Gest v. Gest

• Decision Date: 01 August 1933
• Citation: 167 A. 909,117 Conn. 289
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GEST v. GEST et al.

167 A. 909

117 Conn. 289

GEST v. GEST et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

August 1, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Carl Foster, Judge.

Action of ejectment, brought to the superior court by Lillian Gest against Guion M. Gest and another, who filed special defenses, and the named defendant filed a cross-complaint claiming that title to the premises be vested in him. By stipulation the issues were tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Error and new trial ordered.

Daniel E. Ryan and Matthew H. Kenealy, both of Stamford, for appellant.

Raymond E. Hackett, of Stamford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The plaintiff, the named defendant, and the other defendant Sylvia Gest, are wife, husband, and daughter, respectively. This action was commenced as one in ejectment; the plaintiff alleging ownership of premises in Darien and wrongful possession thereof by the two defendants. The defendants each deniedownership in the plaintiff, and alleged in substance that the premises were purchased by the defendant Guion M. Gest on or about June 27, 1908, with moneys belonging to him, and title was placed in the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement between the plaintiff and him that he would be and continue to be the actual owner that the premises were at all times to be considered and occupied as a home and domicile by and for the plaintiff and the defendants; that Guion M. Gest should pay all expenses and charges for maintenance, including taxis, interest, etc., and that the legal title would be conveyed by the plaintiff to him at any time upon request, and that the premises were to be at all times available to him for use and possession; that thereafter, and up to December 4, 1931, the premises were used and occupied by all of the parties as a home, and Guion M. Gest paid all expenses for their maintenance, and did all things required of him pursuant to the terms of the agreement; that the plaintiff is not now, and never has been, the actual owner of the property, but title thereto is held by her under an implied and resulting trust for the benefit of Guion M. Gest as the actual owner. The defendant Guion M. Gest, who will be hereafter referred to as the defendant, also filed a cross-complaint, making the allegations of his answer part thereof, alleging that on or about January 31, 1932, the plaintiff attempted to exclude him from possession of the premises, and violated the terms of the agreement pursuant to which title was placed in her name, and claiming a decree directing the plaintiff to convey the title to him or that title be otherwise vested in him. The plaintiff filed general denial to the special defenses and the cross-complaint.

The parties stipulated that the issues be tried to a jury, the case was so tried, and a verdict returned finding the issues for the defendants on both complaint and cross-complaint. The jury also answered and returned interrogatories, submitted to them, as follows:

‘ (1) When the plaintiff received the deed to the property described in the complaint, did she become the owner of such property? Ans. No.

‘ (2) When the plaintiff received the deed to the property described in the complaint, did she take the property to hold the same in trust for her husband Guion M. Gest? Ans. Yes.’

Thereafter the court entered judgment that the defendant is the equitable owner of the property in question and that the legal and record title thereto be and is vested in him.

The paramount issue framed by the pleadings was whether the property was the defendant's absolutely or was subject to a resulting trust in favor of the defendant. The finding shows that upon the evidence there was no dispute that the premises, which are residence property, were purchased by the defendant in 1908 for $16,000 paid by him, but title was taken in the name of the plaintiff. That until December 4, 1931, the premises were used and occupied by the plaintiff, the defendant, their daughter, and their son until his marriage, as a home, but on that date, as a result of a dispute regarding the discharge of a chauffeur, the plaintiff removed to a hotel in Stamford; the defendant remaining in possession. The plaintiff offered evidence that the premises were to be her property, that there was no agreement between her and the defendant that she was to hold title in trust for him, that she did not know that he intended that she should so hold it, but believed at all times that the property belonged to her absolutely and treated it accordingly.

The defendant introduced evidence substantially in accordance with the allegations of his special defense and cross-complaint as above set forth, and, in addition to other matters not of present importance, that it was his purpose and intention, in purchasing the property, to establish a home for himself and his family; that he was then and is now in the contracting business, which he has carried on in his own name, and in the conduct of which it was necessary for him to travel extensively and to be away from home for long periods of time; and that there was a considerable personal risk attached to the conduct of his business. The finding states further that the defendant offered evidence that he ‘ placed the legal title to said premises in the name of the plaintiff for the purpose of building up for himself a personal estate separate and apart from his business estate. His purpose in doing this was for a matter of convenience only.’ The appellant seeks to have added to the finding as to the defendant's offers of proof statements from her draft finding that ‘ his business was fraught with the usual risks among persons with whom he did business and he did not want this property subjected to unjustifiable claims and law suits; ’ also that the legal title was placed in the plaintiff for the purpose of putting the premises beyond the risks and liabilities that the defendant might incur in the conduct of his personal business enterprises.

The record shows that in explanation of his action in causing the title to be taken in his wife's name the defendant testified on direct examination: ‘ My business was of a construction nature and it took me all over the country and Canada and even South America. It was fraught with risk and I did not want anything to happen to my family and I always considered it advisable to keep my affairs in such shape and my home so that they would be protected. I ran my business as a going concern, as an individual, and never incorporated, and I had built up this estate, which I called my estate to everybody, and kept it separate from my business affairs.’ Being asked on cross-examination why such an estate could not have been built up in his own name, he replied: ‘ For the simple reason that any number of suits brought against a man are not justified. A man is liable to attacked from any source and it is not a matter of good business prudence to lay yourself open when going from one end of country to the other, to be attacked by anybody that pleases; ’ and later: ‘ It was merely a question of building up an estate independent from my business. I had my business and I had my family, and I carried it on that way, quite independently. I created an estate for the benefit of my family.’ He also admitted that he believed that, if he met with reverses, the property would be beyond the reach of business debts, although claiming he would always make it available for them. Notwithstanding the limitations upon the correction of a finding in a jury case, in order that its function in testing the adequacy and accuracy of the charge may be served, the appellant is fairly entitled to have included in the finding a substantial statement of the defendant's evidence as to his purposes in placing title in the name of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff requested that there be submitted to the jury interrogatories (1) whether the defendant, in arranging to have the property placed in the name of his wife, did so with the intent to place it beyond the reach of creditors and the risks of business, and (2) if it be found that there was a separate agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff was to hold the property for the benefit of the defendant, was it the purpose of the agreement to place the title in such form as to be beyond the reach of creditors of the defendant and beyond the risks of his business? The case as it went to trial involved demands for equitable relief. In such a situation the better practice is to submit to the jury the appropriate issues, the court, upon their findings, to grant the proper relief claimed. Answers to interrogatories as well as the verdict are appropriate to aid the court in rendering judgment. Kornblau v. McDermant, 90 Conn. 624, 638, 98 A. 587; Roy v. Moore, 85 Conn. 159, 168, 82 A. 233. The interrogatories which were submitted to the jury were adapted and perhaps sufficient to the issue of the existence of a resulting trust, but, as we have seen, in the course of presentation of the defendant's case, evidence had been introduced the effect of which might be to interject the element of fraudulent conveyance and to give rise to a question as to the defendant's right to equitable relief. The interrogatories proposed by the plaintiff not only definitely indicated her claim to the benefit of that obstacle, but were adapted to test its existence. They might well have been submitted, in substance, but, in view of later conclusions, we have no need to decide whether the failure to do so would, of itself, constitute reversible error. Ford v. H. W. Dubiskie & Co., 105 Conn. 572, 582, 136 A. 560.

The only...