George Beavers v. Charles Haubert No 354 George Beavers v. Charles Haubert No 355

• Decision Date: 17 April 1905
• Docket Number: Nos. 354,355,s. 354
• Citation: 198 U.S. 77,49 L.Ed. 950,25 S.Ct. 573
• Parties: GEORGE W. BEAVERS, Appt. , v. CHARLES J. HAUBERT, United States Marshal, etc. NO 354. GEORGE W. BEAVERS, Appt. , v. CHARLES J. HAUBERT, United States Marshal, etc. NO 355
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

198 U.S. 77

25 S.Ct. 573

49 L.Ed. 950

GEORGE W. BEAVERS, Appt.,

v CHARLES J. HAUBERT, United States Marshal, etc. NO 354. GEORGE W. BEAVERS, Appt., v. CHARLES J. HAUBERT, United States Marshal, etc. NO 355.

Nos. 354, 355.

Argued February 23, 1905.

Decided April 17, 1905,

These cases were submitted together. No. 354 is an appeal from an order and judgment of the district court of the eastern district of New York, in habeas corpus, remanding to the custody of appellee. No 355 is an appeal from an order of the United States circuit court for the same district, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus arising out of the same proceedings as No. 354. The same questions of law are presented, and we need not further distinguish the cases.

The arrest from which appellant prayed to be discharged was made upon a commitment and warrant in proceedings to remove him to the District of Columbia, to be tried upon an indictment there found against him. He attacks the commitment and warrant as not being due process of law, in that the commissioner who issued them had no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings against him, or to require bail, or in default thereof to commit him to await the order of the district judge, because indictments were pending against him in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of New York. The contention is that while the indictments were so pending he could not be removed to another jurisdiction.

The facts are as follows: On the 16th of July, 1903, two indictments were found against appellant in the eastern district of New York, charging him with violations of §§ 1781 and 1782 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1212), and on the 25th of July, 1903, another indictment was found against him in the same district for the violation of § 1781.

On the 3d of September, 1903, a bench warrant was issued on the indictments and proceedings instituted against him on the indictment of July 25, 1903. A warrant of removal was issued by the district judge of the southern district of New York, and subsequently an order was entered by the circuit court, directing appellant to surrender himself to the United States marshal for said district, and in pursuance thereof the appellant did so, and entered into a recognizance before one of the district judges for said district in the penal sum of $10,000 for his appearance in the circuit court for the eastern district at the next regular term.

On the 1st of June, 1904, he appeared in said court, in pursuance of the notice from the United States district at- torney, for the purpose of pleading to the indictments. On the 7th of June, a continuance having been granted, he moved to quash the indictment on affidavits and other papers properly served on the district attorney. On the 8th he appeared before the circuit court, 'prepared to move upon and plead to the said indictments.' Thereupon the district attorney refused to proceed further with the indictments, but stated his intention to institute proceedings for the removal of appellant to the District of Columbia, under the indictments found against him there. The court thereupon continued the proceedings until the 13th of June, 1904, from time to time thereafter, until the date of the petition herein, and enlarged him from day to day upon his recognizance, which is still in full force. On the 8th of June, 1904, he was arrested upon the warrant now in question. The indictments have not been quashed or nolle prossed, and the appellant is ready to plead thereto if the motions submitted in respect thereto be overruled.

The petitioner alleges that the only evidence adduced by the government was a certified copy of the indictment, which, it is alleged, constituted no proof, but was incompetent and inadmissible because it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime, and because it appeared from the testimony of the witnesses on whose testimony it was found and who were called before the commissioner that there was no probable cause to believe he was guilty of any offense against the United States, and whatever strength the indictment possessed was rebutted by such evidence.

Messrs. William M. Seabrry and Bankson T. Morgan for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 79-83 intentionally omitted] Assistant Attorney GeneralPurdy for appellee.

Mr. Justice McKenna, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court:

It will be observed that indictments were found against appellant in the eastern district of New York. He was then living in the city of New York, which is in the southern district. He was removed from the latter, by removal proceedings, to the former for trial, and, having been called upon to plead to the indictments, he made certain motions in respect thereto. The district attorney, however, announced an intention not to proceed further with the prosecution, and announced further that he intended to prosecute proceedings to remove appellant to the District of Columbia for trial. This was done, and with the consent of the court. It is stated in Judge Thomas's opinion that the circuit court 'deferred the hearing of the motions pending the hearing before the commissioner, for the purpose of allowing the warrant to be served upon the defendant (petitioner), and to permit the proceedings to continue before the commissioner.'

The appellant contends, nevertheless, that the commissioner had no power to issue warrants, and relies on two propositions:

(1) The proceedings were void because they were an unlawful interference with the jurisdiction of the circuit court for the eastern district of New York, in the custody of which he was.

(2) The proceedings were a violation of appellant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial by jury upon such indictments.

(1) In support of the first proposition is urged the principle 'that where jurisdiction has attached to person or thing, it is—unless there is some provision to the contrary exclusive in effect until it has wrought its function.' Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370, 21 L. ed. 287, 290. But this is primarily the right of the court or sovereignty, and has its most striking examples in cases of extradition. The cited case shows that whatever right a party may have is not a constitutional right. The question in the case was the effect on the bail of a defendant given to a state of the action of its governor sending him out of the state under extradition proceedings. It was held that his bail was exonerated. The court said: 'It is the settled law of this class of cases that the bail will be exonerated where the performance of the condition is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of the law.' And the act of the governor of a state yielding to the requisition of the governor of another state was decided to be the act of the law. It was further said: 'In such cases the governor acts in his official character, and represents the sovereignty of the state in giving efficacy to the Constitution of the United States and the law of Congress. If he refuse there is no means of compulsion. But if he act, and the fugitive is surrendered, the state whence he is removed can no longer require his appearance before her tribunals, and all obligations which she has taken to secure that result thereupon at once, ipso facto, lose their binding effect.'

This case establishes that the sovereignty where jurisdiction first attaches may yield it, and that the implied custody of a defendant by his sureties cannot prevent. They may, however, claim exemption from further liability to produce him.

There is nothing in Re Johnson, 167 U. S. 120, 42 L. ed. 103, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735, which militates against this view. Indeed, that it is the right of the court or sovereignty to insist upon or waive its jurisdiction is there decided. Page 126, L. ed. page 105, Sup. Ct. Rep. page 737. In Cosgrove v. Winney [174 U. S. 64, 43 L. ed. 897, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598], Cosgrove was brought into this country from Canada under a treaty which confined action against him to the very offense for which he was surrendered, until he should have an opportunity of returning. His subsequent arrest for a nonextraditable offense was held to be a violation of the process under which he was brought into the United States, and therefore illegal.

The circuit court, as we have seen in the case at bar, consented to the removal of the appellant, and we are not called upon to decide whether the government had the right of election, without such consent, to proceed in New York or the District of Columbia.

(2) Undoubtedly a defendant is entitled to a speedy trial and by a jury of the district where it is alleged the...