General Ry. Signal Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 September 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 811.,811. |
| Citation | 21 F.2d 697 |
| Parties | GENERAL RY. SIGNAL CO. v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Paul, Paul & Moore, of Minneapolis, Minn., and Clifton V. Edwards and Lawrence K. Sager, both of New York City, and Neil D. Preston, of Rochester, N. Y., for plaintiff.
Thomas Ewing and Frank C. Cole, both of New York City, Thomas Balmer, of Seattle, Wash., and Fletcher Rockwood, of St. Paul, Minn., for defendant.
The bill of complaint charges infringement of Howe patent, No. 1,551,515, and the answer sets up the defenses of lack of invention and noninfringement.
The plaintiff complains of the installation of an automatic train-control system by the defendant, made by the Sprague Safety Control & Signal Corporation; that company has indemnified the railroad against loss by virtue of any patent litigation and has assumed the defense of this suit. While the railroad company has a real interest in the matter, the main contest is between rival manufacturers of automatic train-control devices.
The subject-matter of the patent in suit relates to automatic train control, the general object of which is to require the engineer to observe wayside signals, and, in case he fails in such observations, to stop his train. Train control generally has been under investigation and development by various inventors for a great many years. Most railroad accidents are caused by the failure of the human element, rather than the failure of any of the mechanical equipment, and it has been the hope of various men to produce some automatic control system which would, so far as possible, eliminate the danger caused by carelessness, without seriously interfering with the operation of the road.
The block signal system has generally been adopted by the railroads throughout the country. Under this system, the trackway is divided into block sections, which are ordinarily a mile apart. At the entrance to each block is a signal. When a train is in one block, the signal directly behind it is set at danger. When the train reaches the next block, the signal at that block is set at danger, and the signal in the block behind becomes a caution signal, and the signal in the block behind that, which was previously a caution, goes to the clear position. Therefore, behind every train there will be, first, a danger signal at the entrance to the block in which the train is; at the entrance to the block behind that, a caution signal, and at the entrance to the block behind the caution signal, a clear signal. The purpose of these signals is obvious. An engineer, upon seeing a caution signal, knows that at the entrance to the next block he will, in all probability, meet with a danger signal, indicating that a train is in that block. If, before he reaches the danger signal, the train ahead of him has passed out of the block, he will meet with another caution signal, which will advise him of that situation and enable him at all times to keep his train under such control as to avert an accident. The principal function of a railroad is to carry traffic with all possible speed consistent with safety. The purpose of the block signal system is to keep the engineer so advised that he can proceed without stopping unless that becomes necessary. The stopping of a train means expense and delay, and unnecessary stops must be avoided.
The block signal system is electrically operated upon a normally closed track circuit. The system depends upon electrical energy to give a clear signal, and any failure of it results in the danger signal. The wheels of a train, or anything else which short circuits the battery, create a danger signal.
There was no difficulty in providing an inductor in the trackway to be operated in connection with a block signal system, so that, when the signal went to danger, the trackway inductor would give an impulse to an engine-carried inductor which might be used to produce an automatic stop. Such a system has been used on the New York subways. That system was not satisfactory to the railroads, because it required, in every instance, that, if an engineer or motorman passed a danger signal which failed to clear up as he reached it, he would have an automatic stop. It is not always necessary to require an engineer to bring his train to an absolute stop at a danger signal. The purpose of a signal is to advise him of the situation so that he may bring his train under such control that it can make a stop when necessary. The safe operation of the train past a danger signal would, of course, depend upon conditions. The thing which was most desired by the railroads was to secure some system which would not take the train out of the control of the engineer unless that became absolutely necessary. Some of the systems proposed to solve the problem by putting it in the power of the engineer, by operating a device, to put the automatic train-control apparatus out of commission, so that he might rely upon it or not, as he saw fit. These devices have been referred to as annulling devices.
A system causing an automatic stop upon passing a danger signal had the disadvantage that it took the train away from the engineer at a time when that might not be justified. The disadvantage of the system with the annulling device was that the engineer could put it out of operation at a time when he was vigilant, but might fail to put it into operation, and there might be an accident at another block because of his lack of vigilance.
The idea of the patent in suit, in a general way, was to provide a plan to avoid the disadvantages referred to, which would permit the engineer to retain control of his train so long as he was alert and was observing signals, and which would automatically take it away from him if he failed to be alert. To accomplish this, Howe provided an electrical apparatus which, if the block signal was at danger or caution, would result in the stopping of any train coming into the block unless the engineer, within a limited time before the danger or caution signal was reached, threw over a hold-off lever and held it over until he had passed the signal. If he failed to "hold off," his train would automatically be stopped, or, if he held off for more than the time limit, there would be an automatic brake application. Howe's theory was that, to prevent an automatic stop, an engineer must be alert and forestall, and that any failure on his part to observe signals would result in the train being in effect taken away from him. For failing to hold off, he was penalized by the stopping of his train, and, in order to release his brakes, he was required to dismount from the cab and operate a resetting device.
It is claimed that what Howe did was to disclose or describe a practical and efficient means or apparatus intended to carry out a new plan of train control, and that the new means or apparatus constitute the subject-matter of the...
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