Gerlach v. Cove Apartments, LLC

Decision Date13 May 2019
Docket NumberNo. 77179-5-I,77179-5-I
Citation8 Wash.App.2d 813,446 P.3d 624
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
Parties Kimberly J. GERLACH, Respondent, v. The COVE APARTMENTS, LLC, a Washington corporation; and Weidner Property Management, LLC, a Washington corporation, Appellants, and Weidner Apartment Homes, a Washington business entity, dba The Cove Apartments, and Weidner Asset Management LLC, a Washington corporation, Defendants.

Pauline Victoria Smetka, Helsell Fetterman LLP, 1001 4th Ave. Ste. 4200, Seattle, WA, 98154-1154, Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick/Tribe, 2775 Harbor Ave. Sw, Third Floor, Ste. C, Seattle, WA, 98126-2138, for Appellants.

Benjamin Franklin Barcus, Paul Alexander Lindenmuth, Ben F. Barcus & Associates PLLC, 4303 Ruston Way, Tacoma, WA, 98402-5313, Simon Henri Forgette, Attorney at Law, Janis Mary Nevler, Simon H. Forgette P.S., 406 Market St. Ste. A, Kirkland, WA, 98033-6135, Howard Mark Goodfriend, Catherine Wright Smith, Smith Goodfriend PS, 1619 8th Ave. N, Seattle, WA, 98109-3007, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Smith, J. ¶1 Kimberly Gerlach sued The Cove Apartments LLC and Weidner Property Management LLC (collectively Cove) after she fell from a second story apartment balcony with a rotted railing and suffered life threatening injuries. Gerlach was extremely intoxicated at the time of the fall. At trial, Cove sought to limit its liability by proving that Gerlach's intoxication was the proximate cause of her damages and that she was more than 50 percent at fault, in accordance with the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication under RCW 5.40.060(1). Because the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Gerlach’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident and that exclusion prejudiced Cove’s ability to prove Gerlach’s intoxication proximately caused her injuries, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

¶2 On October 26, 2012, Gerlach and her boyfriend Nathan Miller, along with Colin and Brodie Liddell,1 went to a birthday party and then to a bar within walking distance of Miller’s apartment. Miller lived in a second story unit at The Cove Apartments in Federal Way, which were owned by The Cove Apartments LLC and managed by Weidner Property Management LLC. After the bar closed in the early hours of October 27, Miller and Colin stopped by a convenience store to buy beer, while Gerlach and Brodie returned to Miller’s apartment. Brodie stopped to smoke a cigarette before going inside. While he was smoking, he heard a snap and turned in time to see Gerlach in midair, just before she landed head-first on a concrete step on the ground floor. A rotted railing from Miller’s balcony also fell near Gerlach. Gerlach suffered a life threatening head injury as a result of the fall.

¶3 Gerlach sued Cove, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW, and negligence. The breach of contract claim was dismissed on summary judgment because Gerlach was not a tenant and had no contractual relationship with Cove.

¶4 Although no one witnessed how Gerlach fell and Gerlach does not remember the events of that night, her theory at trial was that the severely rotted railing on Miller’s balcony gave way while she was leaning on it, causing her to fall to the ground. Relying on testimony from a biomechanical expert, Cove proffered an alternative theory: that Gerlach did not have a key to the front door, tried to enter the apartment via the balcony, and fell while trying to climb over the balcony railing from the outside. This theory supported Cove’s affirmative defense under RCW 5.40.060(1) that Gerlach was intoxicated at the time of the accident, her intoxication was a proximate cause of her injuries, and she was more than 50 percent at fault. To this end, Cove attempted to introduce evidence that Gerlach’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of the accident was .238 and expert testimony on how a BAC of that level would affect a person’s judgment, psychomotor functions, and cognitive abilities. The trial court excluded this evidence and testimony because it found they were more prejudicial than probative. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that Gerlach "was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident."

¶5 The jury found that Cove was negligent and that its negligence proximately caused Gerlach’s injuries. It also found that Gerlach was contributorily negligent and seven percent at fault. The jury verdict was $3,799,793.78, and the net award to Gerlach was $3,533,808.23.

¶6 Cove appeals.

ANALYSIS

Exclusion of Gerlach’s Blood Alcohol Level

¶7 Cove argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Gerlach’s blood alcohol level and that the exclusion was prejudicial. We agree.

¶8 We reverse a trial court’s evidentiary rulings only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Subia v. Riveland, 104 Wash. App. 105, 113-14, 15 P.3d 658 (2001). "A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons." In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wash.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). But an error does not require reversal unless it is prejudicial, and "[e]rror will not be considered prejudicial unless it affects, or presumptively affects, the outcome of the trial."

Brown v. Spokane County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 100 Wash.2d 188, 196, 668 P.2d 571 (1983).

¶9 "All relevant evidence is admissible unless its admissibility is otherwise limited." Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 168 Wash.2d 664, 669, 230 P.3d 583 (2010) ; ER 402. "Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’ " Salas, 168 Wash.2d at 669, 230 P.3d 583 (quoting ER 401). ER 403 allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ...." "When evidence is likely to stimulate an emotional response rather than a rational decision, a danger of unfair prejudice exists." Salas, 168 Wash.2d at 671, 230 P.3d 583. Where evidence is undeniably probative of a central issue in the case, the ability of the danger of unfair prejudice to substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence is " ‘quite slim.’ " Sisley v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 171 Wash. App. 227, 232, 286 P.3d 974 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash.2d 206, 224, 867 P.2d 610 (1994) ).

¶10 Here, Cove asserted a voluntary intoxication defense against Gerlach. This defense, codified as RCW 5.40.060(1), provides a complete defense to Gerlach's action for personal injury if she was intoxicated, her intoxication was a proximate cause of her injury, and she was more than 50 percent at fault. RCW 5.40.060(1) states:

[I]t is a complete defense to an action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death that the person injured or killed was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or death and that such condition was a proximate cause of the injury or death and the trier of fact finds such person to have been more than fifty percent at fault.

¶11 Before trial, Gerlach moved in limine to exclude evidence of a blood test taken by the hospital less than an hour after the accident. The test showed that her serum alcohol measurement was 252 mg/dL, which roughly translates to a BAC of .238. After several hearings, the trial court granted Gerlach’s motion because Gerlach offered to stipulate to the jury that she was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The court determined that if Gerlach admitted she was intoxicated, evidence of her blood alcohol level was not necessary to establish a defense under RCW 5.40.060(1). The trial court explained that, under Peralta v. State, 187 Wash.2d 888, 389 P.3d 596 (2017), an admission of intoxication was sufficient to establish intoxication under RCW 5.40.060(1) and the admission of Gerlach’s blood alcohol level would have been more prejudicial than probative under ER 403. Because the trial court misapplied Peralta and ER 403, its exclusion of the blood alcohol evidence was an abuse of discretion.

¶12 ER 403 does not support the exclusion of the blood alcohol evidence. Although evidence of Gerlach’s blood alcohol level was irrelevant to establish intoxication once she admitted that she was intoxicated, that evidence was still relevant to prove the extent to which her intoxication proximately caused her injuries. To that end, Cove was prepared to offer expert testimony that a person’s physical and cognitive limitations at a BAC of .238 make it less likely that she could safely stand on a balcony or climb over a railing. Although Gerlach’s high blood alcohol level could stimulate an emotional response in a jury, it is not so prejudicial that its probative value is outweighed. Because Gerlach’s percentage of fault was reserved for the jury, the jury should have been able to consider Gerlach’s level of intoxication and how it may have affected her physical and cognitive abilities. Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 837-38, 854 P.2d 1061 (1993) (the determination of the percentage of total fault attributable to each party is specifically reserved for the trier of fact).

¶13 Furthermore, the trial court’s error in excluding the blood alcohol evidence affected the outcome of the trial. Because of the error, Cove did not have the opportunity to present evidence on a key factual issue: whether Gerlach was predominantly liable for her injuries due to her level of intoxication. See Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 839, 854 P.2d 1061 ("[W]hen a person has voluntarily engaged in behavior which increases the risk of injury, he or she may be held to be predominantly liable for the injuries occurring as a result thereof.")....

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5 cases
  • Gerlach v. Cove Apartments, LLC
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • August 27, 2020
    ...and related expert testimony and this error was prejudicial to Cove's ability to present its defense. Gerlach v. Cove Apts., LLC , 8 Wash. App. 2d 813, 817, 446 P.3d 624 (2019). The Court of Appeals also concluded the trial court erred by denying Cove's motion for summary judgment on Gerlac......
  • Coogan v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec Inc.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • February 19, 2020
    ... ... 1988)). Other courts have repeated this admonition. E.g., ... Gerlach v. Cove Apts., LLC, 8 Wn.App. 2d 813, 820, 446 ... P.3d 624, review granted, 193 Wn.2d ... ...
  • Coogan v. Borg-Warner Morse TEC Inc.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • February 19, 2020
    ...F.2d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 1988)). Other courts have repeated this admonition. E.g., Gerlach v. Cove Apts., LLC, 8 Wn. App. 2d 813, 820, 446 P.3d 624, review granted, 193 Wn.2d 1037 (2019); Lodis, 192 Wn. App. at 48. We review the exclusion of evidence under ER 403 for an abuse of discretio......
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    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 18, 2019
    ...App. Div. 2015). Reimbursement rates are not relevant to show whether a medical charge is reasonable. See Gerlach v. Cove Apartments, LLC , 8 Wash.App.2d 813, 446 P.3d 624, 633 (2019) ; see also State v. Campbell , 296 Or.App. 22, 438 P.3d 448, 457 n.14 (2019) (reasonable value of medical c......
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