Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
• Citation: Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 185 L. Ed. 2d 636, 569 U.S. 66 (2013)
• Decision Date: 16 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1059.,11–1059.
• Parties: GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners v. Laura SYMCZYK.

569 U.S. 66

133 S.Ct. 1523

185 L.Ed.2d 636

GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, et al., Petitioners

v.Laura SYMCZYK.

No. 11–1059.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Dec. 3, 2012.

Decided April 16, 2013.

Ronald J. Mann, New York, NY, for Petitioners.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Anthony A. Yang, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondent.

James N. Boudreau, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Michele H. Malloy, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Stephen A. Miller, Cozen O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, Ronald J. Mann, Counsel of Record, New York, NY, Christina M. Michael, Mitts Law, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioners.

Gary F. Lynch, Counsel of Record, Carlson Lynch LTD, New Castle, PA, Neal Kumar Katyal Washington, DC, Adina H. Rosenbaum, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, Stephen I. Vladeck, Washington, DC, Gerald D. Wells, III, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Jenkintown, PA, for Respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., provides that an employee may bring an action to recover damages for specified violations of the Act on behalf of himself and other " similarly situated" employees. We granted certiorari to resolve whether such a case is justiciable when the lone plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot. 567 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 26, 183 L.Ed.2d 674 (2012). We hold that it is not justiciable.

I

The FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract. Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), gives employees the right to bring a private cause of action on their own behalf and on behalf of "other employees similarly situated" for specified violations of the FLSA. A suit brought on behalf of other employees is known as a "collective action." See Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169–170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989).

In 2009, respondent, who was formerly employed by petitioners as a registered nurse at Pennypack Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint on behalf of herself and "all other persons similarly situated." App. 115–116. Respondent alleged that petitioners violated the FLSA by automatically deducting 30 minutes of time worked per shift for meal breaks for certain employees, even when the employees performed compensable work during those breaks. Respondent, who remained the sole plaintiff throughout these proceedings, sought statutory damages for the alleged violations.

When petitioners answered the complaint, they simultaneously served upon respondent an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The offer included $7,500 for alleged unpaid wages, in addition to "such reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses ... as the Court may determine." Id., at 77. Petitioners stipulated that if respondent did not accept the offer within 10 days after service, the offer would be deemed withdrawn.

After respondent failed to respond in the allotted time period, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioners argued that because they offered respondent complete relief on her individual damages claim, she no longer possessed a personal stake in the outcome of the suit, rendering the action moot. Respondent objected, arguing that petitioners were inappropriately attempting to "pick off" the named plaintiff before the collective-action process could unfold. Id., at 91.

The District Court found that it was undisputed that no other individuals had joined respondent's suit and that the Rule 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her individual claim. It concluded that petitioners' Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted respondent's suit, which it dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 656 F.3d 189 (C.A.3 2011). The court agreed that no other potential plaintiff had opted into the suit, that petitioners' offer fully satisfied respondent's individual claim, and that, under its precedents, whether or not such an offer is accepted, it generally moots a plaintiff's claim. Id., at 195. But the court nevertheless held that respondent's collective action was not moot. It explained that calculated attempts by some defendants to "pick off" named plaintiffs with strategic Rule 68 offers before certification could short circuit the process, and, thereby, frustrate the goals of collective actions. Id., at 196–198. The court determined that the case must be remanded in order to allow respondent to seek "conditional certification"¹ in the District Court.

If respondent were successful, the District Court was to relate the certification motion back to the date on which respondent filed her complaint.² Ibid.

II

Article III, § 2, of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies," which restricts the authority of federal courts to resolving " ‘the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies,’ " Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885) ). In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or " ‘personal stake,’ " in the outcome of the action. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2028, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) ). This requirement ensures that the Federal Judiciary confines itself to its constitutionally limited role of adjudicating actual and concrete disputes, the resolutions of which have direct consequences on the parties involved.

A corollary to this case-or-controversy requirement is that " ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’ " Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) ). If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a "personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit," at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–478, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the proceedings below, both courts concluded that petitioners' Rule 68 offer afforded respondent complete relief on—and thus mooted—her FLSA claim. See 656 F.3d, at 201 ; No. 09–5782, 2010 WL 2038676, *4 (E.D.Pa., May 19, 2010). Respondent now contends that these rulings were erroneous, because petitioners' Rule 68 offer lapsed without entry of judgment. Brief for Respondent 12–16. The United States, as amicus curiae, similarly urges the Court to hold that petitioners' unaccepted offer did not moot her FLSA claim and to affirm the Court of Appeals on this basis. Brief for United States 10–15.

While the Courts of Appeals disagree whether an unaccepted offer that fully satisfies a plaintiff's claim is sufficient to render the claim moot,³ we do not reach this question, or resolve the split, because the issue is not properly before us. The Third Circuit clearly held in this case that respondent's individual claim was moot. 656 F.3d, at 201. Acceptance of respondent's argument to the contrary now would alter the Court of Appeals' judgment, which is impermissible in the absence of a cross-petition from respondent. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 364, 114 S.Ct. 855, 127 L.Ed.2d 183 (1994) ; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 119, n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). Moreover, even if the cross-petition rule did not apply, respondent's waiver of the issue would still prevent us from reaching it. In the District Court, respondent conceded that "[a]n offer of complete relief will generally moot the [plaintiff's] claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation." App. 93; 2010 WL 2038676, at *4. Respondent made a similar concession in her brief to the Court of Appeals, see App. 193, and failed to raise the argument in her brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. We, therefore, assume, without deciding, that petitioners' Rule 68 offer mooted respondent's individual claim. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 34, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004).

III

We turn, then, to the question whether respondent's action remained justiciable based on the collective-action allegations in her complaint. A straightforward application of well-settled mootness principles compels our answer. In the absence of any claimant's opting in, respondent's suit became moot when her individual claim became moot, because she lacked any personal interest in representing others in this action. While the FLSA authorizes an aggrieved employee to bring an action on behalf of himself and "other employees similarly situated," 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the mere presence of collective-action allegations in the complaint cannot save the suit from mootness once the individual claim is satisfied.⁴ In order to avoid this outcome, respondent relies almost entirely upon cases that arose in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions, particularly United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) ; Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) ; and Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). But these cases are inapposite, both because Rule 23 actions are fundamentally...