Gentry v. Deuth

• Decision Date: 31 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-6273.,05-6273.
• Citation: 456 F.3d 687
• Parties: Carrie GENTRY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Doris DEUTH, Warden, Kentucky Correctional Institute for Women, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

456 F.3d 687

Carrie GENTRY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Doris DEUTH, Warden, Kentucky Correctional Institute for Women, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 05-6273.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: May 31, 2006.

Decided and Filed: July 31, 2006.

ARGUED:

William Robert Long, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant. Timothy G. Arnold, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

William Robert Long, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant. Timothy G. Arnold, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BOGGS, Chief Judge.

This is a case in which the district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus after the petitioner had already been released from incarceration, but no party challenges that order. Instead, the respondent-appellant Commonwealth of Kentucky challenges the district court's subsequent order rendering the conditional writ absolute in response to the appellee's motion to enforce, on the grounds that the commonwealth had failed to comply with the district court's conditions. By the express terms of this order, the district court nullified the petitioner-appellee's criminal conviction so that she would not suffer any collateral consequences as a result of her felony conviction. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I

The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 28, 1999, Carrie Gentry met Brian Pettit at Ginger and Pickles, a bar in McCracken County, Kentucky. Both were drinking, though Gentry claims that she was much more sober than her new friend. Gentry agreed to drive Pettit, in his 1991 Ford Mustang, to her apartment. Upon arriving at her home, however, Pettit wished to continue listening to some new music that he had recently purchased, so Gentry agreed to keep driving so as not to wake her daughter who was asleep in the apartment. While driving, Gentry failed to negotiate a curve. The car crossed the center line, hit a bridge abutment, and flipped in the air. Both Pettit and Gentry were ejected from the vehicle. Pettit died at the scene.

Gentry was indicted by a grand jury for driving under the influence and manslaughter in the second degree. During trial, the Commonwealth introduced, over Gentry's objections, the testimony of five expert witnesses—state employees testifying as to Gentry's blood alcohol level and as to physical evidence in the car that pointed to her as having been the driver— via two-way closed-circuit television. Gentry was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. Gentry's appeals were denied at all levels, including the United States Supreme Court. Gentry v. Kentucky, 537 U.S. 981, 123 S.Ct. 450, 154 L.Ed.2d 343 (2002) (denying cert.).

Gentry filed the instant habeas petition on January 23, 2003. While her petition remained pending, she was released from prison in July 2003. The district court denied her habeas petition on March 18, 2004, holding that although the Commonwealth had violated Gentry's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights by employing the two-way closed-circuit system without good cause, the error had been harmless. Gentry then filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, and the district court subsequently changed its mind, holding that its prior harmless error analysis had been inadequate. The court conditionally granted a writ of habeas corpus "if the Commonwealth does not retry Gentry within ninety days of the entry of this judgment should appeal not be taken, or within ninety days of any final opinion on appeal that affirms this revisited decision should an appeal be taken by the respondent." The order was entered on the docket on May 21, 2004. Kentucky filed an appeal, but then dropped it voluntarily on July 14, 2004.

On January 27, 2005, Gentry filed a motion asking the district court to enforce its May 2004 judgment by voiding the Commonwealth's conviction so that she would not face any collateral consequences as a result of having been convicted of a felony. The district court granted this motion on July 21, 2005, converting the conditional grant of habeas into an absolute grant, and nullifying the conviction. The Commonwealth thereafter filed a timely appeal from that order.

II

We review a district court's disposition of a habeas petition de novo, and its findings of fact for clear error. Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir.1997). Questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir.2005). As this appeal is essentially predicated on a technical legal issue—whether the district court possessed jurisdiction over the motion to enforce and the authority to nullify the Commonwealth's conviction—we must apply de novo review.

A

The Commonwealth first argues that Gentry's January 2005 motion to enforce should be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that such a motion would have been untimely as it was filed eight months after entry of judgment. The state predicates this argument on its assertion that Gentry was asking for relief that she had not been previously granted—relief from collateral consequences of her felony conviction— and that such relief was extrinsic to the conditional writ. As such relief was ostensibly not granted by the district court's May 2004 order, the state thus suggests that Gentry was essentially asking the court to alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 59.

The Commonwealth is wrong. In her January 2005 motion, Gentry clearly asked the district court to enforce its May 2004 judgment, and she did not challenge or seek to amend that order. The district court issued its May 2004 order "conditionally granting [the writ] if the Commonwealth does not retry Gentry within ninety days of the entry of this judgment should not appeal be taken, or within ninety days of any final opinion on appeal that affirms this revisited decision should an appeal be taken by the respondent." The Commonwealth unquestionably failed to grant Gentry a new trial, and therefore it failed to abide by the condition that the district court had established. As there was no need to release Gentry from incarceration, the only action required was to expunge Gentry's record of her unconstitutional felony conviction. The Commonwealth took no such action. Gentry therefore filed her January 2005 motion asking for the essential relief contemplated by the conditional order, for the court's May 2004 order implicitly expected that the Commonwealth would vacate the prior judgment pursuant to seeking a new trial, and thus the Commonwealth's failure to seek a new trial effectively circumvented the district court's purpose. The motion was thus not filed pursuant to Civil Rule 59, and it was not untimely.

B

The Commonwealth next argues that the district court did not retain jurisdiction to hear this matter. Again, the Commonwealth is incorrect. In the first place, the sole distinction between a conditional and an absolute grant of the writ of habeas corpus is that the former lies latent unless and until the state fails to perform the established condition, at which time the writ springs to life. See Smith v. Lucas, 9 F.3d 359, 366-67 (5th Cir.1993); McQuillion v. Duncan, 253 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1134 (C.D.Cal.2003). District courts rightly favor conditional grants, which provide states with an opportunity to cure their constitutional errors, out of a proper concern for comity among the co-equal sovereigns. "[C]ourts may delay the release of a successful habeas petitioner in order to provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation found by the court." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987). Absolute grants are therefore generally limited to situations where the nature of the error is simply incurable. such as a conviction under an unconstitutional statute. See, e.g., Staley v. Jones, 108 F.Supp.2d 777, 788 (W.D.Mich.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 239 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.2001). Conditional grants of writs of habeas corpus are final orders, Phifer v. Warden, United States Pen., Terre Haute, Ind., 53 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir.1995), exactly like absolute grants, and they ordinarily and ideally operate automatically, that is, without the need for the district court to act further.

Nevertheless, district courts retain jurisdiction to execute a lawful judgment when it becomes necessary. "If the state complies with its order, the petitioner will not be released; if the state fails to comply with its order, release will occur. Ordinarily, the only task that remains for the district court is the execution of judgment." Ibid. "A federal district court retains jurisdiction to determine whether a party has complied with the terms of a conditional order in a habeas case. A state's failure to timely cure the error identified by a federal district court in its conditional habeas order justifies the release of the petitioner." Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, No. 03-71682-DT, 2005 WL 2704877, at *2, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25874, at *6 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 19, 2005) (internal citations omitted) (vacating petitioner's conviction), aff'd in part, 453 F.3d 362 (6th Cir.2006). See also Santos-Rosario v. Renico, 05-CV-70456, 2006 WL 847111, at *1-2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14074, at *3-4 (E.D.Mich. March 30, 2006) (denying writ even though the state failed to comply with the precise terms of the district court's conditions because the state had substantially complied with the conditions). On the other hand, when a state meets the terms of the habeas court's condition, thereby avoiding the writ's actual issuance, the habeas court does not retain any further jurisdiction over the matter. Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 490, 95 S.Ct. 1748, 44 L.Ed.2d 317...