Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel

Decision Date17 October 1983
Docket NumberNo. 81-7485,81-7485
Citation716 F.2d 1565
Parties13 Ed. Law Rep. 609 GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF RETARDED CITIZENS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross- Appellants, v. Dr. Charles McDANIEL, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.

Fisher & Phillips, Griffin B. Bell, Jr., Ruth W. Woodling, Atlanta, Ga., for Savannah Chatham Bd. of Educ.

Jonathan A. Zimring, Atlanta, Ga., Rose Firestein, Ga. Legal Service Program, Savannah, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before HILL and VANCE, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge:

In this controversy, we are asked to determine whether plaintiff Russell Caine, a profoundly mentally retarded child, and members of the certified class are entitled, under applicable federal statutes and regulations, to more than 180 days of public education in Georgia each year upon a showing of need. Plaintiffs contend, and the district court found, 511 F.Supp. 1263, that the defendants refused as a matter of policy to consider or provide such education in all cases. The court also determined that this policy results in regression in the training of profoundly and severely mentally retarded children. We conclude that the district court's findings are supported by the record and that the refusal to consider or provide year round educational programs is contrary to the defendants' obligations under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act and Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to provide a free public education serving each handicapped child's particular needs.

I. Background

Defendants, comprising the Georgia Superintendent of Schools, the Georgia State Board of Education and that Board's individual members ("state defendants"), and the Superintendent of the Savannah-Chatham School System, the Savannah-Chatham Board of Education and its individual members ("local defendants"), appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia enjoining the policy by which the defendants do not consider or provide more than 180 days of education for profoundly and mentally retarded ("PSMR") children. Defendants challenge the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs, who are Russell Caine, a PSMR child, his parents, L. Douglas and Virginia Caine, the Georgia Association of Retarded Citizens ("GARC") 1 and two classes composed of (1) all handicapped school aged children in Georgia who are mentally retarded and require more than 180 days of public school programming and (2) the parents and guardians of these children, cross-appeal from the district court's order failing to reach a determination of specific need for Russell Caine and other individual PSMR children. The plaintiffs also challenge the lack of specificity of the district court's injunction.

In early 1978, the Caines appealed the decision of the Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education denying their son placement in a full year educational program. Russell Caine, nine years old at the time this suit was filed, had a mental age of two. As with most other PSMR children, he required training in basic living skills, including walking, feeding, and toilet use. On April 18, 1978, an administrative hearing was held before the Chatham County Hearing Review Board, affirming the School Board's decision. An appeal to the State Board of Education in May, 1978, similarly produced an adverse ruling. The Caines filed this action in November, 1978, challenging the Board's decision under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act ("the Act" or "the Handicapped Act"), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 et seq., Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Sec. 504"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and under the Georgia Constitution and the Adequate Program for Education in Georgia Act, Georgia Code Annotated Sec. 32-601a et seq.

In June, 1979, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and class certification. The district court determined that plaintiffs did not show irreparable injury and that it would not be in the public interest to grant a preliminary injunction. The court certified two separate classes of plaintiffs. The first class is composed of "all handicapped children of school age in the state of Georgia who are mentally retarded, and who because of their special needs, require more than 180 days of public school programming of special education and related services." The second class is composed of all parents or guardians of all children in the first class.

The case was tried on the merits without a jury during the summer of 1980. The district court rendered its opinion on April 2, 1981, granting an injunction against the challenged policy but refusing to require specific educational placement for any of the children. After oral argument on appeal, we received briefs from the parties assessing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 173, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). We then solicited the parties' views on the procedural appropriateness of an apparent attack by a private party on the state plan brought under 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2) as a challenge to an individualized education program. We also requested advice from the Secretary of Education on his role in such a suit and entertained a brief from the United States as amicus curiae. We first outline the Handicapped Act's mandates, the primary statute under which this suit was brought, as interpreted by Rowley, so as to be on firm footing in addressing the procedural questions we posed to counsel. We next turn to the substance of the defendant's contentions on appeal, and lastly to the issues presented on cross appeal.

II. The Handicapped Act

Congress intended, by adopting the Handicapped Act, to encourage and assist the provision of a free and appropriate education by the states to all handicapped children. The Act was passed in response to Congress' perception that most handicapped children in the nation "were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in the regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 'drop out'." House of Representatives Report No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975). The Act is a model of "cooperative federalism" in that it offers funds in exchange for the acceptance of certain standards for the education of handicapped children. This case arises from the proper interpretation and application of those standards.

An analysis of the Act must be bottomed on the central role states play in educating their citizens. The Supreme Court has recognized that:

No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, we observed that local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence'.

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3125, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). (Cites omitted). See also San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 19 (1973).

Yet a state's responsibility for providing education is bounded by certain congressionally developed concerns once the state accepts federal financial assistance under the Act. Federal delimitations upon state educational programs for the handicapped reflect two core principles: first, that each handicapped child's education must be carefully crafted to meet that child's individual needs so that the child may benefit from his or her education; and second, that states must adopt extensive due process procedures to insure that substantive individual needs are met. The statutory requirement of an "appropriate" education draws its content from these principles.

The central requirement a state receiving federal funds under the Handicapped Act faces is to effect a "policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1). The Act plainly provides that such an education must be uniquely suited to each handicapped child's needs. The Act defines free appropriate public education as:

Special Education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the state educational agency, (C) include an appropriate pre-school, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under Sec. 1414(a)(5) of this title.

20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(18) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Act defines "special education" as a program of instruction which is "specially designed ... to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(16) (emphasis added). "Related services" are "such developmental, corrective and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services ...) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education ..." 20 U.S.C....

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