Gercey v. U.S., 76-1137

Citation540 F.2d 536
Decision Date19 August 1976
Docket NumberNo. 76-1137,76-1137
PartiesMichael B. GERCEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Abraham Goldstein, Providence, R. I., for appellants.

Mark N. Mutterperl, Atty., Appellate Section, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, with whom Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., Providence, R. I., and Robert E. Kopp, Atty., Appellate Section, Washington, D. C., Dept. of Justice, were on brief for appellee.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants are the parents of Steven Gercey, who drowned when the motor vessel COMET sank off Port Judith Rhode Island on May 19, 1973. They instituted this wrongful death action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52, 1 alleging that the Coast Guard had, by its negligence, caused their son's death. They contended that the Coast Guard had revoked the COMET's certificate to operate as a "passenger-carrying vessel" because it found the vessel to be unsafe, but that it failed to take positive, feasible steps to protect individuals like their son from the danger of voyaging on the vessel. The district court, on the basis of the pleadings and proposed findings of fact, granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that plaintiffs had failed to allege that defendant's negligence was a cause-in-fact of decedent's death. 409 F.Supp. 946 (D.R.I.1976). We affirm, although on a different ground.

The facts are relatively few and undisputed. The COMET, a 30 year old, 49 foot wooden motor vessel, capable of carrying up to 39 passengers, failed to pass the Coast Guard inspection in 1971, principally because its hull was found to be rotten. The Coast Guard accordingly removed its certificate to operate as a passenger carrying vessel. Without this certificate the COMET could not lawfully carry six or more passengers for hire, see 46 U.S.C. § 390c, and, if it were to do so, it and its master would be liable for up to $1000 in fines. See id. § 390d. The lack of such a certificate, however, does not preclude a vessel from otherwise operating lawfully.

Following the revocation of the COMET's certificate, plaintiffs allege that the Coast Guard took absolutely no follow up measures to protect the fee paying public from the danger of riding on the vessel. According to plaintiffs, the sole action taken by the Coast Guard was to remove the certificate from the COMET a 4" by 6" piece of paper which presumably had been displayed "in a conspicuous place in the vessel where it (was) most likely to be observed by passengers", see id. § 400 and file it in Washington.

In the fall of 1971, the COMET was sold to one William Jackson, who, possibly out of ignorance of both the condition of the vessel and the requirements of federal law, proceeded to carry large groups of fee paying passengers on it during 1972 and 1973. During this period, the COMET made trips to and from the port of Galilee, at the head of which was a Coast Guard station. The record reflects that no Coast Guard personnel were aware either of the vessel's movements or that it had been decertified. On May 19, 1973, Jackson took a large group of fee paying passengers, including decedent, on a fishing trip off the coast of Rhode Island. Although the weather and sea conditions were alleged to be quite normal, the COMET, some five miles off the coast, split in two and sank. Decedent, Jackson, and fifteen other passengers perished.

The theory upon which plaintiffs seek to recover can be stated simply: they maintain that the Coast Guard is under either a statutory or common law duty to take reasonable steps to protect the fee paying public from vessels which the Coast Guard has refused to certify and which it knows to be unsafe. Plaintiffs list half a dozen actions which they allege the Court Guard could easily have taken and which, in their view, would have substantially increased the likelihood that fee paying passengers like their son would not have voyaged on the COMET. These include: (1) informing the public of the condition of all such vessels by either a public notice or a sign placed on the vessel; (2) periodically checking to determine if such vessels are being used contrary to § 390c; (3) informing any new purchaser of the condition of the vessel; and (4) notifying all local Coast Guard units which vessels are decertified. Although the district court thought it unlikely that the Coast Guard could be held liable in tort for injuries proximately caused by its failure to take these measures, it did not reach this issue. It held instead that the plaintiffs could not recover since they had not claimed that the Coast Guard's alleged negligence was a cause-in-fact of their son's death. This we think was error.

In deciding that plaintiffs had failed to allege a sufficient causal connection between the alleged acts of nonfeasance and decedent's death, the district court applied too stringent a standard. It apparently believed that plaintiffs could not go to the jury on the issue of causation-in-fact unless they alleged that the implementation of the measures they propose would have prevented the COMET from sinking with fee paying passengers aboard. This is too harsh a test. Causation-in-fact is almost always a jury question. To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiffs need only have shown that reasoning minds could conclude that the Coast Guard's alleged misconduct was a substantial factor in producing plaintiffs' injury which was not the sinking of the vessel per se, but their son's death. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 289 (4th ed. 1971). Plaintiffs clearly made this showing. Reasonable men could conclude that, if the Coast Guard had performed but one of the measures plaintiffs suggest requiring that decertified vessels display notices informing the public of its condition decedent probably would not have gone aboard the vessel and, thus, would not have drowned. 2 Although we understand why the principles of judicial economy and restraint led the district court, when faced with the novel question of the Coast Guard's liability, to prefer this narrow ground of decision, we believe we must reach the broader question of the Coast Guard's liability.

In addressing this question, we note at the outset that the Coast Guard's alleged negligence lies in failing to adopt a policy of taking positive steps to protect the public from vessels whose certificates have been revoked, not in imperfectly executing a federal program established either by an act of Congress or a federal regulation. Compare Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955) and Coastwise Packet Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1968). Neither the Congress nor the Coast Guard has explicitly required that positive action be taken to protect the public from such vessels. Congress has mandated only that the Coast Guard periodically conduct certain types of inspections of passenger carrying vessels, see 46 U.S.C. §§ 390a, 391, revoking the certificates of vessels which fail to meet federal requirements. Id. §§ 390c(c), 391. Although Congress plainly...

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