General Teamsters Union Local No. 174 v. Trick & Murray, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3977,86-3977
• Citation: 828 F.2d 1418
• Parties: 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2736, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,171 GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 174, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRICK & MURRAY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1418

828 F.2d 1418

126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2736, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,171

GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL NO. 174, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRICK & MURRAY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86-3977.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 5, 1987. ^*

Decided Sept. 28, 1987.

Kenneth J. Pedersen, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellant.

Lawrence B. Ransom, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Before WALLACE, FLETCHER and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

General Teamsters Union Local No. 174 (the union) appeals from a summary judgment in its action for breach of contract and to compel arbitration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I

The union is the exclusive bargaining representative for certain employees of Trick and Murray, Inc. (employer). On December 29, 1980, the parties entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement, which had provisions for automatic renewal. On March 28, 1984, the employer unilaterally withdrew its recognition of the union, contending that the bargaining unit contained only one employee. On the same day, the employer petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (Board) for decertification of the union. The union then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. The Board dismissed the employer's petition and refused to issue a complaint as requested by the union, invoking a longstanding policy of refusing to assert jurisdiction over representational disputes involving bargaining units with less than two members.

On November 28, 1984, the union requested that the employer submit the dispute to arbitration. The parties' collective bargaining agreement contained a detailed grievance and arbitration provision. The employer did not respond. On April 5, 1985, the union filed the instant action, seeking an order to compel arbitration pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. A breach of contract claim was added later.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court, citing Teamsters Union Local 315 v. Great Western Chemical Co., 781 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1986) (Great Western ), ruled that the union had failed to bring the suit to compel arbitration within the applicable six-month limitations period. According to the court, the union's claim to compel arbitration had accrued when the employer withdrew its recognition of the union. The district court also applied the same six-month statute of limitations to bar the union's breach of contract action. The union appeals, arguing (1) that our decision in Great Western to apply a six-month statute of limitations to suits to compel arbitration should not be applied retroactively, and (2) that the breach of contract claim should be controlled by Washington's six-year statute of limitations for actions based upon written contracts.

II

We are faced initially with a jurisdictional question. The employer argues that a federal district court does not have jurisdiction under section 301 over a labor organization representing a single member bargaining unit. The employer relies on language in section 301 which gives the district court jurisdiction over breach of contract actions between "an employer and a labor organization representing employees." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) (emphasis added). The employer argues that because the union allegedly represents only a single employee, section 301's jurisdictional grant is not applicable. We have, however, already implicitly rejected the employer's crabbed interpretation of section 301. See, e.g., John S. Griffith Construction Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 785 F.2d 706, 709 (9th Cir.1986) (Griffith ) (asserting jurisdiction over action even though bargaining unit contained no members at the time the action was filed); Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Beck Engineering & Surveying Co., 746 F.2d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1984) (Operating Engineers ) (asserting jurisdiction over section 301 action to recover benefits for a single employee bargaining unit). We now hold that a district court can exercise jurisdiction over an action brought under section 301 even though it involves a contract with a labor organization representing less than two employees.

The employer next argues that this is essentially a representational dispute over which the Board has primary jurisdiction. Even if we were to agree with the employer's categorization, the Board has twice refused to assert its jurisdiction. We have ruled that when an "injured party ... has no acceptable means to invoke the Board's jurisdiction," it is permissible for the district court to exercise jurisdiction, even though a dispute may involve a representation issue. Griffith, 785 F.2d at 711, quoting Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Kaufman & Broad, Inc., 707 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.1983). The single employee unit is precisely such a case. Operating Engineers, 746 F.2d at 565. Because of the Board's consistent refusal to exercise its primary jurisdiction over this case, the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 301(c) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(c).

III

There is no federal statute of limitations for actions to compel arbitration brought under section 301 of the LMRA. Where Congress has not enacted a limitation for a federal claim, our task is to "borrow" the most suitable limitations period from some other source. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (DelCostello ). In Great Western, we ruled that certain suits to compel arbitration should be governed by the six-month statute of limitations for actions brought under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b). 781 F.2d at 769. Our conclusion was based on the DelCostello analysis which applied the same six-month statute of limitations to a "hybrid" section 301/breach of the duty of fair representation action brought by an employee against his employer and union. See id. at 768-69, citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2295.

Great Western was decided nine months after the union filed the instant action. Prior to Great Western, we had borrowed the state statute of limitations for the state law claim that was most analogous to a federal action to compel arbitration. The union alleges that, if we did not apply Great Western retroactively, its action to compel arbitration would be timely under the most closely analogous state statute of limitations. The union does not contest the district court's finding that its claim was untimely under Great Western. Thus, the issue before us is whether Great Western should be applied retroactively to bar the union's claim to compel arbitration. Whether a decision should be applied retroactively is an issue of law we review de novo. Cf. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).

Whether we should apply Great Western retroactively should be determined in light of the three factors identified in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (Chevron ). First, we must determine whether Great Western established "a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (citations omitted). Second, we decide " 'whether the retrospective operation [of the new rule] will further or retard its operation.' " Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (citation omitted). Finally, we look to see whether retroactive operation of the rule will " 'produce substantial inequitable results.' " Id. (citation omitted).

Turning to the first factor of the Chevron test, it is clear that Great Western was foreshadowed. Twenty-two months before the instant action was filed, and thirty-one months before Great Western, the Supreme Court held in DelCostello that the section 10(b) six-month statute of limitations period was appropriate for "hybrid" section 301/duty of fair representation claims. While DelCostello did not involve a "pure" section 301 action to compel arbitration, the Court observed in a footnote that "even if this action were considered as arising solely under Sec. 301 ... the objections to use of state law and the availability of a well-suited limitations period in Sec. 10(b) would call for application of the [six-month statute of limitations]." Id. at 159 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2287 n. 12. Although dicta, this statement foreshadowed the abandonment of applying state statutes of limitations to section 301 suits to compel arbitration. Soon after DelCostello, the Third Circuit ruled in Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 736 F.2d 896 (3d Cir.1984) (Westinghouse ), that the statute of limitations of section 10(b) was appropriate for suits to compel arbitration. Westinghouse was decided on June 12, 1984, less than three months after the employer in this case unilaterally withdrew its recognition of the union. Despite the clear import of Westinghouse, the union waited over ten months to bring the instant action. We draw two conclusions from Westinghouse. First, the fact that both appellate courts that have considered this issue have come to the same conclusion strengthens our view that adoption of the six-month statute of limitations for arbitration suits was foreshadowed by DelCostello. Second, even if Great Western was not clearly foreshadowed, Westinghouse put the union on constructive notice that its prospective claim might be subject to the shorter six month statute of limitations. The union was not a helpless litigant which was ambushed by a sudden change in the law. Rather, the union...