Genest v. Odell Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1909
• Citation: 74 A. 593,75 N.H. 365
• Parties: GENEST v. ODELL MFG. CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

74 A. 593

75 N.H. 365

GENEST

v. ODELL MFG. CO.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Coos.

Nov. 2, 1909.

Transferred from Superior Court, Coos County; Chamberlin, Judge.

Action by Charles Genest, by his wife as next friend, against the Odell Manufacturing Company, tried with a suit in equity, brought by the defendant against plaintiff and his wife. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions sustained in part.

Case for personal injuries suffered by Charles Genest while employed in the defendants' mill. The plaintiff in interest was confined in the asylum for the insane when the suit was brought and at the time of the trial, and the action is prosecuted by his wife as next friend. The defendants pleaded a release and later filed a bill in equity against Genest and his wife, setting up the, release, and alleging fraud in the prosecution of the suit. The defendants' motion for separate trials of the cases was denied, and they excepted. A copy of the bill was then filed as an answer in the suit at law, and the defendants' motion that the issues thus raised be first determined was denied, subject to exception. The question of discretion was not reserved. The issues were all submitted to the jury, and there was a verdict for the plaintiff.

The evidence tended to prove that a trapdoor in the floor of the defendants' mill was left unguarded by those who opened it; that the place was not well lighted; that Genest had occasion to walk there, and while so doing, in the exercise of reasonable care, fell into the hole and was injured. The servant ill charge of those who opened the door knew that the defendants had given a general instruction to guard all dangerous openings, but he left this unguarded because he did not think a guard necessary under the circumstances. After the injury Genest suffered from insane delusions. There was evidence' that at about the time the release was taken he was "not right"; that he was "crazy"; that he was insane the day he brought the money home; that he was unable to sleep without drugs; that he saw ghosts and a big devil, and used holy water to drive these things away; and that he was not capable of settling intelligently a case for personal injuries. There was also evidence that his insanity consisted solely of delusions relating to the death of his son, and that he was capable of doing business. During the period covered by this conflicting evidence he executed a release for the sum of $63.60. His wife knew of the settlement and received the money from him, but understood it was only to pay for his time. The money had not been returned to the defendants, and the jury were instructed to deduct it from the damages assessed, if they found for the plaintiff.

The defendants' motions for a nonsuit and that a verdict be directed for them were denied, subject to exception. Subject to the defendants' exception, a witness testified that Dr. Dessaint, a witness called by the defendants, had pleaded guilty in the Berlin police court to a charge of intoxication.

Henry P. Hollis, Alexander Murchle, and Mr. Hollis, for plaintiff. Drew, Jordan, Shurtleff & Morris and Mr. Morris, for defendant.

PEASLEE, J. The defendants' exceptions to the procedure at the trial present no question of law. All the issues which the defendants make have been tried. The order in which they should be disposed of was to be determined by the presiding justice. It seemed to him that there should be but one trial. His decision of this question was final. Meloon v. Read, 73 N. H. 153, 59 Atl. 946; Owen v. Weston, 63 N. H. 599, 4 Atl. 801, 56 Am. Rep. 547. The question whether equity has jurisdiction on the issues of release, and fraud in bringing the suit, is not raised by the case. There was no ruling on that question. The ruling was that the issues raised by the bill in equity should not be tried first; that all the issues in the bill and suit at law should be tried together; and that they should be tried by a jury. That it is the practice in this state to submit issues of fact arising in suits in equity to the determination of a jury is not denied. State v. Saunders, 66 N. H. 39, 25 Atl. 588, 18 L. R. A. 646; Curtice v. Dixon, 73 N. H. 393, 62 Atl. 492. The contention seems to be that the issues were too numerous to be intelligently considered by a jury. The presiding justice found against the defendants on this proposition, and his conclusion is not open to review here. Mooar v. Mooar, 69 N. H. 643, 46 Atl. 1052, and authorities cited. The argument that, if these issues in personal damage suits against corporations are to be disposed of by juries, the defendants, will always lose, does not raise a question within the jurisdiction of this court. One duty owed to Genest as to transitory dangers was to provide suitable rules and regulations...