George B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n of Mechanics, Mt. Hood Lodge, Local No. 1005, Auto Mechanics
| Decision Date | 29 December 1936 |
| Parties | GEO. B. WALLACE CO. et al. v. INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MECHANICS, MT. HOOD LODGE, LOCAL NO. 1005, AUTO MECHANICS, et al. [*] |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
In Banc.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; James W. Crawford Judge.
Separate suits by Geo. B. Wallace Company, by A. B. Smith Chevrolet Company, and by Wentworth & Irwin, Incorporated, against the International Association of Mechanics, Mount Hood Lodge Local No. 1005, Auto Mechanics, and others, which were consolidated for hearing in the lower court and on appeal. From adverse decrees, the defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded to lower court, with direction to retain jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief if subsequently warranted.
B. A. Green and K. C. Tanner, both of Portland (Green, Tanner & Boesen, of Portland, on the brief), for appellants.
R. M. Burley, of Portland, for respondent Geo. B. Wallace Co.
Maurice W. Seitz, of Portland, for respondent A. B. Smith Chevrolet Co.
Will H. Masters, of Portland, for respondent Wentworth & Irwin.
These three suits-which were consolidated for hearing in the lower court and on this appeal-were commenced by plaintiffs to enjoin defendant officers of Mt. Hood Lodge Local No. 1005 from picketing their places of business in the city of Portland. The plaintiffs are engaged in the sale, servicing, and repairing of automobiles. On May 11, 1936, defendants called a strike of union automobile mechanics in the city of Portland and proceeded forthwith to picket various places of business engaged in the repairing of automobiles. From a decree enjoining picketing in each of the above cases, the defendants appeal.
It appears from the uncontradicted evidence that A. B. Smith Chevrolet has 32 mechanics employed to service and repair new automobiles; that no employee was a member of any labor union and had no desire to become such; that the employees were satisfied and no dispute existed between them and their employer over wages, hours, or working conditions; that no employee responded to the call to strike; and that the plaintiff maintained what he said was an "open shop" and did not discriminate against union labor.
On the day following the strike, the defendants caused one picket to patrol in front of the Chevrolet Company's place of business on Thirteenth street and one to patrol on Couch street, each bearing a banner, "Strike On, Unfair to Auto Mechanics' Local No. 1005, A. F. & L." After suit was started, that part of the banner having the words, "Strike On," was folded under so as not to be visible. There is no contention that the picketing involved violence. There was evidence, however, that some unknown persons across the street were listing the license numbers of automobiles of customers who came to plaintiff's place of business.
It further appears from the uncontradicted evidence that the Chevrolet Company paid its mechanics under the piece-work system, i. e., that the employee received 40 per cent. of the standardized charge of $2 an hour made to the public and that the average pay to an employee under such basis was $160 to $165 a month. Under this plan, the customer was quoted a price in advance and the length of time required to do the job was immaterial. Of course, the pay of the employee depended somewhat upon the speed with which he worked. The average mechanic under such basis would earn 80 cents an hour. A slow worker would earn less than 80 cents an hour and the speedy one would earn in excess of such rate. No extra pay was allowed for overtime and the standard work week was 5 1/2 days of 8 hours a day, or 44 hours.
The standard fixed by the union was on the basis of 40 hours a week at the rate of 90 cents an hour, with extra pay for overtime. Under the union scale, the employee would receive $156 a month and additional pay if overtime work were done.
Plaintiffs-respondents assert that the variance from the union standards affords no basis for a labor controversy and that the real objective is the unionization of their shops. The defendants, on the other hand, deny that the picketing was conducted to compel plaintiffs to operate a "closed shop" and assert that the standards maintained by plaintiffs tend to undermine and defeat the cause of organized labor. Defendants urge that the hourly wage system best promotes the general welfare of the laboring man.
The facts in the Wentworth & Irwin case, so far as the application of the law is concerned, are not materially different from those in the Chevrolet Company case. In the Geo. B. Wallace Company case the facts are to be differentiated in that some of the employees were members of the union and there is evidence tending to show that a majority of the employees "seemed to prefer to work by the hour rather than on the percentage basis." Furthermore, four of the employees of the Wallace Company went out on call of the strike.
The defendant-appellants urge that, under and by virtue of chapter 355, Oregon Laws for 1933 (page 559), they are immune from an injunctive order or decree in that a "labor dispute" existed within the meaning of the act and that the picketing was conducted "without fraud or violence and/or intimidation." The plaintiffs contend that, under a proper construction of the above act, no "labor dispute" was involved and hence the act has no application. Plaintiffs further contend that if the act is construed as being applicable, it is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' contention that no labor controversy is involved within the meaning of the act is based upon the fact that there was no immediate dispute between employer and employee. It is also urged in reference to the Wallace Co. case that the evidence discloses violence and intimidation.
It will thus be seen that the decision hinges primarily upon the construction and constitutionality of the legislative enactment of 1933. The act in question is entitled "An Act Declaring the public policy of the state of Oregon regarding the relationship of employers and workmen, and defining and limiting the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in relation thereto." Section 1 provides in substance that no court shall issue any injunction in a case "involving or growing out of a labor dispute," except in strict conformity with the provisions of the act.
Section 2 thus declares the public policy of the state: "Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in a corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of this state hereby are enacted,"-and admonishes courts to interpret the act in accordance with such declaration of public policy.
Section 3 purports to invalidate what are commonly known as "Yellow Dog Contracts." Since such contracts are not in issue, the provisions of this section will not be set forth.
Section 4 deprives courts of the power to issue an injunction in any case "involving or growing out of any labor dispute" and specifically immunizes from injunction certain acts whether done singly or in concert, among which are (subdivision 5): "Giving publicity to the existence of, or facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patroling or by any other method not involving fraud or violence and/or intimidation." Note: It will be observed that courts are not precluded from granting equitable relief where fraud, violence or intimidation is involved.
Sections 5 and 6-not material to issues involved.
Sections 7-12, inclusive, pertain to the procedure in the lower court and on appeal where injunctive relief is sought.
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