Geraghty v. Suburban Trust Co., 189

• Decision Date: 31 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 189,189
• Citation: 208 A.2d 606,238 Md. 197
• Parties: Mary E. GERAGHTY v. SUBURBAN TRUST COMPANY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 197

238 Md. 197

208 A.2d 606

Mary E. GERAGHTY v. SUBURBAN TRUST COMPANY.

No. 189.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 31, 1965.

Joseph Zitomer, Silver Spring, and Jack S. May, Takoma Park, for appellant.

William W. Beckett, Hyattsville (Duckett, Orem & Christie, Hyattsville, on the brief), for appellee.

Before PRESCOTT, C. J., HAMMOND, HORNEY and OPPENHEIMER, JJ., and O. BOWIE DUCKETT, Special Judge.

PRESCOTT, Chief Judge.

This appeal results from an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County sustaining, without leave to amend, a demurrer to appellant's declaration, which she claims sets forth, in two counts, a cause of action for slander.

The first count, in substance, alleges the following: On November 26, 1963, appellee was engaged in the banking business, having its principal offices in Prince George's County, Maryland. Appellant was the sole owner of a business known as Penco Decorators, located in Bethesda, Maryland. On the date aforementioned, appellant, in the course of her business, had an appointment with appellee corporation, acting through its officer and employee Lester J. Crawley, 'for the purpose of securing an F.H.A. loan to finance the proposed sale of labor and material to one of [appellant's] customers.' At this time, 'in the presence of employees of the said defendant and members of the community' Crawley spoke false, malicious, and defamatory words to appellant in reference to her business. The words in question are, 'I doubt very much if this will go through,' and, 'I think you are just a front for Mr. Provost.' These words were uttered in a 'loud, belligerent, arrogant, and disrespectful voice and manner' and meant (italics ours) that appellant was not the true owner of her business, but was 'a sham, fraud, deception and artifice for one Norwood E. Provost' and was 'therefore, not honest, trustworthy, dependable or a woman of character.' As a result of the speaking of these words, appellant alleges that she 'was injured in her business, her good name, fame and credit and was brought into public scandal, infamy and disgrace' and that she 'further suffered embarrassment and humiliation, all of which was most harmful, detrimental and injurious' to her.

Count two of the declaration states the same basic facts alleged in the first count, but claims that since it is a criminal act to make, knowingly, a false statement upon the loan application in question, Mr. Crawley's words were, in effect, accusing appellant of committing a crime and constituted, therefore, slander per se.

General damages were claimed in the declaration, but no special damages were alleged under either count thereof.

The appellant contends that she has made in count one a sufficient allegation of facts to show that false words were spoken to, and of, her, in the presence of others, of such a character as to constitute slander per se, on the ground that said words tended directly to prejudice her in her trade and business; and in count two she has shown that the said falsely spoken words were slanderousper se on the theory that they directly contained an imputation that she had committed a crime involving moral turpitude, for which corporal punishment was the immediate penalty.

In Mayland, the pleader who alleges slander may resort, in proper cases, to the short form provided by the Code (1957), Article 75, Section 14(34), or he may adopt the common-law form of alleging the purported slander.

The appellee suggests, with considerable force, several other reasons as to why the trial court was correct in sustaining the demurrer; however, we base our decision on the narrow ground hereinafter stated.

It will be noted that the narr filed by the appellant has some peculiar and unusual aspects. It alleges that appellant was in the Silver Spring Branch Officer of the appellee (which is some five miles distant from where appellant conducts her business on Wisconsin Avenue in Bethesda); and she was there 'for the purpose of securing an F.H.A. loan [in the first count],' and 'was submitting a written application for said loan [in the second count].' At no point does she allege that she had signed the application. Nor is there any allegation that any person in whose presence the words complained of were spoken knew her, knew of her decorating business, knew for what purpose she was at the bank, or that any person who heard the words attributed to them anything of a...