Gerber Life Ins. Co. v. Wallace
| Citation | 839 F.Supp.2d 998 |
| Decision Date | 15 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:11–cv–31. |
| Parties | GERBER LIFE INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, v. Samantha WALLACE; Thomas Wallace; Bobby Nolan; Teresa Nolan; Sandi Wallace; Mattea L. Rolin, as administrator for the Estate of Deceased Dena McNabb; Randy Basham; Larry Johnson; C.G., minor, and C.N., minor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John W. Reis, Cozen and O'Connor, Charlotte, NC, Kenan G. Loomis, Cozen O'Connor, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Daniel J. Ripper, Luther, Anderson, PLLP, Tonya K. Cammon, Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC, Chattanooga, TN, Mattea Lee Rolin, Law Office of Mattea Lee Rolin, Soddy Daisy, TN, for Defendants.
This interpleader action presents a straightforward question borne of tragic facts: Does Tennessee's “Slayer Statute,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 31–1–106, bar insurance recovery by parents charged with criminally negligent homicide in connection with their child's death? The Court concludes that it does not, and it will therefore GRANT Defendant Samantha Wallace's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs the Court to grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record,” including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir.2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply “by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot “rest upon its ... pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348;Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). The nonmoving party must present sufficient probative evidence supporting its claim that disputes over material facts remain and must be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). See also, White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir.2010). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505;Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374. If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts in this case. ( See Docs. 50–53).
Defendants Samantha and Thomas Wallace are the parents of deceased minor C.W. (Doc. 49 at 2). Defendant Samantha Wallace (“Ms. Wallace”) purchased three separate life insurance policies (collectively, “the Policies”), in which C.W. was named as the insured. ( See Doc. 1–1 at 6–20, 25–41; Doc. 1–2 at 1–19).
Policy number 16506416 (“the First Policy”)—for which Ms. Wallace applied on January 8, 2008—provided a $15,000 benefit in the event of C.W.'s death. 1 (Doc. 1–1 at 2, 6–20). The application stated: “Unless otherwise requested, the parents of the Proposed Insureds shall be the beneficiaries.” (Doc. 1–1 at 9). Ms. Wallace did not specify a beneficiary on the application, but it appears that Plaintiff listed Ms. Wallace and Thomas Wallace (“Mr. Wallace”) as primary beneficiaries. ( Id.). The First Policy provided that the beneficiary was designated in the application. (Doc. 1–1 at 6).
Policy number 40909278 (“the Second Policy”)—for which Ms. Wallace applied on April 25, 2008—also provided a $15,000 death benefit. (Doc. 1–1 at 25–41). Like the First Policy application, the Second Policy application stated: “Unless otherwise requested, the parents of the Proposed Insureds shall be the beneficiaries.” (Doc. 1–1 at 26). Ms. Wallace did not specify a beneficiary on the Second Policy application.2 ( Id.).
Policy number 21299007 (“the Third Policy”)—for which Ms. Wallace applied on August 19, 2008—provided a $5,000 benefit in the event of C.W.'s death. (Doc. 1–1 at 43; Doc. 1–2 at 2–19). Like the other two applications, the Third Policy application stated: “Unless otherwise requested, the parents of the Proposed Insureds shall be the beneficiaries.” (Doc. 1–2 at 4). Ms. Wallace again did not specify a beneficiary on the application. ( Id.). The Third Policy provided that the beneficiary was designated in the application. (Doc. 1–2 at 5).
On July 12, 2010, C.W. died. (Doc. 1–2 at 21; Doc. 49). C.G., another minor child of Ms. Wallace, discovered a gun in Mr. and Ms. Wallace's bedroom and accidentally shot C.W. in the chest. (Doc. 1–2 at 21; Doc. 49). As a result, C.W. sustained fatal injuries. (Doc. 1–2 at 21, Doc. 49). According to Ms. Wallace's undisputed affidavit, she was not present when the shooting occurred, neither she nor Mr. Wallace were aware that C.G. had discovered the gun, and neither she nor Mr. Wallace engaged in any intentional conduct that led to C.W.'s death. (Doc. 49 at 2).
As a result of C.W.'s death, Mr. and Ms. Wallace were arrested and charged with criminally negligent homicide, per Tenn.Code Ann. § 39–13–212. 3 ( Id.). No other charges were filed in connection with the shooting. ( Id.). Those criminal proceedingsremain pending in Tennessee state court.
On February 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed this Petition for Interpleader, invoking this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff named as Defendants: Mr. and Ms. Wallace; C.G. and C.N., C.W.'s minor half-siblings; Bobby Nolan and Teresa Nolan, C.W's grandparents; Sandi Wallace, C.W.'s grandparent; Mattea L. Rolin, the administrator of the estate of Dena McNabb, C.W.'s grandparent; Randy Basham, C.W.'s grandparent; Larry Johnson, C.W.'s grandparent; and Whitwell Memorial Funeral Home, Inc., which the Court has since dismissed from this action. (Docs. 1, 31). Plaintiff noted its potential liability to multiple claimants based on the possible application of Tennessee's “Slayer Statute,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 31–1–106. (Doc. 1 at 6–7). Plaintiff averred that, if the Slayer Statute barred Mr. and Ms. Wallace's recovery, then the appropriate beneficiary under Tenn.Code Ann. § 31–1–104 () was not clear. ( Id.).
Plaintiff requested that the court discharge it from any liability and determine the rights of the named defendants as to C.W.'s life insurance benefits. ( See id.). In April 2011, the Court permitted Defendant to deposit three checks totaling $35,334.40—representing payment for each of the Policies' benefits plus interest, less payment for C.W.'s funeral arrangements—into the Court registry. ( See Docs. 22–1, 28, 29). The Court then discharged Plaintiff, a disinterested stakeholder, from this action and from any liability arising from the various claims to the proceeds of the Policies. (Docs. 28, 45).
In August 2011, Ms. Wallace moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 46). She asserted that she and Mr. Wallace were the beneficiaries of the Policies on C.W.'s life and that § 31–1–106 does not apply in this case. (Doc. 47 at 7–10). Consequently, she claimed that they were entitled to the Policies' death benefit. ( Id. at 11).
The estate of Dena McNabb, through Administrator Rolin, did not oppose Ms. Wallace's Motion. (Doc. 51). Rather, it stated that it “has found no case law or statute that is contrary to the information provided in [the Motion].” ( Id.). It therefore “ask[ed] this Court to determine the issues in this cause of action.” ( Id.).
C.G. and C.N., through their guardian ad litem, also did not oppose the Motion. (Doc. 52). They stated that they “located no applicable statute or case law that dictates a result contrary to that advocated by Samantha Wallace in her motion and supporting brief.” ( Id.). Therefore, they “defer[red] to this Court's interpretation and application of the applicable law in its determination of the proper beneficiaries to receive the funds deposited with the Court by [Plaintiff] less reasonable and necessary costs and expenses related to this matter.” ( Id.).
Although they were served with process, the other named Defendants did not respond to Ms. Wallace's Motion or otherwise appear in this action. ( See Docs. 9–15).
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