George Martin & Martin Custom Homes, LLC v. Camas Cnty.

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BURDICK, Justice.
• Citation: George Martin & Martin Custom Homes, LLC v. Camas Cnty., 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (Idaho 2011)
• Decision Date: 17 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 36605.,36605.
• Parties: George MARTIN and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CAMAS COUNTY, Idaho, by and through the duly elected BOARD of COMMISSIONERS in their official capacity, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman, Defendants–Respondents.

150 Idaho 508

248 P.3d 1243

George MARTIN and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.CAMAS COUNTY, Idaho, by and through the duly elected BOARD of COMMISSIONERS in their official capacity, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman, Defendants–Respondents.

No. 36605.

Supreme Court of Idaho. Boise, January 2011 Term.

Feb. 17, 2011.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 2011.

The Simms Law Firm, Hailey, for appellants. Christopher P. Simms argued.

Moore, Smith, Buxton and Turcke Chtd., Boise, for respondents. Paul J. Fitzer argued.

BURDICK, Justice.

This case comes before this Court from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Camas County, on the basis that George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC (collectively "Martin"), lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against Camas County to challenge the validity of various planning and zoning ordinances and regulations. Martin argues that the district court committed prejudicial error in failing to take judicial notice of orders entered in a related case (CV–2007–24) challenging substantially identical amended zoning ordinances, wherein the district court found that Martin had standing. Martin also argues that the district court erred in finding that Martin lacked standing where Martin owned, or held interests in, properties that were either rezoned or adjacent to properties which were rezoned, cumulatively having a negative fiscal impact on Martin. We affirm, holding that Martin has failed to show a distinct palpable injury.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. CV–2007–24 (currently awaiting hearing before this Court as Case No. 36055–2009)

In late 2005 the Camas County Board of Commissioners ("the Board") instructed the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission ("the Commission") to amend the Camas County Zoning Ordinance and rezone certain areas of the county. The Commission submitted an Amended Comprehensive Plan (Resolution 96) with an amended Land Use Map (Resolution 103) and an Amended Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance 153) with an amended Zoning Map (Ordinance 150) (collectively, the "2007 zoning amendments") to the Board, which subsequently adopted them. On May 4, 2007, Martin filed a declaratory judgment action against Camas County, seeking a permanent injunction of the 2007 zoning amendments.

On December 28, 2007, the district court granted preliminary injunctive relief to Martin. The district court found, inter alia, that: (1) the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) applied to Camas County's zoning decisions; (2) the action of the County—in enacting the 2007 zoning amendments—constituted a quasi-judicial, rather than quasi- legislative, activity and was not immune from judicial review; and (3) the County failed to maintain a transcribable verbatim record, as required by I.C. § 67–6536. On March 10, 2008, the district court amended the previously entered injunction to also prohibit the County from proceeding under the zoning ordinances that had preceded Ordinance 153. On April 2, 2008, the court entered a separate order of preliminary injunction on the basis that conflicts of interest existed at both the planning and zoning and county commissioner levels, in violation of I.C. § 67–6506.

On May 12, 2008, the Board adopted a new Amended Comprehensive Plan (Resolution 114) and Land Use Map (Resolution 115) as well as a new Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance 157) and a Zoning Designation Map (Ordinance 158) (collectively the "2008 zoning amendments"). On August 8, 2008, Martin requested to amend his complaint to include claims for damages under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and an additional declaratory relief action for the 2008 zoning amendments. On October 8, 2008, the district court granted Martin's request to amend his complaint to include Section 1983 claims, but denied the motion as to the 2008 zoning amendments.

On November 5, 2008, Camas County removed CV–2007–24 to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho ("USDCDI"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b), 1446(b), divesting the district court of jurisdiction. On December 3, 2008, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Following Trial granting Martin's requested relief as to the 2007 zoning amendments. On May 17, 2009, the USDCDI remanded CV–2007–24 back to the district court. On May 27, 2009, the district court recognized that it had been divested of jurisdiction prior to entering its order on December 3, 2008, and was not re-vested until the USDCDI issued an order of remand. The district court accordingly reissued its December 3 order on May 27, 2009.

B. CV–2008–40 (the present matter, before this Court as Case No. 36605–2009)

On October 15, 2008, Martin filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, seeking both preliminary and permanent injunctions of the 2008 zoning amendments. The district court denied the preliminary injunction on November 10, 2008, finding that Martin had not shown that he had suffered or would suffer irreparable injury in the event that the court did not enter the injunction. Camas County filed a motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2009, which the district court granted on May 6, 2009, finding that Martin lacked standing to bring a complaint for declaratory judgment. Martin filed his notice of appeal with this Court on June 15, 2009.

The parties stipulated before the district court that Martin owned the following property in Camas County:

(1) A forty acre parcel that was zoned as Agricultural ("A")—allowing one residential unit per eighty acres—both before and after the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments.¹

(2) A twenty-nine acre parcel that was zoned A prior to the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments, and zoned Residential ("R1")—allowing one residential unit per acre—after.

(3) A one acre parcel consisting of three lots in an existing, approved and platted subdivision, which was zoned as Agricultural Transitional ("AT")—allowing one residential unit per acre—prior to the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments and zoned R1, allowing the same residential density, after.

However, since the time of that stipulation Martin has sold the one acre parcel located in the platted subdivision. At oral argument before this Court counsel for Martin notified this Court for the first time that Martin no longer owns the twenty-nine acre parcel. Best practice is to notify this Court in writing, in a timely fashion, when changes that may affect justiciability occur in the factual circumstances of a case. As it stands now, Martin owns only the forty acre parcel in fee simple which was zoned A both before and after the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments; however, the parcel's designation on the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map was changed from AT to A.

In addition to the property that Martin owns in fee simple, Martin holds contractual interests in the following:

(1) Two eighty acre parcels in which Martin holds contractual rights for development, marketing and building. The northern parcel's zoning designation did not change with the 2008 zoning amendments; the southern parcel was rezoned from A to R1.

(2) A sixty-seven acre parcel to which Martin holds the right of first refusal was rezoned from A to R1.

These three properties were given an "R7" designation (allowing seven residential units per acre) on the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map prior to the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments, and an R1 designation afterward.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As noted in Castorena v. General Electric:

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is the same as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. This Court exercises free review over questions of law.

149 Idaho 609, 613, 238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010) (quoting Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45, 218 P.3d 388, 389 (2009) ). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of proving the absence of material facts, but the non-moving party cannot rest upon mere allegations and denials. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The non-moving party must set forth specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Martin argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Camas County because it incorrectly determined that Martin lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment action seeking to question the validity of the 2008 zoning amendments. Martin contends that: (1) the district court erred in not taking judicial notice of the orders entered in Case No. CV–2007–24, and if the court had taken judicial notice of these orders, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would have prevented the court from reaching the issue of standing; (2) Martin owned property intended for development that was rezoned as a result of the 2008 zoning amendments, and property adjacent to Martin's property was also rezoned, resulting in a negative fiscal impact on Martin, and as such the district court erred in finding that Martin failed to demonstrate a specific and personal injury and, consequently, did not have standing. These issues shall be addressed in turn.

A. Standing is a jurisdictional issue, not an adjudicative fact that a court may take judicial notice of.

Martin argues that the district court was required to take judicial notice of the orders entered in CV–2007–24, under I.R.E. 201. Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 is titled "Judicial notice of adjudicative facts" and provides, inter alia:

(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of

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