George Pierce Company v. Wells Fargo Company

Decision Date08 December 1913
Docket NumberNo. 14,14
PartiesGEORGE N. PIERCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Alfred L. Becker, William B. Hoyt, George E. Hamilton, John W. Yerkes,John J. Hamilton, and Maurice C. Spratt. for petitioner.

Messrs. Charles W. Pierson, William, W. Green, L. A. Doherty, and Charles W. Stockton for respondent.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This action was begun in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of New York, to recover $20,000 for the loss of certain automobiles, shipped for the petitioner, hereinafter called the automobile company, by the respondent, hereinafter called the express company. The automobiles were shipped under circumstances to be detailed later, and the recovery of their value was sought for a breach of the contract to carry safely; failure to deliver according to the contract; for negligence; and for breach of the duty imposed upon the initial carrier by § 20 of the act to regulate commerce [24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104], the Carmack amendment (act of June 29, 1906, chap. 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 584, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8592). The automobiles were shipped and receipt was issued in the form usually used by the express companies, and containing the clause, 'Nor in any event shall said company be held liable beyond the sum of fifty dollars, at not exceeding which sum the said property is hereby valued, unless a different value is hereinabove stated.' The receipt is in the form of the one shown in Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. ed. 314, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, and is identical in form with the one involved in the case of Wells, F. & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co. 227 U. S. 469, 57 L. ed. 600, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267.

At the trial, the tariff book of the express company was marked for identification, but does not appear to have been embodied in the record. Counsel for the petitioner has, since the argument, filed a memorandum in explanation of the tariffs of the express company, and giving extracts therefrom, from which it appears that the rate for uncrated automobiles is double the merchandise rate, and that a through rate could be made by combination of rates from the point of shipment to the basing point, thence to destination. The rates filed, according to the memorandum, show merchandise rate from Chicago, as a basing point, to Buffalo, whence the goods were shipped, and shows merchandise rate, California section, page 20, from Chicago to San Francisco, and double the merchandise rate from Chicago to Buffalo, Chicago to San Francisco, would be $26.50 per hundred pounds, or, using Kansas City as a basing point, taking the rates from Kansas City to Buffalo, Kansas City to San Francisco, the doubled rate would be the same amount per hundred pounds; also a valuation tariff, showing an additional charge for value in excess of $50, on rate of $8 per hundred pounds or over, 20 cents per hundred pounds, and, as the memorandum shows, if the value of the shipment may be taken to be $15,487.06, the rate for that sum in excess of $50 would be $31.

The automobile company was engaged in Buffalo in the manufacture, sale, and shipment of automobiles. It had frequently made use of the services of the express company, knew its course of business, had a copy of its tariffs and a book of its express receipts, and was familiar with the same; that is, it knew of the filed rate based upon weight or volume and the primary statement of value and consequent limitation upon the right to recover, as well as of the existence of a right to declare additional value, and secure, in case of loss, an additional amount of recovery. Indeed, the automobile company had frequently resorted to the method of making a declaration of increased value in order to secure an increased amount of recovery under the tariff.

In May, 1907, the automobile company requested the express company to furnish an express car for the shipment of a carload of automobiles to San Francisco. Negotiations followed between the officers of the two companies and an understanding was reached. An express car was furnished and put, as requested by the automobile company, upon a side track, where it could be by that company conveniently loaded. Four automobiles were then moved by their own power to the place of loading, and, together with an extra automobile body and other automobile parts, were loaded in the car by the shipper. When the car was loaded, triplicate receipts on the form usually used by the express company were made out and handed to the agent of the automobile company, who read them, observed the absence of declaration of value and the limitation of $50, and said they were satisfactory. Before the shipment moved, the agent of the express company again called the attention of the agent of the shipper to the absence of declared valuation, inquired whether such declaration had been intentionally omitted and whether the property was insured, and was told that the omission was intentional and that the property was insured. Indeed, it was shown beyond dispute that the failure to declare an additional value was the result of a change in the method of shipping its goods which had been shortly before put in practice by the automobile company, and that in this particular case the additional value was not declared because the shipment had been ordered from San Francisco, and the primary rate, that is, the one shown by the tariff on weight or volume, based upon the primary value, had been designated from San Francisco as the rate under which the goods should be carried. The car moved toward its destination, but never reached there because, while in transit on the rails of the Santa Fe Railway in the state of Missouri, it was destroyed by fire.

This suit was then brought by the automobile company against the express company and the Santa Fe Railway to recover $20,000, the alleged value of the automobiles. The suit as to the Santa Fe Railway was dismissed for want of service, and the case was tried only against the express company. As the case went to the jury, there was no denial of some liability on the part of the express company, the issue being whether its responsibility was limited to the sum of $50, the value of the automobiles as stated in the shipping receipt, which was in accordance with the published and filed tariff, or embraced the actual value of the things shipped. The trial court sustained the limitation in the receipt and directed a verdict for the $50 only, and after the affirmance by the circuit court of appeals of the second circuit of the judgment of the trial court, entered on such instructed verdict (110 C. C. A. 645, 189 Fed. 561),...

To continue reading

Request your trial
86 cases
  • Donovan v. Sells Fargo & Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 1 Giugno 1915
    ...any and all shippers, so that such a rate can therefore in no view constitute a preferential rate or a rebate. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278, 35 Sup. Ct. 351, 59 L. Ed. —. Indeed, this identical certain knowledge on the part of the carrier's agent of the actual value of th......
  • Cicardi Brothers Fruit & Produce Company v. Pennsylvania Company
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 6 Maggio 1919
    ... ... Mo. 440; Griffin v. Railroad, 115 Mo.App. 549; ... Geo. M. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S ... 278. (10) The defendant is not in ... ...
  • Donovan v. Wells Fargo & Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 1 Giugno 1915
    ...of the carrier's agent of the actual value of the article shipped was present in the very late case of George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278, 59 L.Ed. 576, 35 S.Ct. 351. There shipment consisted of a car load of automobiles. These were released by a limited-liability contr......
  • Florida East Coast Railway v. City of West Palm Beach, No. 00-14434
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 27 Settembre 2001
    ...Commerce Act. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 749 (1931) (citations omitted). See also George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1915); ICC v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 275-77 (1892). In particular, Congress sought to eliminate the pre......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT