Genslinger v. New Illinois Athletic Club of Chicago

• Decision Date: 07 December 1928
• Docket Number: No. 18132.,18132.
• Citation: 163 N.E. 707,332 Ill. 316
• Parties: GENSLINGER v. NEW ILLINOIS ATHLETIC CLUB OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

332 Ill. 316

163 N.E. 707

GENSLINGER

v.NEW ILLINOIS ATHLETIC CLUB OF CHICAGO.

No. 18132.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 25, 1928.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 7, 1928.

Action by Elizabeth Jane Genslinger, as executrix of the will of Charles H. Genslinger, deceased, against the New Illinois Athletic Club of Chicago. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Cause transferred to the Appellate Court for the First District.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; David Brothers, judge.

Sims, Welch, Godman & Stransky, of Chicago (Franklin J. Stransky, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Hume & Kennedy, and Cutting, Moore & Sidley, all of Chicago (Charles S. Cutting and Frank L. Hume, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

DUNN, J.

This is an appeal taken directly to this court by the New Illinois Athletic Club of Chicago from a judgment for $194,600 recovered against it in the circuit court of Cook county by Elizabeth Jane Genslinger, as executrix of the will of Charles H. Genslinger, in an action on the case for the alleged conversion of 973 certificates of membership in the appellant. The appeal was taken to this court on the ground that questions of construction of sections 11 and 12 of article 6, section 22 of article 4, and section 29 of article 6 of the Constitution, are involved. A brief statement of facts is necessary to show how these questions of constitutional construction are supposed to arise.

The cause of action which is the basis of the judgment grew out of the transactions of the defendant and Charles H. Genslinger in his lifetime. The appellant, a corporation not for pecuniary profit, was incorporated on November 11, 1904, its object being the encouragement of physical culture and manly sports and the promotion of social intercourse among its members. Genslinger was one of the original incorporators and promoters of the club. He was its first secretary, and continued to be a life member until his death, on September 15, 1920. He participated actively in its organization, securing members, the purchase of a site for the club building and its erection, in pursuance of a contract with the club. He afterward brought a suit against the appellant in the municipal court of Chicago for the sum of $200,000. The appellant filed a bill to restrain him from prosecuting the suit and praying for an accounting. Genslinger filed an answer to the bill and a cross-bill praying for an accounting against the appellant. Upon a hearing a decree was rendered granting a part of the relief prayed for by the complainant, and dismissing Genslinger's cross-bill for want of equity. Genslinger appealed to the Appellate Court, where the decree was reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court, with directions to dismiss the bill for want of equity, to enter a decree in favor of Genslinger for $23,683.52, and to decree that the club be directed to issue to him 1,000 certificates of membership in the club. Upon the reinstatement of the cause in the circuit court, that court entered its decree in conformity with the mandate of the Appellate Court. The club issued these certificates as directed by the decree, and it is for the conversion of these certificates, except 27 which Genslinger had sold, that the present suit was prosecuted.

[1][2][3][4][5][6] The decree so entered was offered in evidence on the trial, and it is contended that the judgment of the Appellate Court was void, because that court was without jurisdiction to decide the facts upon the evidence contrary to the finding of the circuit court and direct the circuit court what decree it should enter, and that thereby the appellant was deprived of its property without due process of law. The Appellate Court had jurisdiction of the appeal and the parties. If it had jurisdiction to enter the order, its judgment was competent evidence in this case, and by its use the appellant could not have been deprived of its property without due process of law. If the Appellate Court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order, its judgment was void and of no binding effect on the parties, and its admission in evidence was merely an error in the progress of the trial. The trial of the cause was conducted according to the legal and usual method of procedure in actions on the case, and the judgment rendered by the court on such a trial is the result of due process of law, however erroneous or unjust the decision may be, if the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment which it did enter. The constitutional requirement of due process of law is not a guaranty that the courts shall not commit error in the trial of causes, or guarantee against erroneous and unjust decisions by courts which have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter. If errors are committed, or erroneous and unjust decisions are rendered, they may be corrected in the manner provided by law for the correction of such errors, but mere error in a judgment or decree does not deprive the losing party of the benefit of due process of law. Tarallo v. Hubbell Fertilizer Co., 281 Ill. 286, 117 N. E. 1001. “Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them; the question is, whether, in the case before a court, their action is judicial or extra-judicial; with or without the authority of law to render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant parties. If the law confers the power to render a judgment or decree, then the...