Gerla v. City of Tacoma
| Decision Date | 11 March 1975 |
| Citation | 533 P.2d 416,12 Wn.App. 883 |
| Parties | John G. GERLA, Respondent, v. The CITY OF TACOMA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant. .no. 1083--II. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
William J. Barker, F. H. Chapin, Jr., Asst. City Attys., Robert R. Hamilton, City Atty., Tacoma, for appellant.
Alan Rasmussen, Spanaway, for respondent.
The City of Tacoma appeals an adverse judgment in a suit brought by plaintiff, John G. Gerla, claiming inverse condemnation arising out of an action by the City's Planning Commission. 1
The primary issue raised on appeal is whether or not a condition attached to the issuance of a special use permit granted to plaintiff's tenant, Mobil Oil Corporation, was a valid exercise of the City's police power.
Answer to the primary issue necessitates a consideration of the following questions:
(1) Did the City have statutory authority to impose the condition?
(2) Did the City's ordinance authorize imposition of the condition?
(3) From a factual standpoint, was the condition reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose, or on the other hand, was it unreasonably burdensome to the plaintiff under the circumstances?
The facts giving rise to the controversy may be summarized as follows. Plaintiff owned a parcel of real property on the southwest corner of East 72nd Street and Portland Avenue in the city of Tacoma. He negotiated a lease with Mobil Oil Corporation for the latter to erect and operate a gasoline service station. The trial court found that plaintiff was aware that before the City would allow construction of a service station at that location it would probably require a dedication to the City of 6 feet of the property abutting South 72nd for a length of 138 feet and another strip 12 feet in width for a length of 124 feet abutting on Portland Avenue. The required dedication would permit the widening of both major arterial streets to accommodate anticipated increases in the volume of traffic, would allow for the addition of right and left turn lanes at the intersection, and would also provide space for the construction of sidewalks and curbs.
Plaintiff was aware of the probability of these requirements, since the Planning Commission, of which he was a member, had imposed like conditions upon other service stations in other areas as well as upon other businesses in the area involved. The preliminary lease with Mobil Oil Corporation took into account the probability of this type of condition.
The property involved was located within a C--2 (commercial zone) and consequently eligible under Tacoma's zoning ordinance for use as an automobile service station. However, because of the hazardous nature of this type of business, another city ordinance (No. 18628) required a prospective applicant to obtain a special use permit and to comply with detailed development standards. Section D(1) of Tacoma Ordinance No. 18628 is part of a provision setting standards for service station development, and that section itself provides for a minimum lot size for service stations 'after dedication of all required street right of way.'
Mobil Oil Corporation's representative formally applied to the Planning Commission for the special use permit. Following a hearing in which testimony was taken, the commission determined to issue the permit on the condition, among several others not in controversy, that plaintiff dedicate the two strips of property so that the two streets could be widened and sidewalks and curbs installed.
At this point the plaintiff entered into an oral stipulation with the City which departed from the normal procedure of appealing the condition to the City Council and from there to the superior court. The City Attorney advises us that to accommodate plaintiff in his desire to proceed with development of the service station and to accommodate a test case on the validity of the condition, plaintiff was allowed to deed the properties to the City in compliance with the condition attached to issuance of the permit, and still reserve his right to collaterally attack the Planning Commission's action. In this regard, the trial court found that plaintiff complied with the condition while at the same time 'reserving his right to question the authority of the City to require the dedication of the said property.' In the meantime, the deeds have been recorded, the streets widened, the sidewalks installed, and the service station has been erected and is in operation.
The 'test case' then took the form of an inverse condemnation action, 2 in which plaintiff sought compensation for the two strips of land which he had dedicated to the City. The form of this action caused two departures from established procedures for judicial review of administrative actions. First, evidence was allowed and considered which was clearly not before the Planning Commission. Plaintiff, who had not been a witness before the Planning Commission, testified at length concerning traffic conditions as they existed both before and after the service station commenced operation. Also, the court made two visits to the scene and commented at length upon the traffic flow in its oral decision. Obviously these observations were used by the court in concluding that the service station had not caused an 'immediate danger of congestion.'
Had normal appellate review been utilized, the court could properly consider only the evidence put before the Planning Commission. Such evidence could not have included more than expectations of congestion, or the lack thereof, generating from the new service station. While it seems unfair to the City to allow its administrative actions to be reviewed by independent and 'after the fact' evidence, in the absence of an objection, we must assume that this evidence was properly considered.
The second departure from normal review procedure involves the scope of review, and poses a much more serious problem. The trial court obviously made an independent review of the factual issues and applied a 'preponderance of the evidence' test in arriving at its decision, rather than an 'arbitrary and capricious' standard normally required in judicial review of administrative actions. It is axiomatic that administrative actions, if properly authorized under zoning ordinances, may be interfered with by the courts only if they are conducted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Evergreen State Builders, Inc. v. Pierce County, 9 Wash.App. 973, 516 P.2d 775 (1973). Applying any other standard for review of the decision of the Planning Commission would, we think, defeat the purpose of the action as stipulated by the parties, I.e., to test the validity of the condition imposed in connection with grant of the permit. Accordingly, we believe that in order to reverse the Planning Commission's factual determination of the need for the condition, the trial court would have to find that the imposition of the condition, as applied to the evidence before it, was willful and unreasoning, without consideration and in disregard of facts and circumstances. Evergreen State Builders, Inc. v. Pierce County, Supra.
It was noted in Evergreen that where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though the court might believe that an erroneous conclusion was reached by the Planning Commission. Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955); State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. 99 v. Bruno, 59 Wash.2d 366, 367 P.2d 995 (1962).
For these reasons, if the Planning Commission's factual determination was not 'arbitrary and capricious' when applied to the facts, the trial court was in error in its conclusion, even though the result might be proper by application of a 'preponderance of the evidence' test. See Sharninghouse v. Bellingham, 4 Wash.App. 198, 480 P.2d 233 (1971).
The trial court's ruling against the City was based largely upon three grounds, two legal and one factual: (1) that the City acted 'without authority in law' in imposing the condition upon grant of the permit; (2) that the Tacoma City Code, Sec. 13.06.376, did not expressly authorize the dedication of such property; and (3) since the City failed to establish that the service station would pose an 'immediate danger' of traffic congestion, the condition imposed was 'without basis in fact.'
For the reasons stated below, in our view these rulings were in error. We first consider the general authority of the City to impose the type of condition involved. We note that the trial court was without the benefit of State ex rel. Standard Mining & Devel. Corp. v. Auburn, 82 Wash.2d 321, 510 P.2d 467 (1973). 3 That case discusses the general statutes through which cities are allowed to regulate and impose restrictions upon the use of land. It would be unnecessarily repetitious to review the Supreme Court's careful analysis of the statutory power of cities to delegate to planning commissions the authority to require permits for special uses of land. The principal requirement for the issuance of such permits is that they be guided by adequate standards. Durocher v. King County, 80 Wash.2d 139, 492 P.2d 547 (1972).
More importantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Standard Mining & Devel. Corp. v. Auburn, Supra, held that cities have inherent power to impose reasonable conditions and restrictions on the issuance of special use permits, even though the imposition of such conditions is not guided by specific standards. 3 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 15.29 (1968). To be valid, such conditions must (1) not offend any provision of the zoning ordinance, (2) not require illegal conduct on the part of the permittee, (3) be in the public interest, (4) be reasonably calculated to achieve some legitimate objective of the zoning ordinance, and (5) not be unnecessarily burdensome or onerous to the land owner. State...
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Table of Cases
...1 Wash. 587, 21 P. 314 (1889): 11.2(3)(a) Gerald v. San Juan Cnty., 43 Wn. App. 54, 715 P.2d 149 (1986): 2.2(2) Gerla v. City of Tacoma, 12 Wn. App. 883, 533 P.2d 416 (1975), review denied, 85 Wn.2d 1011 (1975): 7.3(1) Ghione v. State, 26 Wn.2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946): 12.2(5)(c)(i), 12.2(......
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§ 7.3 - Sources of Authority
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