Georgia Power Co. v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 10 October 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 17209,17209 |
| Citation | 62 S.E.2d 183,207 Ga. 406 |
| Parties | GEORGIA POWER CO. v. BROOKS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. On appeal from an award made in a condemnation proceeding for an easement over land, where the evidence shows that the condemnee has, by a prior lease, divested himself of title to valuable minerals in the land, it is reversible error for the court to charge the jury that they should return a verdict in favor of the condemnee for the full amount which they find, from the evidence, the premises will be injured by the easement.
2. Under general law, one party to a suit is not allowed to prove transactions between the other party thereto and a third party--transactions similar in nature but entirely independent. Code (Ann.Supp.) § 36-608, Ga.L.1945, p. 143, in allowing the condemnee to introduce evidence of such a character and not allowing the condemnor to do likewise, denies equal protection guaranteed by art. 1, sec. 1, par. 3 of the State Constitution, Code, Ann. § 2-103; Ga.L.1945, p. 10, and is void.
3. On the trial of the appeal from an award in a condemnation proceeding, evidence of an offer to compromise or evidence of the amount of an award allowed in another case is inadmissible.
4. Upon the trial of such an appeal, the only issue is the amount of injury sustained by the condemnee, and the burden is on the condemnor to prove such injury.
5. It is not reversible error to admit, over objection, evidence that may be irrelevant when it does not appear that such evidence could possibly be prejudicial to the objector; nor is a juror disqualified because he has, in the same court, served upon a similar case, but one in nowise connected, and has returned a verdict therein.
6. The evidence at another trial may not be the same, and no ruling is made upon the grounds of the motion which bring in question the sufficiency of the evidence.
This case is an appeal from a final judgment after a jury trial in Wilkinson Superior Court, which was an appeal to that court from an award of assessors under a statutory condemnation proceeding for an easement for an electrical transmission line right-of-way. The condemnation proceeding resulted in an award by the assessors in an amount of $12,000. Pursuant to Code, § 36-601, Georgia Power Company, the condemnor and plaintiff in error here, filed an appeal to the Superior Court and tendered the amount of the award to the condemnee, O. L. Brooks, who is the defendant in error here. After the trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the condemnee in the amount of $12,000, the condemnor filed a motion for new trial, which was subsequently amended, and also filed a motion to set aside and vacate the verdict and judgment. The bill of exceptions here is to the judgment overruling the above motions.
The general grounds of the motion for new trial are as to the excessiveness of the verdict and that the evidence fails to support the findings of the jury. The first special ground complains of the charge of the court wherein the jury were instructed to find for the condemnee the full value of the damage to the land involved, although, at that time, there existed a mineral lease in favor of Georgia Kaolin Company, which was not a party to the proceeding and would not be bound by the award of the jury. Special ground 5 is also a complaint as to an excerpt of the charge in that it was not a correct abstract principle of law. Special ground 2 assails the constitutionality of Code Ann.Supp. § 36-608, Ga.L.1945, p. 143, which authorizes a condemnee to prove the value of comparable property wheresoever situated, and to introduce in evidence the price paid by the condemnor for any comparable property acquired within two years prior to the condemnation proceeding. Special grounds 3 and 4 are complaints as to the illegal introduction of certain testimony, and statements of counsel for the condemnee made before the jury. Special ground 6 complains of the court allowing a witness to answer a hypothetical question, wherein the question assumed facts that had not been proven. Special ground 7 is a complaint as to the court's refusal to purge certain jurors from the panel of jurors; and special ground 8 is merely an argument in favor of the general grounds as to the excessiveness of the verdict. The motion to set aside and vacate the verdict and judgment is a contention by the condemnor that the judgment does not conform to the verdict and is not authorized by the verdict and, for this reason, is null and void.
Miller, Miller & Miller, Macon, for plaintiff in error.
Victor Davidson, Irwinton, Jackson & Jackson, Gray, Frank O. Evans, Milledgeville, for defendant in error.
1. The first special ground of the motion complains of the charge wherein the court instructed the jury that they should first determine the fair market value of the land embraced in the easement, described as 100 feet in width and 1935 feet in length; that, in doing this, the jury should take into consideration the nature and character of the land and whether or not it contained valuable mineral deposits; and that they should find in favor of the condemnee for the fair market value of the land, and, further, any damages resulting to other lands if they found that any such damage resulted to other lands of the condemnee. This ground is bottomed upon the fact that there was evidence that, prior to the institution of the condemnation proceeding, the condemnee had executed to a third party a lease or option conveying the kaolin and other minerals in the land for a consideration of $600 per year and, in addition, twenty-five cents per ton for bauxite and fifteen cents per ton for kaolin and other minerals when mined and taken from the land. This instrument was to remain of force for twenty-five years, but was terminable at any time by the lessee upon thirty days notice; and it was contended that the charge required the jury to compensate the condemnee for damages to the lessee and damages which the condemnee would not sustain. There is abundant evidence in this record showing the amount of kaolin and silica sands in the land embraced in the easement and showing that these constituted the major value of the land. We may put aside at this point all consideration of allegations of the pleadings or the necessity for a request to charge as being irrelevant to a determination of the...
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