Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Com.

Decision Date12 May 1982
Docket NumberGEORGIA-PACIFIC
Citation183 Cal.Rptr. 395,132 Cal.App.3d 678
PartiesCORPORATION, a Georgia corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 51055.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., N. Gregory Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dennis Eagan, Kathleen W. Mikkelson, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Paul R. Haerle, Joseph A. Darrell, Steven L. Hock, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

RATTIGAN, Associate Justice.

Respondent and appellant Georgia-Pacific Corporation ("Georgia-Pacific") operates a lumber processing facility on real property owned by it and located on the coastline at Fort Bragg in Mendocino County. The property is within the coastal zone established by the California Coastal Act of 1976 (hereinafter "Coastal Act"). (Pub. Resources Code, div. 20, commencing with Georgia-Pacific thereupon commenced the present action by petitioning the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus requiring the Commission to issue the four permits without the access conditions. The Commission answered the petition, and the action was submitted on the record of the administrative proceedings. The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a judgment ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed.

                §   30000.) 1  Pursuant to the Coastal Act, Georgia-Pacific applied to the California Coastal Commission, North Coast Region ("Regional Commission"), for permits authorizing the construction of four proposed facilities on the property.  After administrative proceedings to be described, appellant and respondent California Coastal Commission ("Commission") granted each of the requested permits on condition that Georgia-Pacific dedicate specified easements on its property which would provide public access to the shoreline
                

The Commission appeals from the judgment. Georgia-Pacific appeals from it in respects described later in this opinion.

BACKGROUND

The following recitals are supported by the lengthy records made in the administrative proceedings and in the action:

The property owned by Georgia-Pacific is located along the coastline on the north and south sides of Noyo Bay, which is a wide estuary at the mouth of the Noyo River. All or most of the property is within the territorial limits of the City of Fort Bragg. It commences at Pudding Creek on the north and runs south along approximately three and one-half miles of shoreline. It is bounded on the west by the ocean, to which its land levels drop sharply down to narrow beaches from the top of a sheer bluff. The property is bounded on the east by State Highway One, which runs in a north-south direction roughly parallel to the shoreline. The part of the property north of Noyo Bay is traversed by Elm Street, a narrow way which runs west from Highway One to the ocean. The shoreline of the property at the westerly end of Elm Street is known as Glass Beach.

The property has been treated as consisting of three parcels for purposes of this action. The northernmost parcel lies between Pudding Creek and Elm Street, and is wholly undeveloped. In the findings of fact, the trial court called it "the area north of Elm Street" and accurately described it as "bounded ... by the Pacific Ocean on the west, by Pudding Creek on the north, by Highway One on the east, and by Elm Street on the south."

Georgia-Pacific conducts its lumber processing operations on the second parcel, which lies between Elm Street and Noyo Bay and the Noyo River. The trial court called this parcel the "industrial area," and described it as "bounded ... by the Pacific Ocean on the west, Elm Street on the north, Highway One on the east, and Noyo Bay and the Noyo River on the south." The court also found, and it is not disputed, that the parcel "is subject to intensive industrial use, including heavy machinery, lumber mills and related facilities, log decks, drying stacks and an air strip."

The third parcel consists of 18 acres of undeveloped and unused land on a promontory immediately south of Noyo Bay. The trial court called it the "Noyo Headlands parcel," and described it as "located south of the industrial area and ... geographically separated from the industrial area by Noyo Harbor and Noyo Bay." The Noyo Headlands parcel is actually "separated" from the industrial area by overwater distances of one-third of a mile at the widest point of the bay and by the width of the Noyo River at its mouth on the inland side of the bay. The only overland connection between the two parcels is by way of Highway One, which crosses the river on a bridge located upstream from the bay.

Elm Street, which divides the two parcels north of Noyo Bay, is part of an easement which Georgia-Pacific's predecessor in interest granted to the City of Fort Bragg for access to a dump site included in the grant. The grant also included a provision to the effect that the easement could be exchanged for another dump site and access route in the event of "major industrial expansion" by Georgia-Pacific. Elm Street thus represents a nonpermanent municipal easement for dumping purposes, and it is not a public street in the conventional sense.

Georgia-Pacific presently allows the public to use Elm Street for pedestrian access to Glass Beach. On weekends only, it also allows the public to use a haul road on its property for vehicular access to the shoreline near Pudding Creek. There is public access to the shoreline at Pudding Creek itself; at two points between two and three miles further north; at a small beach which is publicly owned and located on Noyo Bay at the southerly end of the industrial area; and at a third point three and one-half miles south of the property.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

In and before 1978, Georgia-Pacific decided to undertake four construction projects within the industrial area only. The projects were (1) the erection of a six-foot chain link security fence to enclose approximately 120 acres of the area; (2) the construction of a helicopter pad, hangar, and related service facilities near Highway One; (3) the construction of a "forest information center," parking lot, septic system, and related facilities near the highway and south of the helicopter pad; and (4) the construction of a "rock revetment" to replace a dike which had previously been constructed on the shoreline of the industrial area. The dike had sustained storm damage, and its replacement was necessary to prevent the contamination of ocean waters by "spillage" from a "settling pond" maintained by Georgia-Pacific in the vicinity.

In April of 1978, Georgia-Pacific applied to the Regional Commission for permits authorizing the four construction projects pursuant to section 30600 of the Coastal Act. 2 The staff of the Regional Commission recommended that the permits be issued upon condition that provisions for public access to the shoreline be required pursuant to sections 30607 and 30212. 3 The Regional Commission rejected the recommendation and granted the requested permits without requiring provisions for access.

Third parties appealed the Regional Commission's decision to the Commission. Later

                in 1978, after hearings, the Commission adopted findings and granted each of the requested permits on the express condition that Georgia-Pacific make "an irrevocable offer of dedication" of a number of easements across its property to provide public access to [132 Cal.App.3d 687] the shoreline. 4  Georgia-Pacific challenged the validity of the so-called "access conditions" by commencing the present action
                
THE ACTION

The issues raised on the appeals require that the record of the action be summarized in close detail and chronologically. It supports the recitals separately captioned below.

The Pleadings

Georgia-Pacific filed a "Petition For Writ Of Mandate" on October 13, 1978. The Commission and fictitious parties were named in the petition as the respondents in the action. Georgia-Pacific alleged in a prefatory sentence that it was seeking "a writ of mandate" directed to the Commission pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. It thereupon stated 19 causes of action for this relief in separate counts.

The allegations made in the several counts of the petition may not feasibly be summarized in detail. In each count, Georgia-Pacific alleged the substance of the administrative proceedings described above and that it was entitled to relief in administrative mandamus on one or another of the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. 5 As pertinent to the appeals, it thus alleged in some counts that the Commission had "failed to proceed in the manner required by law" in various respects; in others, that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion"; in still others, that the Commission had denied Georgia-Pacific "a fair hearing" and that certain findings the Commission had made were not supported by the evidence received in the administrative proceedings. (See fn. 5, ante.)

In the prayer of the petition, Georgia-Pacific requested the issuance of alternative and peremptory writs of mandate directing the Commission to set aside the permits and to reinstate the permits issued by the Regional Commission.

When the petition was filed on October 13, 1978, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alternative writ of mandate as prayed. On April 23, 1979, the Commission filed an answer to the petition in which it admitted most of the factual allegations made in each of Georgia-Pacific's several counts; denied the accompanying allegations that it was entitled to relief in administrative mandamus; and alleged several affirmative defenses.

Further Proceedings

The first of several hearings in the action was conducted on April 25, 1979. The...

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