Gerks v. Deathe, No. CIV-92-1681-A.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. CIV-92-1681-A.
• Citation: 832 F. Supp. 1450
• Parties: Carl GERKS and Christina Gerks, individually, and as parents and next friends of Kristi Marie Gerks, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. Tracey DEATHE, individually, and in her teaching capacity; Pat Knuppenberg, individually, and in her teaching capacity; Nancy Krodel, individually, and in her capacity as Principal of Coronado Heights Elementary; Bill Spaeth, individually, and in his capacity as Assistant Superintendent of the Putnam City Public Schools; Ralph Downs, individually, and in his capacity as Superintendent of the Putnam City Public Schools, Independent School District No. 1 of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, a political subdivision of Oklahoma, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

832 F. Supp. 1450

Carl GERKS and Christina Gerks, individually, and as parents and next friends of Kristi Marie Gerks, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. Tracey DEATHE, individually, and in her teaching capacity; Pat Knuppenberg, individually, and in her teaching capacity; Nancy Krodel, individually, and in her capacity as Principal of Coronado Heights Elementary; Bill Spaeth, individually, and in his capacity as Assistant Superintendent of the Putnam City Public Schools; Ralph Downs, individually, and in his capacity as Superintendent of the Putnam City Public Schools, Independent School District No. 1 of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, a political subdivision of Oklahoma, Defendants.

No. CIV-92-1681-A.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

October 6, 1993.

Shannon K. Emmons, Cary E. Hiltgen, Stacey L. Haws, Manchester Hiltgen & Healy, Jason C. Wagner, Lee Collins & Fields, Oklahoma City, OK, for plaintiffs.

William P. Bleakley, Linda M. Meoli, Center for Educ. Law Inc., Larry D. Ottaway, Timothy M. Melton, Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Caldwell, Oklahoma City, OK, for defendants.

ORDER

ALLEY, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Plaintiffs have filed a response to defendants' motion and defendants have filed a reply; therefore, this issue is ripe for decision. After reviewing the briefs and attached evidence, the Court rules as follows.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

Plaintiff Kristi Gerks ("Kristi") is the daughter of plaintiffs Carl and Christina Gerks ("the Gerks"). On September 24, 1991, Kristi, who has been diagnosed as being mentally handicapped and suffering from cerebral palsy, was attending a special education class taught by defendant Tracey Deathe ("Deathe") at Coronado Heights Elementary School ("Coronado Heights") in the Putnam City School District ("School District").

On that morning, Deathe instructed the children to go to the bathroom before classes started at 9 AM. Kristi had a documented fear of bathrooms and, although Kristi refused to go with the other children, Deathe eventually persuaded her to do so. When Kristi did not return with the rest of the class after some time, Deathe asked the classroom assistant to check the bathroom. Upon returning, the assistant asked Deathe to come to the bathroom, where Deathe found three piles of excrement on the bathroom floor. Kristi was still inside the bathroom at the time. Deathe walked back to her class to get paper towels and then returned to the bathroom where she asked Kristi to help her clean up the piles. Kristi was reluctant to assist Deathe and would frequently stop to talk with Deathe, eventually ceasing to make any progress. Deathe then told Kristi that she was going to leave the bathroom and Kristi was going to remain inside and clean the mess. Kristi then repeatedly returned to Deathe with the same paper towel. After another while, Deathe told Kristi that she was going to hold the door of the bathroom shut while Kristi cleaned. Deathe then used a white ribbon to keep the bathroom door shut, checking Kristi's progress sporadically. After Kristi cleaned the bulk of the mess, Deathe attempted to clean Kristi and gave her new clothes.

While Kristi was in the bathroom, Deathe asked the school principal, Nancy Krodel ("Krodel"), to observe the mess and talk to Kristi. Krodel saw the piles and asked Kristi what happened, to which Kristi did not respond. Later, after she changed Kristi's clothes, Deathe took Kristi to Krodel's office where Krodel talked to her about her behavior and told her that big girls didn't make a mess on the bathroom floor. Krodel also showed Kristi a paddle to let her know what happened when children did not obey school rules. Krodel then let Kristi return to class and subsequently wrote up a disciplinary report about Kristi's behavior. The entire incident lasted almost the whole morning of that day, nearly three hours.

On October 4, 1991, the Gerks met with Assistant Superintendent Bill Spaeth ("Spaeth") and Dr. Siano about Kristi's placement. Spaeth offered them a placement for Kristi in the only other trainable mentally handicapped class, which was also in Coronado Heights. At the time, the Gerks indicated that Kristi was going to be re-evaluated and Spaeth mentioned that there could be other placement possibilities depending upon the results of the new evaluation. The Gerks rejected the offer of placement in the other class at Coronado Heights and refused to allow Kristi to return to the school. Spaeth agreed to provide Kristi with a homebound tutor pending the results of her testing and a meeting to discuss Kristi's education plan ("IEP") was to be scheduled. The Gerks subsequently moved out of the Putnam City School District to Edmond, Oklahoma. Kristi now attends public school in the Edmond Public Schools. After the meeting with Spaeth, the School District sent notices to the Gerks informing them of their right to have a due process hearing to review Kristi's educational plan; however, the Gerks did not file a request for a hearing.

On September 1, 1992, the Gerks filed an initial complaint against Deathe, teaching assistant Pat Knuppenberg ("Knuppenberg"), Krodel, Spaeth, School District Superintendent Ralph Downs ("Downs"), and the School District alleging violations of the Individuals With Disabilities' Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq. In addition, the Gerks alleged violations of Kristi's constitutional rights and various common law torts which resulted from the occurrences at Coronado Heights. On January 20, 1993, the Court stayed this action pending exhaustion of administrative remedies by the Gerks. On March 5, 1993, the plaintiffs reported that they were unable to obtain a due process hearing from the Oklahoma State Department of Education because they no longer lived in the original school district. On June 22, 1993, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging violations of Kristi's Fourteenth Amendment rights by the same defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged the state common law torts of false imprisonment and outrage against defendant Deathe.¹ The plaintiffs have asked for both actual damages, including medical and moving expenses, and punitive damages.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the party seeking summary judgment. In addition, the inferences drawn from the facts presented must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2806, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982). Nonetheless, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply allege that there are disputed issues of fact; rather the party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).

A. Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim

In the context of school discipline, the standard for finding a substantive due process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is "whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of power literally shocking to the conscience." Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.1980)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988). Plaintiffs claim that Deathe's actions on the morning of September 24, 1991 were so outrageous as to be a substantive violation of Kristi's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Deathe contends that nothing she did affected Kristi's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, in order to determine whether Deathe violated Kristi's rights, we must first look to whether the Fourteenth Amendment was implicated by anything that happened that morning.

The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The closest analytic framework to Kristi's circumstance can be found in the jurisprudence concerning corporal punishment. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977), the Supreme Court held that corporal punishment did involve Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court stated, "At least where school authorities, acting under color of law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated." Id. at 674, 97 S.Ct. at 1414.² The Ingraham Court then continued by analyzing the circumstances surrounding corporal punishment, finding that a procedural due process violation does not occur as long as "common law constraints and remedies" remain. Id. at 683, 97 S.Ct. at 1419.

Ingraham left open the possibility that the use of corporal punishment may be so severe as to be a substantive violation of the Due Process Clause. The Tenth Circuit has addressed this issue in two main decisions. In Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir.1982), the court found that the use of certain disciplinary techniques by a...