George G., In re
Decision Date | 01 September 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 1317,1317 |
Citation | 64 Md.App. 70,494 A.2d 247 |
Parties | In re GEORGE G. , |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, Baltimore, on brief), for appellant.
Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Kurt L. Schmoke, State's Atty., and Cornelia Bright, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on brief), for appellee.
Submitted before BISHOP, ALPERT and BLOOM, JJ.
The issues presented by this appeal are: (1) whether the trial judge should have recused himself after presiding at the trials of appellant's co-defendants; and (2) whether the court lacked the authority to mandate the terms of appellant's confinement to the Maryland Training School for Boys.
Appellant, a juvenile, brings this appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Appellant was found delinquent by that court in connection with the rape of a young girl in appellant's apartment building. Appellant allegedly engaged in the rape accompanied by six other males, five of whom engaged in sexual relations with the victim. During the course of appellant's trial, appellant did not deny the incident but asserted that the young lady in question consented to the activity.
Appellant was tried in late May, 1984, by the same judge who, just three weeks earlier, heard the withdrawn admissions and subsequent bench trials of three of appellant's six co-respondents. The judge found these respondents delinquent. At trial appellant's counsel, pointing to the trial judge's prior adjudication of the co-defendants, requested that the judge recuse himself with respect to appellant's bench trial. This request was refused.
On appeal, appellant contests the propriety of this refusal. He argues that this case is analogous to one where a judge hears prior damaging facts made in connection with a guilty plea and then when the plea is withdrawn the same judge attempts to hear the defendant's trial on the merits. We observe that under Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(5) this is not permitted. If a guilty plea is withdrawn, the same judge may not hear the subsequent trials if requested to recuse himself. See Brent v. State, 63 Md.App. 197, 492 A.2d 637 (1985).
Appellant also relies upon our decision in Mason v. State, 12 Md.App. 655, 280 A.2d 753 cert. denied, 263 Md. 717 (1971), which alludes to a distinction between a court and jury trial. In Mason, the defendant, although tried by a jury, argued that the trial judge who had earlier heard the nolo contendere plea of a co-defendant and presided at the trial of another co-defendant ought to recuse himself from the defendant's trial. In disagreeing, we noted that the prior adjudications "were beside the point, since [the trial judge] was not acting as a fact finder upon the appellant's case but was simply presiding over the presentation of that case to a jury." Id. at 683 (emphasis added). See also Silbert v. State, 12 Md.App. 516, 537-38, 280 A.2d 55 cert. denied, 263 Md. 720 (1971). There we decided that a motion to disqualify the trial judge was properly denied where, in earlier cases, although ruling on questions of law and the admissibility of evidence, "[t]he judge had made no ruling ... involving the substantive question of guilt or innocence." Id. at 537. Holding that a judge who was to preside over a jury trial need not recuse himself merely because he presided over an earlier trial which ended in a hung jury in McFadden v. State, 42 Md.App. 720, 402 A.2d 1310 (1979), we reasoned that "[h]e was not the fact finder and was not, therefore, in a position to be influenced by any testimony which he had heard on an earlier occasion." Id. at 729, 402 A.2d 1310.
At first blush, our decision in Carey v. State, 43 Md.App. 246, 405 A.2d 293, cert. denied, 286 Md. 744 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1660, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980) appears to be dispositive of the issue in the case sub judice. We held in Carey that a judge hearing a bench trial need not recuse himself "merely because he had found appellant's co-defendants guilty in a prior non-jury trial." Id. 43 Md.App. at 249, 405 A.2d 293. While we rejected a per se rule requiring recusal, we observed that a judge may be required to recuse himself where he was prejudiced toward or biased against a defendant. Our holding in Carey appears to be in accord with many jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 2939, 64 L.Ed.2d 822 (1980); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 636-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir.1976) (), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1107, 97 S.Ct. 1140, 51 L.Ed.2d 560 (1977); United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2nd Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1609, 29 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971); In Re Richard W., 91 Cal.App.3d 960, 968, 155 Cal.Rptr. 11 (1979) ( ); Jones v. State, 416 N.E.2d 880 (Ind.App.1981). Contra People v. Zappacosta, 77 A.D.2d 928, 431 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1980).
In Carey we recognized the "assumed proposition that 'judges are men of discernment, learned and experienced in the law and capable of evaluating the materiality of evidence.' " Id. 43 Md.App. at 249, 405 A.2d 293 (quoting State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547, 550, 267 A.2d 190 (1970)). We believe, however, that "there nonetheless do exist those times when, to protect the defendant's and the public's right to a fair trial, and to ensure that the trial judge's impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned, the judge must remove himself from sitting as the trier of fact in the defendant's criminal trial." Brent, 63 Md.App. at 205-206, 492 A.2d 637. Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(5) seems to be a recognition by the Court of Appeals that such times do exist. Id. at 205, 492 A.2d 637.
This reasoning is fortified by Mason, Silbert and McFadden, where we perceive a subtle recognition that there may be times when a judge, as a fact finder, may unwittingly be influenced by some previous exposure to the facts of the case. We believe that may have occurred in the instant case. In fairness to the appellant and the trial judge, we set out in full the colloquy that ensued concerning the recusal motion.
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