Geraud v. Schrader, 1
Decision Date | 07 February 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 1,A,Nos. 4389-4391,1,s. 4389-4391 |
Citation | 531 P.2d 872 |
Parties | Lawrence J. GERAUD et al., Appellants (Petitioners below), v. Robert G. SCHRADER, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., Appellees (Respondents below), and Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc., a nonprofit Wyoming Corporation, et al., Appellees (Intervenors below). Alfred WARD et al., Appellants (Petitioners below), v. Robert G. SCHRADER, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., Appellees (Respondents below), and Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc., a nonprofit Wyoming Corporation, et al., Appellees (Intervenors below), and Fremont County Vocational High School District and Lander School Districtppellants (Second Intervenors below). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Frank P. Hill, and Richard I. Leedy of Hettinger & Leedy, Riverton, for appellants, Lawrence J. Geraud and others.
W. A. Smith of Smith & Simonton, Lander, for appellants, Alfred Ward and others.
Harold E. Meier of Meier & Gist, Lander, for appellants-second intervenors, Fremont County Vocational High School District and others.
David B. Kennedy, Atty. Gen., and Jerome F. Statkus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellees, Robert G. Schrader, and others.
H. Clandillon Phibbs II, Jackson, Michael P. Gross, Henniker, N.H., and John Forhan, South Bend, Ind., for appellees-intervenors, the Wind River Indian Ed. Ass'n, Inc., and others.
Before McEWAN, 1 C. J., and GUTHRIE, 2 McCLINTOCK, RAPER and THOMAS, JJ.
While there are a number of reasons why the court cannot approve the action of the state committee for school district organization, one of several of which would be dispositive of the case, as later in this opinion disclosed, it is felt by the court that a decision confining itself to a single reason or issue would not be useful in the future reorganization of Fremont County. Before turning to the primary questions, which we decide, there should be some narrative generally outlining the history of the Fremont County long-drawn-out efforts to become reorganized under the mandate of the Wyoming School District Organization Law of 1969, §§ 21.1-105 through 21.1-135, W.S.1957, 1973 Cum.Supp.
Fremont County has 11 schools districts. Under the School District Organization Law, the Fremont County Planning Committee in June, 1971, presented its first plan of reorganization of the school districts of that county. Three other plans were subsequently presented, all of which were rejected by the state committee for various reasons. The court will not attempt to describe each plan, but through the opinion, as appropriate, may mention some pertinent features. The last plan proposed was rejected by the state committee on March 2, 1973. On March 30, 1973, the state committee made a decision and order creating its own four-district plan and directing that it be carried into effect. It is from this order and decision of the state committee that two groups of citizens and taxpayers in Fremont County appealed first to the district court and with the intervenor school districts, now to this court, from the judgment of the district court.
The district court permitted the Fremont County Vocational High School District and the Lander School District No. 1 to intervene, purportedly pursuant to Rule 24, W.R.C.P. Section 21.1-128 provides that:
* * *'
A school district is not a citizen nor a taxpayer. Its motion for intervention is no more than a petition for judicial review, regardless of the label by which it did get into this proceeding. During the course of the trial held by the district court, it was treated in all respects as an appellant. A school district has no standing in an appeal involving a petition for review of administrative action under the specific terms of the Wyoming School District Organization Law of 1969. A school district cannot do indirectly that which it could not do directly. To prosecute an appeal under the guise of an intervention is an improper application of Rule 24, W.R.C.P. in the presence of a specific statute limiting those who may contest school reorganization. It is interesting to note that the motion to intervene was filed almost a year after the state committee's decision and order. Time for appeal is within 30 days after the final decision of an agency. Rule 72.1(d), W.R.C.P. The back door is not available when the front door is closed.
The right of an appeal is a privilege rather than a right.
* * *'Mau v. Stoner, et al., 1905, 14 Wyo. 183, 193-194, 83 P. 218, 219.
The legislature has authority to abridge or extend the right of appeal at its discretion and can determine in what cases and under what circumstances appeals may be taken, as well as regulate the manner of appeal. 4 Am.Jur.2d (Appeal and Error) § 6, pp. 536-537.
Intervention by the Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc., a private entity, and various citizens of the Indian community was of a different stripe in that these intervenors were either a private entity or citizens and fit the statutory requirement of 'citizens or taxpayers', and there was no special statute which would impose a restraint upon use of Rule 24, W.R.C.P., pertaining to intervention. They were not appealing. Those taking the side of the appellees were more in the nature of amicus curiae.
The district court improperly permitted and conducted a trial type hearing on issues of a legislative nature in this 'non-contested' case. School district reorganization proceedings are non-contested cases. Lund v. Schrader, Wyo.1971, 492 P.2d 202, 209. In .johnson v. Schrader, Wyo.1972, 507 P.2d 814, 817, the court decided that the reorganization process is a delegated legislative function and such factor, along with it being a non-contested case, negative the necessity of a trial type hearing. The court in Johnson, just cited, refused to permit the taking of evidence by the district court, because this is an imposition by the courts upon the legislative function delegated to the county committee and the state committee. If there was any further evidence to have been taken, it should have been remanded to the state agency having that function, and that function after December 20, 1971, as will appear later, rested solely with the county committee. If, after an appropriate hearing on a motion showing the necessity for consideration of further matter or facts, the court found that all pertinent material matter or facts had not received the attention of the administrative agency, then the case should have been remanded to the proper committee authorized to carry on the organization function, to receive and consider the evidence, and revise or confirm its decision, within the authority delegated to it, within its judgment. This delicate relationship between the judicial, executive and legislative departments must be meticulously protected.
Without disturbing the court's views in Lund v. Schrader, supra, or Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814, that the School District Organization Law of 1969 does not suggest the holding of trial type hearings before the state or county committees, we must confine ourselves to the facts of those cases, where there was apparently no disputed factual issue. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 Supp., § 7.01, p. 301, declares that, 'The basic principle is that trial procedure is required for-and only for-issues of fact, not for issues of law, policy, or discretion.' We only add that there may be an occasion to use a question, answer, cross-examination and other evidence type of approach to settle a disputed fact-a pivotal statistic, for example.
The transcript of the court hearing consists of a castigation of the State Director of School District Reorganization, authorized by § 21.1-112 to assist the state committee in carrying out its power and duties testimony of a witness as to the number of Indians in boarding schools, about which there was no dispute; testimony from the project director of the Wyoming Indian High School about its facilities, operation, financing, future plans and ownership of the lands upon which located; and, testimony from a Shoshone Indian who testified about the history of the school system on the reservation and tribal council operation of the reservation, there being one for the Arapahoes and one for the Shoshone Tribe, the Arapahoe's council favoring the state plan, the Shoshones opposing it.
The last mentioned witness pointed up the fact that proposed District 3 did not cover the whole Wind River Indian Reservation. In the northwestern area alone there are 500 to 600 Indian families sending their children to schools outside the proposed Indian school district. This particular Shoshone did not like the arrangement because of the probability that the district would be dominated by the Arapahoe tribe.
The trial judge during the court proceeding further heard the testimony of a superintendent of a school district outside the reservation, to tell about its academic program, counseling program,...
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