died as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by appellant; that both appellant and decedent had accepted the provisions of the Workman's Compensation Law of the state of Indiana, and therefore the Allen Superior Court No. 2 did not have jurisdiction of the cause; that it was vested exclusively in the Industrial Board of Indiana. The appellee filed a reply in general denial to the second and third paragraphs of answer.
On these issues the cause was submitted to a jury for trial, which returned a verdict for appellee, on which judgment was rendered in her favor. Within proper time appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled. The only cause therefor discussed by appellant and requiring our attention is that the verdict of the jury was contrary to law.
Appellant appeals assigning as errors for reversal, that the court erred in overruling its demurrer to appellee's third paragraph of complaint, and that the court erred in overruling its motion for a new trial.
These two errors present but a single question for our consideration, namely: was the accident and injury described in the third paragraph of complaint, and as shown by the evidence, most favorable to appellee, an accident arising out of and in the course of decedent's employment by appellant, so that the only remedy which appellee had to recover damages was granted by and confined solely to the provisions of the Indiana Workman's Compensation Act, Acts 1915, p. 392, § 9451, Burns 1926, § 40-1206, Burns 1933, § 16382, Baldwin's 1934. We therefore consider the errors together.
The provisions of the "Indiana Workman's Compensation Act," supra, together with any amendments made thereto and in force previous to February 15, 1929, are controlling insofar as they determine any of the respective rights of the parties to this action. Paragraph (d) of § 76 of said act as amended by Acts of 1919, p. 175, § 9521, Burns 1926, § 40-1704, Burns 1933, provides that, "'injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form except as it shall result from the injury." It is appellee's contention that her decedent died as the result of a disease brought about because of the negligence of appellant, and not because of a disease resulting from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by appellant; that therefore her remedy for relief did not lie with the Industrial Board, but that she was compelled to resort to the common law as supplemented by the Employer's Liability Act, 1911, see § 40-1111, Burns 1933, § 10100-11, Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934, for redress of the wrongs suffered by her.
Neither the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the third paragraph of complaint to state a cause of action, nor the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury is questioned by appellant.
The complaint alleges that the death of appellee's decedent was the proximate result of appellant's negligent failure to furnish him a safe place in which to work as provided by §§ 40-1013 and 40-1011, Burns 1933, §§ 10085 and 10072, Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934. It is upon the theory of disease resulting because of the negligent failure of appellant to comply with positive statutory provisions regulating the construction, equipment, and ventilation of buildings and work rooms, where certain kinds of occupations and industries are conducted and carried on, of which negligent failure the decedent had no knowledge and which negligence was the proximate cause of his illness and ultimate death.
Section 7 of the Employer's Liability Act, being § 40-1107, Burns 1933, § 10100-7, Baldwin's Ind. St. 1934, provides that: "All questions of assumption of risk, negligence or contributory negligence shall be questions of fact for the jury to decide, unless the cause is being tried without a jury, in which case, such questions shall be questions of fact for the court."
Appellant urges with much force, that the decedent's death was the result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and that therefore any right or remedy which the appellee had was under § 6 of the Workman's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n
... ... New York ... L. Ins. Co. 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451, 458; General ... Printing Corp. v. Umback, 100 Ind.App. 285, 292, 195 ... N.E. 282; ... ...
- Gen. Printing Corp. v. Umback