Geor. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Hous. Hosp., Inc.
| Docket Number | A24A0424,A24A0425,A24A0662,A24A0664 |
| Decision Date | 27 June 2024 |
| Citation | 904 S.E.2d 70 |
| Parties | GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH v. HOUSTON HOSPITALS, INC. Coliseum Medical Center, LLC v. Houston Hospitals, Inc. Coliseum Medical Center, LLC v. The Medical Center of Peach County, Inc. Georgia Department of Community Health v. Medical Center of Peach County, Inc. et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Christopher Michael Carr, Margaret Kemmerly Eckrote, Jeffrey William Stump, Atlanta, Chelsea S. C. Harvey, Charles Thimmesch, for Appellant in A24A0424.
Jason Edward Bring, Atlanta, Michael G. Gray, Perry, for Appellee in A24A0424.
Christopher Michael Carr, Jeffrey William Stump, Atlanta, Kathlynn Butler Polvino, Andrew Bain McClintock, Chelsea S. C. Harvey, Charles Thimmesch, for Appellant in A24A0425.
Jason Edward Bring, Atlanta, for Appellee in A24A0425.
Kathlynn Butler Polvino, for Appellant in A24A0662.
Armando Luis Basarrate II, Elizabeth Murphy Kitchens, Grace Park Blood, Atlanta, Julia Hall Magda, Macon, Lawrence C. Collins, Byron, for Appellee in A24A0662.
Christopher Michael Carr, Margaret Kemmerly Eckrote, Jeffrey William Stump, Atlanta, Andrew Bain McClintock, Chelsea S. C. Harvey, Charles Thimmesch, for Appellant in A24A0664.
Armando Luis Basarrate II, Elizabeth Murphy Kitchens, Grace Park Blood, Atlanta, Julia Hall Magda, Macon, Lawrence C. Collins, Byron, for Appellee in A24A0664.
These appeals challenge two separate superior court orders reversing the Georgia Department of Community Health’s grant of a certificate of need allowing Coliseum Medical Center, LLC to build a freestanding emergency department. Because the superior courts correctly ruled that the Department had exceeded its authority in granting the certificate of need to Coliseum, we affirm their orders.
As detailed below, this is the second appearance of this matter before this court. See Dept. of Community Health v. Houston Hosps., 365 Ga. App. 751, 880 S.E.2d 245 (2022).
Coliseum applied to the Department for a certificate of need to build a freestanding emergency department in Houston County. The Department rendered an initial decision granting the application and issuing a certificate of need to Coliseum.
Several nearby hospitals, including Houston Hospitals, Inc. and the Medical Center of Peach County, Inc., appealed the decision to the Certificate of Need Appeal Panel, which is an independent agency. The Appeal Panel then assigned a hearing officer. After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer reversed the Department’s initial decision and denied Coliseum’s application for a certificate of need, finding, among other things, that there were numerous existing alternatives to the proposed freestanding emergency department and that the project would not have a positive relationship to the existing healthcare delivery system.
Coliseum and the Department then appealed to the Department’s commissioner. The commissioner reversed the hearing officer’s decision, modifying various findings of fact and granting the certificate of need to Coliseum.
Houston Hospitals sought judicial review of the commissioner’s decision in the Houston County Superior Court, and the Medical Center sought judicial review in the Peach County Superior Court. Both superior courts reversed the commissioner’s decision. Both courts held, among other things, that the commissioner exceeded his authority to review the hearing officer’s findings of fact. In modifying the hearing officer’s findings of fact, the superior courts held, the commissioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements that he state with particularity that such findings were not based on any competent substantial evidence.
Id. at 777 (V) (3), 880 S.E.2d 245. We vacated the superior court orders and remanded the cases with direction that both courts vacate the commissioner’s decision and remand the case to the Department for further consideration of Coliseum’s certificate of need application in a manner consistent with our opinion. Id. at 777-778 (V) (3), (VI), 880 S.E.2d 245.
On remand, the commissioner again reversed the hearing officer’s decision and approved Coliseum’s certificate of need request. Upon judicial review, both the Houston County Superior Court and the Peach County Superior Court reversed the commissioner’s remand decision, holding that the commissioner had again failed to follow the statutory requirements concerning review of the hearing officer’s findings of fact.
We granted applications for discretionary review of the two superior court orders, and these appeals followed. In Case Nos. A24A0424 and A24A0425, the Department and Coliseum, respectively, appeal from the Houston County order. And in Case Nos. A24A0662 and A24A0664, they appeal from the Peach County order.
The Department contends that the Houston County Superior Court erred in determining that the commissioner had improperly modified the hearing officer’s findings of fact. We disagree.
After our prior decision in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court issued its decision in Vantage Cancer Centers of Ga. v. Dept. of Community Health, 318 Ga. 361, 898 S.E.2d 462 (2024), explaining the commissioner’s limited authority over a hearing officer’s findings of fact in a contested certificate of need case.
[W]hen a case is contested, it is the hearing officer, rather than the agency, that is tasked with evaluating the evidence…. In contested [certificate of need] cases, after the Department’s staff makes its initialdecision, see OCGA § 31-6-43 (b), the hearing officer conducts the full evidentiary hearing de novo, see OCGA § 31-6-44 (f), and OCGA § 31-6-44 (a) provides that the purpose of a panel of hearing officers shall be to serve as a panel of independent hearing officers to review the department’s initial decision to grant or deny a certificate of need application. After the evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer, not the [c]ommissioner, evaluates the evidence and makes written findings of fact and conclusions of law. OCGA § 31-6-44 (i) …. [T]he [c]ommissioner plays no role in the evidentiary hearing under OCGA § 31-6-44[.]
Id. at 372 (2) (b), 898 S.E.2d 462 (punctuation omitted).
[1, 2] The commissioner, however, reviews the hearing officer’s decision on appeal, and in doing so, "OCGA § 31-6-44 (k) (1) requires the [c]ommissioner to accept the hearing officer’s findings of fact ‘unless the commissioner first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon any competent substantial evidence.' " Vantage, supra at 367 (2), 898 S.E.2d 462 (emphasis supplied). The term "competent substantial evidence"
refer[s] to evidence that is relevant such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support, a finding of fact, OCGA § 31-6-44.1 (a) (5), and that is admissible. Moreover, as the foregoing indicates, this standard is a deferential one that does not permit the [c]ommissioner to reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or substitute his judgment on factual issues for that of the hearing officer based on the [c]ommissioner’s expertise.
Id. at 373 (2) (b), 898 S.E.2d 462 (punctuation omitted). The "particularity" requirement means "that the [c]ommissioner must provide sufficient detail in his order from which a reviewing court can determine whether the [c]ommissioner has or has not improperly substituted his judgment for the findings of fact of the hearing officer." Id. at 374 (2) (c), 898 S.E.2d 462.
[3] In this case, the commissioner fully adopted 15 of the hearing officer’s findings of fact, but expressly modified 25 of his findings of fact. While the commissioner’s order initially recited the appropriate standard for such modifications — that the findings of fact were not based upon any competent substantial evidence — the commissioner did not apply the standard correctly. First, the commissioner did not find with particularity that the evidence cited by the hearing officer in support of his findings of fact was inadmissible and thus not competent. See Vantage, supra at 370 (2) (b), 898 S.E.2d 462 ().
Moreover, for each finding of fact that was modified, the commissioner recited the same reasoning that the finding was "unsupported by competent substantial evidence on the basis that a review of the full evidentiary record reveals evidence supporting different findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions." (Emphasis supplied). The commissioner then cited different evidence in the record to make modified findings of fact, which included findings directly conflicting with findings in the hearing officer’s order. For instance, the hearing officer relied on certain testimony and exhibits to find it "evident that service area residents already have abundant access to emergency services." Conversely, the commissioner cited different testimony to find that emergency services in the area "are not necessarily right sized for the community" and "the record supports a determination that existing [emergency departments] in the area are not providing sufficient access to...
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