George v. Ashland-Warren, Inc.
Decision Date | 14 March 1985 |
Docket Number | INC,No. 41440,ASHLAND-WARRE,41440 |
Citation | 326 S.E.2d 744,254 Ga. 95 |
Parties | GEORGE et al. v. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Claude R. Ross, Thomas C. Blaska, Charles C. Clay, Ross & Blaska, P.C., Atlanta, for Dorothy N. George, et al.
Paul Webb, Jr., Webb & Daniel, Atlanta, for Ashland-Warren, Inc. HILL, Chief Justice.
While working as a project engineer for the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) on a road construction project, Joe Allen George was struck and killed by a piece of earth-moving equipment owned and operated by Ashland-Warren, Inc., the general contractor on the project. His widow recovered workers' compensation benefits from DOT, which was in turn reimbursed by Ashland-Warren pursuant to an indemnification and hold harmless clause in the construction contract. His widow then brought a wrongful death action against Ashland-Warren. Ashland-Warren's motion for summary judgment was granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals pretermitted the question of whether Ashland-Warren's contractual obligation to reimburse DOT resulted in immunity from tort liability, and ruled that the provisions of OCGA § 34-9-11 afforded Ashland-Warren immunity as a co-employee of the deceased. George v. Ashland-Warren, 171 Ga.App. 556, 320 S.E.2d 586 (1984). We granted certiorari to determine whether Ashland-Warren is an "employee" within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-11.
1. OCGA § 34-9-11 provides that "The rights and remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death; provided, however, that no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tortfeasor, other than an employee of the same employer...." Assuming without deciding that DOT had the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work, and that Ashland-Warren was therefore an "employee" of DOT (rather than an independent contractor) under the common law, as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that a corporation is not an "employee" within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-11 because the term "employee" as used in OCGA § 34-9-11 refers only to individuals and does not protect corporations. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the intent as well as the wording of the workers' compensation statute.
"Employee" is defined in OCGA § 34-9-1(2) as meaning "every person in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship...." Ashland-Warren is not "in the service" of DOT under a contract of "hire or apprenticeship." Moreover, the major purpose for defining "employee" in OCGA § 34-9-1(2) is to establish who is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. No one would contend that a corporation is an "employee" entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits. Likewise, we hold that a corporation is not an "employee" entitled to immunity under OCGA § 34-9-11. That is to say, we find that when the General Assembly used the word "employee" in OCGA § 34-9-11, it intended to refer to an individual as it did in OCGA § 34-9-1(2).
2. Having determined that Ashland-Warren is not entitled to immunity as a co-employee of the deceased, we proceed to the second question, pretermitted by the Court of Appeals, which is whether Ashland-Warren is immune to suit in tort by virtue of its indemnification of DOT. Again, the scope of OCGA § 34-9-11 is at issue, for that section also provides tort immunity to "any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers' compensation benefits to an injured employee...." This provision was intended to provide tort immunity to workers' compensation insurers. See OCGA § 34-9-1(3). The workers' compensation act generally is to be liberally construed in favor of...
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