Genis v. Superintendent

• Decision Date: 08 October 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-300
• Parties: DOUGLAS JAMES GENIS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, SCI ALBION, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DOUGLAS JAMES GENIS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, SCI ALBION, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-300

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date: October 8, 2013

Judge Arthur J. Schwab

OPINION

I. Introduction

Before this Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, Douglas James Genis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). He is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed upon him by the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County on October 12, 2004. Petitioner raises a Sixth Amendment claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. He also claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated because the prosecution violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and because it introduced "false" evidence at his trial.

After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claims. Therefore, his petition will be denied. A certificate of appealability also will be denied.

II. Discussion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2003, Petitioner was charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County with numerous crimes relating to the sexual molestation of "B.B." She was age 12 and 13 at the timethe multiple incidents of abuse were alleged to have occurred and Petitioner was around age 32. Bruce Barrett, Esq., represented Petitioner at his trial. The state court subsequently summarized some of the evidence introduced at Petitioner's trial as follows:

B.B. was fourteen-years-old at the date of trial and testified to events that occurred during the two-years prior. N.T., 48:19-20; 55:9-16. She testified at trial that petitioner began molesting her on December 31, 2001 at his parent's house; kissing, hugging, touching her vagina over her clothing and compelling her to touch his penis. Id. at 55:9-16. Petitioner warned B.B. at that time that if she told anybody, he'd go to jail. Id. at 58:11-12. The molestation began with fondling and kissing, but by the end of February escalated to digital penetration of B.B.'s vagina. Id. at 61:20-21; 65:24-25. B.B. testified that the abuse occurred on a twice-monthly frequency during occasional weekend visits. During the spring of 2002, petitioner moved from his parent's home into a nearby trailer. Id. at 64:2-5. Here, B.B. testified that petitioner "tried to have sexual intercourse" with her and then performed cunnilingus. Id. at 65:14-15; 69-21-22. B.B. testified that no one else had penetrated her vagina. Id. at 150:9-13.

The abuse was occasioned by B.B.'s frequent overnight visits to petitioner throughout the spring and summer, and a one-week stay in the time shortly after B.B.'s birthday. Id. at 145:2-7. B.B. explained that she prayed that petitioner would stop, Id. at 101:16-21; but it was not until November of 2002 that she reported the abuse to her bus driver who, in turn, reported it to the school. Id. at 139:3-9; 140:22-24. On November 19, 2002, B.B. recorded her complaint on paper, writing "he stuck his finger in 'there' and he also did something he called 'eating out.'" Commonwealth's Trial Exhibit, 3; Id. at 138:1-8; 143:8-15. Melissa Caldwell, B.B.'s mother, testified that, despite her longstanding relationship with petitioner, B.B. had no contact with petitioner until November 2001. Id. at 153:24-25; 154:1-2. She permitted B.B.'s frequent overnight visits to petitioner [to] cultivate a "friendship." Id. at 155:10-14; 160:21-23; 161:1-3. And she indicated that B.B.'s visits were always alone. Id. at 155:15-18.

[Forensic Nurse Examiner Rhonda] Henderson gave testimony at trial that she conducted an "extensive genital exam." She testified that she treated B.B.['s] situation as a "chronic case" of abuse, Id. at 111:14-15, and looked for "evidence of scarring or injury ... subsequently healed since the actual crime." Id. at 110:5-6 And Henderson found what she set out to find. In communicating her findings to the jury, Henderson describes significant injury to B.B.'s genitals, including "transaction of a [ ]cutting, per se, to the hymeneal tissue ... one at three o'clock, one at nine o'clock." Id. at 115:19-2. Lastly, she observes, "there was also injury ... on the outside of the labia." Id. at 116:7-8. Henderson waxed on in great detail, using visual aids from the examination, See Commonwealth Exhibits 5-9, todescribe and demonstrate the "injuries" she observed in the victim. Id. at 109:1 et seq.

Finally, petitioner also testified on his own behalf collaborating the victim's statements regarding the nature of their relationship and dealings. While denying the actual sexual crimes, he otherwise gave considerable credence to B.B.'s testimony. Petitioner acknowledged that he and B.B. spent a great deal of time together between January and July of 2002. As he relates it, they spent time swimming, doing calligraphy and ceramics and frequently watching movies. Id. at 201:22-25; 202:1. B.B. stayed overnight on a regular basis between January and July of 2002 - at least twice a month on the weekends, and a full week during the summer. Id. at 190:2-3; 201:7-9. He admitted that B.B. slept in the same room as himself despite that other rooms were available. Id. at 194:10-17. Petitioner also sent B.B. birthday, Christmas and Valentine's Day cards and gifts on an on-going basis. Id. at 200:6-25; 201:1-6. Petitioner used and encouraged the use of pet names for each other (he calling her "beautiful" and she calling him "crazy" after a movie title), Id. at 214:20-25; 215:1-25, and frequently exchanged notes and emails with the victim. The notes were exploitive, if not manipulative, considering B.B.'s "crush" on petitioner. Id. at 211:4-16; 212:10-12; the language is more reminiscent of an adolescent romance than an individual seeking to cultivate a healthy father-daughter relationship as petitioner claimed. Id. at 217:5-10; 219:16-20. In one example, petitioner writes to B.B.: "I wish for just one moment you could be me just so you could know how much I love you." Id. at 219:16-19. Elsewhere he continues in the same vein: "[s]itting here telling you how much I love you would be telling something you know very well - not to mention what we feel when we're around each other or the lonlienss [sic] or how we make each other laugh or smile. There's so much more, I could fill this page." Id. at 217:5-10.

(RR¹ at 412-14 (italicized and bracketed text in original)).

On March 14, 2004, the jury found Petitioner guilty of five counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, twelve counts of indecent assault, five counts of aggravated indecent assault, and one count of corruption of minors. On October 12, 2004, the trial court imposed a sentence of 13-45 years of imprisonment.

Mark Stevens, Esq., represented Petitioner at his sentencing and on direct appeal, in which he raised claims not relevant to this proceeding. On November 16, 2005, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Petitioner's judgment of sentence. (RR at 72-81).

In August of 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for collateral relief pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (RR at 115-22). The PCRA court appointed Gary M. Alizzeo, Esq., to represent him, and Alizzeo filed an amended PCRA motion. (RR at 123-28). Petitioner claimed that his trial attorney, Barrett, provided him with ineffective assistance because he:

(1) failed to seek to quash the amended information that added five charges of a higher grade and degree;

(2) failed to seek to dismiss the information on the ground that its amendment was a denial of due process;

(3) failed to request an alibi instruction;

(4) failed to request a competency hearing on the victim outside the hearing of the jury;

(5) failed to object to the prosecutor presenting her personal opinion as to Petitioner's guilt during her closing argument; and,

(6) failed to impeach the victim witness with evidence of bias.

(RR at 130).

The PCRA court presided over an evidentiary hearing on January 2, 2008, at which Petitioner and Barrett testified. The PCRA court subsequently issued a Memorandum and Order in which it denied Petitioner's request for PCRA relief. (RR at 133-35). It held that Petitioner's first two claims of ineffectiveness were waived for failing to present evidence to support them. (RR at 131). It denied Petitioner's remaining claims for lack of merit. (RR at 131-42).

Petitioner, through Alizzeo, filed an appeal with the Superior Court in which he raised only one claim: that the PCRA court erred in denying his claim that Barrett was ineffective for failing to request an alibi instruction and failing to object to the trial court's omission of such an instruction. (RR at 144-59). The Superior Court denied that claim on the merits in a Memorandum it issued on December 2, 2008. (RR at 186-93).

In June of 2010, Petitioner filed a second PCRA motion in state court (RR at 231-39) pursuant 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi), which is "the provision of the state post-conviction relief act dealing with claims of innocence based on after discovered evidence." Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 123 (3d Cir. 2007). Subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi) provides that a state prisoner may obtain post-conviction relief if he demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that exculpatory evidence has become available that, if it had been available at trial, "would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced."

The PCRA court appointed Edward J. Hatheway, Esq., to represent Petitioner, and he filed a second amended PCRA motion on Petitioner's behalf in which it was alleged that newly discovered evidence had recently come to light that completely discredited the testimony that Nurse Henderson had given at Petitioner's trial. This new evidence, it was alleged, entitled Petitioner to relief under § 9543(a)(2)(vi). (RR at 273-92).

The PCRA court...