Georgia Dept. of Human Resources v. Nash

• Decision Date: 30 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-8120,88-8120
• Parties: GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Georgia Department of Human Resources, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Jessie C. NASH, Defendant-Appellee, National Federation of the Blind, Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1482

915 F.2d 1482

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Georgia Department of

Human Resources, Division of Vocational

Rehabilitation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. Jessie C. NASH, Defendant-Appellee, National Federation of the Blind, Intervenor.

No. 88-8120.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 30, 1990.

William M. Droze, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for state.

William J. Cole, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.

Stroud P. Stacy, Atlanta, Ga., for Nash.

Peggy Pinder, Grinnell, Iowa, for intervenor--National Federation of the Blind.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, CLARK, Circuit Judge, and RYSKAMP ^*, District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

This case involves an issue of statutory interpretation under the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act (Act). The district court below interpreted the statute to provide a blind vendor with an action for damages against a State licensing agency based on that agency's failure to complain when a federal entity closed a vending stand located on property under its control. Following that interpretation, the district court upheld an award of compensatory damages to the blind vendor made by an arbitration panel convened under the Act. The State licensing agency appeals this decision. We hold that the district court has misinterpreted the statute and therefore reverse its decision.

I.

Congress enacted the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act in 1936 to "provid[e] blind persons with remunerative employment, enlarg[e] the economic opportunities of the blind, and stimulat[e] the blind to greater efforts in striving to make themselves self-supporting." Ch. 638, 49 Stat. 1559, 1559 (1936) (codified at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 107(a) (1982)). The Act authorized blind persons "to operate vending facilities in any Federal building." Id. As amended in 1954 and 1974, the Act requires that "departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the United States" managing federal property make available space for a vending facility and give priority in operating those facilities to licensed blind persons. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 107(b) (1982). ¹

Under section 107(b), the Secretary of Education must "prescribe regulations designed to assure that ... the priority ... is given." The regulations now in effect require the managers of federal property to make vending facilities available to blind vendors "wherever feasible, in light of appropriate space and potential patronage." 34 C.F.R. Sec. 395.30(a) (1988). The Act also establishes procedures for placing blind vendors in such facilities: the Secretary designates state agencies to license and train blind vendors; once the state agency licenses vendors, they become eligible for employment at available vending facilities. See 20 U.S.C. Secs. 107a, 107b; see also 34 C.F.R. 395.2-.7, .11. In addition, federal property managers establish new vending facilities and contact the state agencies to run them. The agencies then assign licensed blind vendors to these new locations. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 107a; 34 C.F.R. Secs. 395.7, .16. The vendors remain licensees of the state and earn income from the facilities' profits.

The Act provides a set of remedial procedures in section 107d-1. ² Under section Instead, section 107d-1(b) gives the "State licensing agency" (and not the blind licensee) ⁵ a right to complain when a case involves action by "any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States that has control of the maintenance, operation, and protection of Federal property"--such as the United States Marine Corps in the present case. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 107d-1(b). Under this provision, "[w]henever" the State licensing agency determines that the federal entity at issue "is failing to comply with the provisions of this chapter or any regulations issued thereunder," the state agency "may file a complaint with the Secretary who shall convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute." Id. (emphasis added).

                107d-1(a), a blind licensee "who is dissatisfied with any action arising from the operation or administration of the vending facility program" is entitled to "a full evidentiary hearing" before the state agency.  20 U.S.C. Sec. 107d-1(a).  If the blind licensee remains "dissatisfied with any action taken or decision rendered as a result of such hearing," then the licensee may file a complaint with the Secretary who must convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute.  Id.  The section thus guarantees the blind licensee a full evidentiary hearing and an arbitration proceeding if the licensee is "dissatisfied" (for any reason) with "any action arising from the operation or administration" of the program. 3   This guarantee, however, applies only to grievances concerning actions by state licensing agencies. 4   Section 107d-1(a) provides no direct grievance procedure for a vendor who is dissatisfied with action by a federal entity
                

The present case involves an issue of interpretation under this statute. The blind vendor involved in this case has attempted to fashion a cause of action under the statute that would provide her with compensatory damages against the state agency based on that agency's failure to complain about action by a federal entity. ⁶ Both the arbitration panel convened by the Secretary under section 107d-1(a) and the district court have, under two different interpretations of the statute, allowed the vendor to proceed. We hold that this cause

of action is inconsistent both with the Act's express language and its remedial structure. After presenting the case's facts and procedural history, we discuss the cause of action.

II.

In October 1973, the United States Marine Corps contacted the Georgia Department of Human Resources (GDHR) ⁷--the state licensing agency designated to administer Georgia's vending facility program--about placing blind vendors on a Marine base in Albany, Georgia. The Marines and the GDHR arranged for blind vendors licensed through the GDHR to operate four vending facilities on the base. The GDHR gave one of the facilities to a blind woman named Jessie C. Nash, who had applied to participate in the GDHR's vending facility program. In September 1975, the GDHR requested the Marines to terminate the license for the facility because of continuing financial losses. The Marines agreed to do so. The following summer, Nash was reassigned to another vending facility on the base. As Nash was informed, however, this assignment was only temporary: the Marines wanted to include the facility in a package deal with a single contractor who would provide hot-food services on the entire base.

In the fall of 1976, the Marines officially began their search for a single hot-food-service contractor and informed the GDHR that the package would in fact include Nash's facility. The GDHR indicated that it wanted to retain Nash's facility although it did not want to bid for the hot-food contract. In January 1977, the Marines notified the GDHR of their decision to award the hot-food contract to a private firm and gave notice of their intention to close the remaining vending facilities on the base, including Nash's.

Following termination of her facility, Nash took action under the Act and requested a hearing before the GDHR pursuant to section 107d-1(a). ⁸ The GDHR's hearing officer, however, dismissed Nash's request for a hearing. He held that the GDHR lacked jurisdiction over the Marines and thus could not provide Nash with the relief she sought--an order requiring the Marines to cancel their contract with the private food contractor and reinstate Nash's facility.

Pursuant to section 107d-1(a), Nash filed a complaint with the Secretary in May 1977, requesting him to convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute. In August, the Secretary informed Nash that, because the GDHR had not provided Nash an evidentiary hearing, the Secretary could not convene an arbitration panel. Instead, the Secretary required the GDHR to hold an evidentiary hearing and address whatever issues were within its jurisdiction.

A few months later, the GDHR held the hearing. At the hearing, Nash argued that the GDHR had a duty under section 107d-1(b) to protest the Marines' decision to eliminate the blind vending facilities on the base. In October 1977, the hearing officer again dismissed Nash's claim for relief, holding that the GDHR had committed no violation in failing to file a complaint against the Marines under section 107d-1(b).

In December 1977, Nash filed a second complaint with the Secretary pursuant to section 107d-1(a), naming the Department of Defense as a defendant as well. The Secretary dismissed the Department of Defense and finally convened an arbitration panel, which held hearings in October and December of 1979. The panel issued its The GDHR brought an action in the district court against the Secretary ⁹ and Nash seeking judicial review of the panel's decision pursuant to section 107d-2(a) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-06 (1988). On review, the district court held that section 107d-1(b) "requires the agency to pursue a licensed blind vendor's grievance when his rights are arguably being jeopardized by the Federal agency's actions." See Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Bell, 528 F.Supp. 17, 24 (N.D.Ga.1981). ¹⁰ The district court thus affirmed the arbitration panel's decision and remanded the case to the panel for a determination of the damages amount. The court also retained jurisdiction to enforce the award. In an order dated April 16, 1982, the court subsequently amended its holding. Striking out the above-quoted passage, the court instead stated that "section 107d-1(b) gives the state licensing agency discretion to determine whether to file a complaint with the Secretary." "Nevertheless," the court concluded (without discussion), "the state licensing...