Genthner v. Wiley
| Decision Date | 14 February 1898 |
| Docket Number | 712.,628 |
| Citation | 85 F. 797 |
| Parties | GENTHNER v. WILEY. WILEY v. GENTHNER. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Edward S. Dodge, for William Otis Wiley.
Carver & Blodgett, for Philip J. Genthner.
The first libel was filed by Genthner, the owner of the barge Esopus, to recover for injuries to the barge, caused by the alleged defective condition of the dock of Wiley, the consignee of the cargo. The second libel was filed by Wiley against Genthner to recover the expense incurred by Wiley in pumping out the Esopus, and in placing her in the dock so that her cargo could be discharged, and she herself should cease to obstruct the dock. The injuries to the barge for which Genthner sought to recover in the first libel, and which prevented the barge from lying properly in the dock were alleged in the second libel to have been caused by the fault of Genthner's agents. Wiley prays in his libel that proceedings in the first libel be stayed until the stipulation required by rule 53 shall have been filed therein. Genthner contends that the libel of Wiley is not a cross libel within the meaning of that rule. The rule requires the respondent in a cross libel to give a stipulation for damages where the cross libel has been 'filed upon any counterclaim arising out of the same cause of action for which the original libel was filed. ' The words 'same cause of action' are, it must be admitted, somewhat ambiguous, and, if construed narrowly might exclude Wiley's libel. I think that they should be construed broadly, and as equivalent to 'same transaction, dispute, or subject-matter.' Vianello v Credit Lyonnais, 15 F. 637. The two libels before me were certainly filed upon claims arising out of the same subject-matter, to wit, certain injuries received by the barge. The injuries caused damage to both Genthner and Wiley and whichever of the two was at fault should pay for the damage. These libels were brought to fix the blame. In Refining Co. v. Funch, 66 F. 342, Judge Butler said that in the Eastern district of Pennsylvania rule 53 was not understood to apply to cases where the original libel was in personam, but the circuit court of appeals, in its opinion in the same case, ignored this practice, although it would have been applicable to the case before them. Refining Co. v. Funch, 73 F. 844. In Steamship Co. v. Hagar, 78 F. 642, Judge Butler himself says that 'the language...
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United Transportation & Lighterage Co. v. New York & Baltimore Transp. Line
...meaning the same transaction, dispute, or subject-matter which has been the cause of the action being brought.' See, also, Genthner v. Wiley (D.C.) 85 F. 797; Highland Light (D.C.) 88 F. 296. The first inquiry then is whether the demand set up in the cross-libel grows out of the same subjec......
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Morse Ironworks & Dry Dock Co. v. Luckenbach
...broad enough to cover all the cases where a cross-libel is filed and the application for security is within its provisions (Genthner v. Wiley (D.C.) 85 F. 797; The Light (D.C.) 88 F. 296). It is, however, left to the discretion of the court to see that no injustice is done in enforcing the ......
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Cudworth v. The St. Cuthbert, 7760.
...same transaction, dispute or subject matter. United Transp. & L. Co. v. New York & Baltimore Transp. Line, 2 Cir., 185 F. 386; Genthner v. Wiley, D.C., 85 F. 797. While this Court is of the opinion that Southwestern Transp. Co. v. Pittsburg Coal Co., supra, is distinguishable on the facts, ......
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The Highland Light
... ... for all purposes, so that the rights of both parties may be ... protected and finally adjudicated in one suit. Genthner ... v. Wiley, 85 F. 797 ... [88 F. 298.] ... The ... demand pleaded in the cross libel may be properly set up as a ... defense in ... ...