Georgejakakis v. Wheeling Steel Corp.
| Decision Date | 01 June 1949 |
| Docket Number | 31636. |
| Citation | 86 N.E.2d 594,151 Ohio St. 458 |
| Parties | GEORGEJAKAKIS v. WHEELING STEEL CORPORATION. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
A person employed in and about an industrial plant, who departs from the sphere of his employment and is injured while deliberately and without authority or necessity engaging in a pursuit wholly foreign to the duties he was hired to perform does not sustain an injury in the course of and arising out of his employment which is compensable under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Belmont County.
Steve Georgejakakis was a long-time employee of the Martins Ferry Ohio, works of the Wheeling Steel Corporation, which corporation is a self-insurer under the provisions of Section 1465-69, General Code. Georgejakakis was a common laborer whose principal duties consisted of transporting materials in and about the plant and sweeping floors.
On the early morning of March 7, 1942, Georgejakakis was engaged in transporting metal rings turned out by a pressing machine. During the temporary absence of the operator of the machine from his duties, Georgejakakis upon his own initiative without any apparent authority and for a reason which is obscure, attempted to operate the pressing machine. In his doing so the fingers of his left hand got caught in the machinery and were so mutilated as to necessitate amputation.
The evidence indicates that some degree of skill and proficiency was required to operate a pressing machine. It appears that only those who had had preliminary training were entrusted with this work.
Georgejakakis filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commission of Ohio on account of the described injury. His claim was denied upon original hearing and upon rehearing, and an appeal was then taken to the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont county.
Trial of the cause was had before the court and a jury, and at the conclusion of all the evidence the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was sustained, and judgment for the defendant followed.
An Appeal to the Court of Appeals resulted in an affirmance of the judgment and the matter is presently in this court for disposition on the merits pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Thomas F. Joseph, Martins Ferry, for appellant.
Kinder & Kinder, Martins Ferry, for appellee.
The unfortunate claimant herein suffered a disabling injury in an industrial accident, but was it an injury sustained under such conditions and circumstances as to justify or support an award of compensation?
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio in its existing form, a compensable injury is one which is received in the course of and arises out of the employment. Section 1465-68, General Code. If an injury is not sustained in the course of employment and does not arise out of it, no compensation is allowable.
Here, the claimant was a laborer whose duties in and about the industrial plant where he was injured were limited in scope. When he voluntarily, deliberately and without authority or necessity stepped out of the orbit of his employment by attempting to operate the pressing machine--an undertaking altogether foreign to the work he was hired to do--he engaged in a pursuit and exposed himself to a hazard not contemplated by his employment as a laborer. His behavior constituted a material deviation and departure from his assigned tasks.
In our opinion, the instant case is distinguishable on its facts from those cases involving a slight or inconsequential departure from the course of employment. See Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Henry, 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194; Tinsman Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573; Bernier v. Greenville Mills, Inc., 93 N.H. 165, 37 A.2d 5; Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 1947, 613.
Upon the undisputed evidence, therefore, the claimant did not sustain an injury in the course of and arising out of his employment within the meaning of those terms as defined and applied in numerous decisions of this court.
For example, see Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, Atty. Genl., 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104; Industrial Commission v. Ahern, 119 Ohio St. 41, 162 N.E. 272, 59 A.L.R. 367; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Lewis, 125 Ohio St. 296, 181 N.E. 136; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Bateman, 126 Ohio St. 279, 185 N.E. 50; Ashbrook v. Industrial Commission, 136 Ohio St. 115, 24 N.E.2d 33; Eagle v. Industrial Commission, 146 Ohio St. 1, 63 N.E.2d 439. Compare 58 American Jurisprudence, 721, 738, 743, Sections 212, 231, 238.
A number of recent cases, factually similar to the one before us, hold that where an employee voluntarily and of his own motion exposes himself to risks patently outside of and beyond the course of his regular employment, and without the knowledge or acquiescence of his employer, and sustains an injury, such injury is not compensable. See Morgan v. City of Guntersville, 239 Ala. 669, 196 So. 877; Kensington Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 385 Ill. 504, 53 N.E.2d 395; Willette's Case, 135 Me. 254, 194 A. 540; Holloway v. Ideal Seating Co., 313 Mich. 267, 21 N.W.2d 125; Simon v. Standard Oil Co., 150 Neb. 799, 36 N.W.2d 102; Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 185 Tenn. 169, 204 S.W.2d 87.
It is plain from the evidence that Georgejakakis was injured outside the sphere of his employment; not through an act which he improperly or unauthorizedly did within such sphere. A marked distinction exists between the two situations. See Laudato v. Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co., 135 Ohio St. 127, 19 N.E.2d 898. Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation, 123 et seq.
This court has held that where an employee is injured in the performance of a voluntary act not approved by or known to his employer and wholly removed from the duties of his employment, such injury does not arise out of the employment and is not compensable. See Highway Oil Co. v. State ex rel. Bricker, Atty. Genl., 130 Ohio St. 175, 198 N.E. 276.
We, of course, recognize and approve the principle that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of an injured employee, but such liberal construction may not be extended to comprehend a case where the facts clearly show, as here, that at the time and place of injury the employee was designedly engaged in an unauthorized venture in no way connected with or causally related to the work he was hired to carry on.
It must be remembered, too, that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not and is not intended to afford the protection and coverage of a general accident insurance policy.
For the reasons given the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
The majority opinion holds that the injuries to claimant did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. It seems to me that his injuries unquestionably arose in the course of his employment.
Rules of common-law liability, originally applicable to the relationship of employer and employee, do not obtain in modern workmen's compensation law. The latter abrogates common-law defenses and imposes liability without fault. Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 422, 44 S.Ct. 153, 154, 68 L.Ed. 366, 369, 30 A.L.R. 532. In the case last cited the court said:
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