Georgia Kraft Co., Woodkraft Div. v. Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, Local Union 246 (AFL-CIO)

• Decision Date: 14 March 1984
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,67113,67114,Nos. 67111,67112,s. 67111
• Citation: Georgia Kraft Co., Woodkraft Div. v. Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, Local Union 246 (AFL-CIO), 317 S.E.2d 602, 170 Ga.App. 581 (Ga. App. 1984)
• Parties: GEORGIA KRAFT COMPANY, WOODKRAFT DIVISION v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 246 () et al.; LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 246 () et al. v. GEORGIA KRAFT COMPANY, WOODKRAFT DIVISION.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 602

317 S.E.2d 602

170 Ga.App. 581

GEORGIA KRAFT COMPANY, WOODKRAFT DIVISION v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL UNION

246 (AFL-CIO) et al.;

LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL UNION

246 (AFL-CIO) et al. v. GEORGIA KRAFT COMPANY, WOODKRAFT DIVISION.

Nos. 67111, 67112, 67113, 67114.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 14, 1984.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1984.

Certiorari Denied May 17, 1984.

Frank Love, Jr., Jeffrey W. Kelley, Atlanta, for Georgia Kraft Co., Woodkraft Div.

Theodore T. Green, Robert J. Connerton, Washington, D.C., for Laborers' Intern. Union of North America, Local Union 246 (AFL-CIO).

B. Randall Blackwood, Columbus, for Tommy Williams, & Local 246.

Martha F.M. Chewning, Pine Mountain, for Guy Tipton.

Harold D. Corlew, Atlanta, for Laborers' Dist. Council of Georgia & South Carolina & Richard Barnes.

POPE, Judge.

Plaintiff Georgia Kraft Company, Woodkraft Division (Georgia Kraft) was struck by Laborers' International Union of North America, Local Union 246 (AFL-CIO) (Local 246) in November and December of 1979. During the strike several incidents of violence and vandalism involving property of non-striking employees and Georgia Kraft property occurred. During the strike, Georgia Kraft sought and was granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting illegal strike activity. At the conclusion of the strike, Georgia Kraft pursued its action for damages for tortious interference with business for allegedly illegal strike activity against Local 246 and its affiliated district council and international union, certain named union officials, as well as twenty-one individual members of the local union; later, these individual local union members were voluntarily dismissed. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Georgia Kraft in the amount of $263,166 against the individual union officials, Tommy Williams, Guy Tipton and Richard Barnes; the jury found in favor of each of the unions. After trial, the court set aside the verdict as to Williams, Tipton, and Barnes for lack of jurisdiction and venue. Georgia Kraft now appeals, as do each of the defendants by cross-appeal. We will consider first the main appeal.

1. In enumerations 5, 6, 7 and 8 Georgia Kraft argues the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding prior adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in violation of the court's order in limine excluding such evidence; in allowing into evidence separation notices for workers fired for alleged strike misconduct; in allowing testimony regarding back-pay for such workers; and in allowing into evidence statements of Georgia Kraft labor policy at plants other than the Greenville, Georgia plant which was struck. Georgia Kraft argues that all such evidence was irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendants committed the tort of interference with business.

We first note that the record does not show that the defendants were allowed to introduce evidence of prior determinations of the NLRB. In its order in limine, the court ruled inadmissible any ruling or adjudication by the NLRB. In a few instances, witnesses made voluntary reference to the NLRB ordering Georgia Kraft to take workers back; objections were made each time. The court sustained the objections and instructed the jury to disregard the remarks. Since the court ruled in favor of Georgia Kraft and gave cautionary instructions to the jury, this ground presents no question for review by this court. See Graham v. State, 147 Ga.App. 202(1), 248 S.E.2d 332 (1978); Harper v. Nu-Air Mfg. Co., 107 Ga.App. 4(1), 128 S.E.2d 554 (1962).

As to the other issues, separation notices, back-pay, and labor policy at other Georgia Kraft plants, we cannot say that these matters were totally irrelevant to the issues being tried. Georgia Kraft alleged that the unions and union officials conspired and acted to illegally interfere with its business through acts of violence and intimidation by striking workers. Showing that the company had first fired workers for alleged strike misconduct and later reinstated those same workers with back pay is material to test the credibility of company claims of damages. "Questions of relevancy of evidence are for the court. [Cit.] When facts are such that the jury, if permitted to hear them, may or may not make an inference pertinent to the issue, according to the view which they may take of them in connection with the other facts in evidence, they are such that the jury ought to be permitted to hear them. [Cits.] That the testimony objected to falls short of proving the fact sought to be established is not in itself sufficient reason for excluding it, provided that it, alone or in connection with other testimony, tends to prove the matter in issue. [Cit.] Evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or throw light on a material issue or issues is relevant. [Cit.]" Jones v. Smith, 160 Ga.App. 147, 148-9, 286 S.E.2d 478 (1981). "[E]ven where the relevancy of evidence is doubtful, it should be submitted to, and its weight determined by, the jury. [Cits.]" Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga.App. 197, 199, 303 S.E.2d 529 (1983).

Georgia Kraft further argues that each of these matters was brought out only on cross-examination, and thus exceeded the scope of direct examination. There is no merit to this argument. "Georgia has always followed the traditional, common law, English or 'free' rule as to the scope of cross-examination.... Under this rule the witness may be asked on cross-examination about any subject relevant to any of the issues in the entire case, including facts relating solely to the cross-examiner's own case or affirmative defense." Agnor's Ga.Evid. 40-41, § 4-8 (1976); Cowart v. Strickland, 149 Ga. 397(2), 100 S.E. 447 (1919); Ficken v. City of Atlanta, 114 Ga 970(1), 41 S.E. 58 (1902). We find no merit in the enumerations dealing with relevancy.

2. In enumerations 9 and 10 Georgia Kraft assigns as error the trial court's rulings allowing the defendants to use a portion of the deposition of David Oliver in their case-in-chief after Oliver had been excused, and the court's ruling that Barbara Lawler, an employee of Georgia Kraft, was not qualified to offer an opinion on how many striking workers would have returned to work absent violence connected with the strike. Both of these rulings were within the sound discretion of the trial court.

"The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, taken upon oral examination, may be used in the discretion of the trial judge, even though the witness is available to testify in person at the trial." OCGA § 9-11-32(a)(4). "A decision by the trial court to admit into evidence a deposition taken upon oral examination where the witness is available shall be reversed only where the party objecting to the admission ... shows that the trial court abused its discretion." Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rosser, 250 Ga. 52, 54, 295 S.E.2d 827 (1982). We find no such abuse here.

"Whether a witness is qualified to give his opinion as an expert is within the discretion of the trial court, and such discretion will not be disturbed unless manifestly abused. [Cits.]" Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga.App. 657, 659, 288 S.E.2d 715 (1982). Ms. Lawler had been with Georgia Kraft only four and one-half months at the time of the strike; her previous strike experience was limited to one strike in a completely unrelated industry in another state in which she had no significant responsibility. We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.

3. Georgia Kraft complains of one charge given and the trial court's refusal to give three requested charges on concurrent cause of damages. In its lengthy charge on principal and agent the court gave the following charge regarding the international union: "I charge you that the International Union is not liable in the action of, participation in, or authorization or ratification of the wrongful acts alleged herein; thus, unless you find that Mr. Henson authorized, participated in, or ratified any of the alleged misconduct herein, you shall render a verdict in favor of the International Union. The International Union is not liable for the unlawful acts of its local or district council officers or agents, if any, unless you find from the evidence before you that the International Union ratified those unlawful acts." Obviously, the beginning of this charge is in error; it completely removes any issue as to the international union from the jury. If the court had stopped there, he would have committed reversible error. However, the court went on and corrected the misstatement with the remainder of the charge. " '(I)f it can be determined that the point in issue was presented in substantially ... clear and understandable a manner ... keeping in mind that a jury is a lay audience, there should be no reversal where the language conveys correctly the intent of the law and is so framed as to be applied with understanding to the fact situation.' [Cit.]" Haynes v. Hoffman, 164 Ga.App. 236, 237, 296 S.E.2d 216 (1982). "The court's instruction to the jury should be looked to as a whole, and if the applicable law is stated accurately and fairly, in such manner as to work no prejudice ..., then this court will not consider a challenge to the wording of isolated segments. [Cit.]" Riceman v. State, 166 Ga.App. 825, 827, 305 S.E.2d 595 (1983). The complete charge as to the international union, coupled with the court's general charge on the law of principal and agent, gave sufficiently clear and accurate instruction to the jury as to the basis for possible liability of the international union. We therefore find no merit in this enumeration.

Regarding the three requests to charge omitted by the court, we find that the principles of Request Number 23 were covered by the court's...