Gerlock v. Gabel

• Decision Date: 14 March 1955
• Citation: 112 A.2d 78,380 Pa. 471
• Parties: Mary E. GERLOCK, Appellant, v. Margaret M. GABEL.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

112 A.2d 78

380 Pa. 471

Mary E. GERLOCK, Appellant, v. Margaret M. GABEL.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 14, 1955

Suit by mother against daughter seeking decree that daughter held title to certain realty as trustee for mother and that daughter be directed to reconvey it subject only to mother's obligation to repay amount advanced by daughter to purchase such realty. The Court of Common Pleas, County of Cumberland, at No. 3, March Term, 1953, in Equity, Mark E Garber, J., entered decree for defendant and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, No. 332, January Term, 1954 Stern, C. J., held that plaintiff, having authorized deed given by trustee of such realty to her daughter, was estopped in equity to challenge validity of title thus conveyed at her own instance and direction.

Affirmed.

Sidney E. Friedman, Harrisburg, Clinton R. Weidner, Carlisle, for appellant.

Robert L. Myers, Jr., Myers & Myers, Lemoyne, Arthur B. Myers, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY and MUSMANNO, JJ.

STERN Chief Justice.

Although a considerable amount of testimony was taken in this case some of the factual background unfortunately remains obscure.

Plaintiff, Mary E. Gerlock, and defendant, Margaret M. Gabel, are mother and daughter. Plaintiff and her husband owned properties numbers 630 and 632 Enola Road, West Fairview, Cumberland County, subject to a mortgage of $2,400 held by one Andrew J. Ryan. In 1920 Ryan foreclosed the mortgage after giving written instructions to his attorney, S. S. Rupp, Esq., to purchase the property at the execution sale and hold it in trust to sell and to account to Ryan for the proceeds. Accordingly Rupp purchsed the property for the sum of some $200 and received a sheriff's deed in his name as trustee. In 1921 he sold 630 Enola Road to one Daniel E. Grubb for $1,819 but continued to hold number 632 under the Ryan trust. In 1923 Ryan, for some undisclosed reason, stating that he had received full satisfaction of the mortgage debt and interest, executed a power of attorney to the Recorder to mark the mortgage satisfied although apparently he had not in fact recovered the full amount of the debt and although the foreclosure sale had itself discharged the lien. Rupp died in 1945 and among his papers there was found a written statement by him that he held the property 632 Enola Road as trustee for the plaintiff to dispose of at her direction and request. The only plausible explanation of the obvious inconsistency between his trusteeship for Ryan and this acknowledgment of a trusteeship for plaintiff is that Ryan was apparently willing to let plaintiff, who had at all times occupied the property, continue to live there and be the equitable owner thereof, subject only to payment of the unpaid balance of the mortgage indebtedness and, meanwhile, the interest thereon as it accrued from time to time. Plaintiff remained in the property and paid the interest periodically to Rupp, trustee, as it fell due.

When Mr. Rupp died plaintiff filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County a petition which she signed and swore to and in which she stated that Rupp had held 632 Enola Road in Trust for her and that she desired title thereto to be transferred for the sum of $1.00 to Margaret M. Gabel; therefore she asked the court to appoint a substituted trustee in Rupp's place for the sole purpose of transferring the title to Margaret M. Gabel. The court, in pursuance of her request, appointed William M. Young, Esq. as substituted trustee. On May 1, 1946, plaintiff and defendant met at the office of an attorney, and there, in pursuance of an oral agreement which they had previously entered into, the attorney delivered to defendant a deed executed by Young as trustee and which conveyed to her a fee simple title to the premises, while at the same time defendant delivered to the attorney her check in the sum of $1,223.10-presumably representing the remaining unpaid balance of the mortgage and interest thereon-to the order of Andrew J. Ryan, who, in person, the day before, had again entered satisfaction of the mortgage. Ryan is now deceased. Upon the death of plaintiff's husband in 1952 plaintiff demanded of defendant the return of the property, offering to repay her the $1,223 which she had expended. Defendant refused the request, whereupon plaintiff instituted the present proceedings.

In the pieadings, and as the case was tried, there was presented only one issue, namely: what were the terms of the oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant in regard to the transfer of the title to defendant? In plaintiff's complaint in equity, after reciting the appointment of Young as substituted trustee at her instigation for the purpose of transferring title to defendant and that the deed was executed and delivered by him to defendant pursuant to the authority thus given him, she alleged that ‘ in so requesting and directing the said deed to be made, executed and delivered by the substituted trustee, the plaintiff relied upon the express agreements and promises to her of the defendant’ (1) that defendant was merely being substituted as trustee for Rupp and the property was to remain the property of plaintiff, the legal title to continue in the name of defendant only until plaintiff should ‘ need or request some other arrangement,’ at which time she would be entitled to receive a reconveyance of the property upon the repayment to defendant of the mortgage money advanced by her; (2) that during the period in which title remained in defendant plaintiff should live in the premises without paying rent, should be allowed to collect and retain the rentals received from apartments in the building, should pay...