Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, No. 91-2278
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and HANSEN; HANSEN |
Citation | 969 F.2d 664 |
Parties | GET AWAY CLUB, INC., Appellee, v. Vic COLEMAN, Jim Snyder, Appellants. |
Docket Number | No. 91-2278 |
Decision Date | 13 July 1992 |
Page 664
v.
Vic COLEMAN, Jim Snyder, Appellants.
Eighth Circuit.
Decided July 13, 1992.
Page 665
J. Mark Lewis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., argued, for appellants.
Bill McLean, Little Rock, Ark., argued, for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Vic Coleman and Jim Snyder (the "troopers"), both members of the Arkansas State Police, appeal from the district court's partial denial of their motion for summary judgment on claims brought against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court held that the troopers were not entitled to qualified immunity and that a genuine issue of material fact still exists concerning the location and frequency of the state police roadblocks which are at the core of Get Away's complaint. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The troopers conducted both roadblocks and stationary patrols in 1989 along Highway 165 near Dumas, Arkansas, on which both Get Away Club, Inc. and another competing liquor-dispensing establishment, Pendleton Marina, are located. Get Away contends that the troopers have impermissibly "singled-out" its premises by conducting the roadblocks and stationary patrols "approximately three or four times per week within 200 yards" of its premises. Get Away alleges that the troopers' actions
Page 666
have caused an economic hardship by depriving it of "significant revenues." Get Away argues that this action constitutes a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment without the payment of just compensation.The troopers disagree. They contend that the 1989 police radio log indicates that only five roadblocks were conducted in 1989 along Highway 165. Moreover, the troopers contend that the roadblocks were conducted outside the view from Get Away's premises. The troopers also emphasize the fact that they conducted the roadblocks and stationary patrols in conformity with the consent decree entered into by the Arkansas State Police that sets forth the specific requirements for conducting a lawful roadblock in the State of Arkansas. See Garrett v. Goodwin, 569 F.Supp. 106 (E.D.Ark.1982). The troopers moved for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the claim for civil damages and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no genuine issue of material fact exists.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the troopers on Get Away's claim seeking relief on behalf of its patrons under the Fourth Amendment and on the alleged violations of the consent decree. The district court, however, denied summary judgment to the troopers on the issue of qualified immunity and also held that a material factual dispute remains concerning the location and frequency of the roadblocks and stationary patrols. The troopers appeal from this order.
II.
On appeal, this court's standard in reviewing a denial or grant of summary judgment by the district court is de novo. United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). Therefore, we apply the same standard as applied by the district court. United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir.1988). We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to Get Away. Economy Housing Co. v. Continental Forest Products, Inc., 757 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute between the parties as to any genuine issue of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Therefore, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties is not sufficient by itself to deny summary judgment to the troopers. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, "the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law." Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir.1989) (citation omitted).
III.
The troopers first argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the issue of civil damages as to Get Away's contention that their conduct constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The troopers contend that they acted in good faith and complied at all times with the consent decree. Get Away responds by arguing that the district court's denial of qualified immunity is correct because the troopers "either intentionally or by reckless disregard for [its] rights, have embarked on an alleged unreasonable course of conduct which could only damage [its] business."
In Siegert v. Gilley, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), the Supreme Court clarified the proper analysis for determining when a public official is entitled to qualified immunity. First, Get Away must assert a violation of its constitutional rights. Id. If no constitutional right has been asserted, Get Away's complaint must be dismissed. Id. If, however, Get Away asserts a violation of its constitutional rights, the second step in the analysis is to decide whether the applicable law pertaining to the constitutional...
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Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, CIV. 13-4051-KES
..." 'the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.' " Mosely, 415 F.3d at 911 (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992)). The general standard set forth in Rule 56 does not apply where, as here, the parties are seeking this court's review of ......
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Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, No. CIV. 13–4051–KES.
...“ ‘the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.’ ” Mosley, 415 F.3d at 911 (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992)). The general standard set forth in Rule 56 does not apply where, as here, the parties are seeking this court's review of a......
-
Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, No. CIV. 13–4051–KES.
...“ ‘the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.’ ” Mosley, 415 F.3d at 911 (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992) ). The general standard set forth in Rule 56 does not apply where, as here, the parties are seeking this court's review of ......
-
Hall v. Hormel Foods Corporation, 8:98CV304 (D. Neb. 2000), 8:98CV304.
...249-50 (1986); Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1124 (1998); Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir. Summary judgment is an extreme and treacherous devic......
-
Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, CIV. 13-4051-KES
..." 'the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.' " Mosely, 415 F.3d at 911 (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992)). The general standard set forth in Rule 56 does not apply where, as here, the parties are seeking this court's review of ......
-
Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, No. CIV. 13–4051–KES.
...“ ‘the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.’ ” Mosley, 415 F.3d at 911 (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992)). The general standard set forth in Rule 56 does not apply where, as here, the parties are seeking this court's review of a......
-
Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, No. CIV. 13–4051–KES.
...“ ‘the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.’ ” Mosley, 415 F.3d at 911 (quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir.1992) ). The general standard set forth in Rule 56 does not apply where, as here, the parties are seeking this court's review of ......
-
Hall v. Hormel Foods Corporation, 8:98CV304 (D. Neb. 2000), 8:98CV304.
...249-50 (1986); Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1124 (1998); Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 968 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir. Summary judgment is an extreme and treacherous devic......