Georgiacarry.org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. S16A0294.,S16A0294.
• Citation: 785 S.E.2d 874,299 Ga. 26
• Parties: GEORGIACARRY.ORG et al v. ATLANTA BOTANICAL GARDEN, INC.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

299 Ga. 26
785 S.E.2d 874

GEORGIACARRY.ORG et al
v.
ATLANTA BOTANICAL GARDEN, INC.

No. S16A0294.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 9, 2016.

785 S.E.2d 876

John R. Monroe, Roswell, for appellants.

Michael Lawrence Brown, David Baird Carpenter, Alston & Bird, LLP, Atlanta, for appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

299 Ga. 26

Appellants GeorgiaCarry.org and Phillip Evans appeal the dismissal of their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief as to the

299 Ga. 27

Atlanta Botanical Garden's prohibition of weapons on the Garden's premises. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

The facts are not in dispute. The Garden is a non-profit corporation that operates a botanical garden complex on property leased from the City of Atlanta. Evans, who holds a Georgia weapons carry license, visited the Garden twice in October 2014 and wore a handgun in a waistband holster each time. After gaining admission to the Garden on his second visit, Evans was stopped by an employee of the Garden and advised that he could not carry the weapon at the Garden; a security officer detained Evans, and Evans was eventually escorted from the Garden by an officer with the Atlanta Police Department.

Appellants subsequently petitioned the Fulton County Superior Court for declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that OCGA § 16–11–127(c)¹ authorizes Evans—and similarly licensed individuals—to carry a weapon at the Garden. Appellants sought a declaration that the Garden could not prohibit licensed individuals from “carrying weapons on property that the Garden leases from the City of Atlanta,” an injunction prohibiting the Garden from “causing the arrest or prosecution of [licensed individuals] from carrying weapons at the [Garden],” and an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Garden from “banning the carrying of weapons at the [Garden] by [licensed individuals] or from causing [their] arrest or prosecution ... for carrying weapons at the [Garden].” In response, the Garden moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that a declaratory action may not be used to interpret a criminal statute, that a declaratory action may not be used to compel a party to take (or refrain from taking) specific action, and that an injunction may not be used to inhibit or control the enforcement of criminal laws. The trial court, agreeing with the Garden's position, granted the motion to dismiss.

1. Appellants first argue that the trial court erroneously dismissed their declaratory judgment action; we agree.

785 S.E.2d 877

299 Ga. 28

It is well settled that

[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor.

(Footnotes omitted.) Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997). “On appeal, a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted is reviewed de novo.” Northway v. Allen, 291 Ga. 227, 229, 728 S.E.2d 624 (2012).

The State Declaratory Judgment Act gives superior courts the power to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party in “cases of actual controversy” under OCGA § 9–4–2(a) and “in any civil case in which it appears to the court that the ends of justice require that the declaration should be made.” OCGA § 9–4–2(b).

Leitch v. Fleming, 291 Ga. 669, 670(1), 732 S.E.2d 401 (2012). Such relief is authorized when there are

circumstances showing [a] necessity for a determination of the dispute to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to his alleged rights and which if taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest.

Morgan v. Guaranty National Companies, 268 Ga. 343, 344, 489 S.E.2d 803 (1997). “ ‘The proper scope of declaratory judgment is to adjudge those rights among parties upon which their future conduct depends.’ ”

299 Ga. 29

SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Board of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 802(2)(b) (iii), 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

Relying on Butler v. Ellis, 203 Ga. 683, 47 S.E.2d 861 (1948), the trial court dismissed Appellants' petition for declaratory relief on the basis that it impermissibly required the trial court to interpret and apply a criminal statute. See Butler, 203 Ga. at 683, 47 S.E.2d 861 (no justiciable controversy where petitioners sought a declaration that intoxicating liquors could be sold legally at a private social club in Fulton County because equity “will take no part in the administration of the criminal law”).² See also Martin v. Slaton, 125 Ga.App. 710, 188 S.E.2d 926 (1972). However, a declaratory judgment action is not inappropriate merely because it touches upon a question of criminal law; in fact, such an action “is an available remedy to test the validity and enforceability of a statute where an actual controversy exists with respect thereto.” Total Vending Service, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 153 Ga.App. 109, 110, 264 S.E.2d 574 (1980). See also Sarrio v. Gwinnett County, 273 Ga. 404...