Geter v. State

CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)
Citation115 So.3d 375
Docket NumberNo. 3D12–1736.,3D12–1736.
PartiesDrewery GETER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Decision Date26 June 2013

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Drewery Geter, in proper person.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before CORTIÑAS, ROTHENBERG, and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

CORTIÑAS, J.

Drewery Geter appeals a circuit court order denying his motion for postconvictionrelief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800.

Geter was arrested for first-degree murder in December 2000, on the eve of his seventeenth birthday. Earlier that same day, a rock or stone was thrown through the front window of the victim's home, breaking the window, and allowing Geter to gain entry into the home. The victim, in an attempt to defend her home, her child, and herself, struggled with Geter and struck him in the head with a crowbar. However, Geter was able to overpower the victim. He ripped the victim's panties from her body, raped her, and ejaculated inside her vagina.1 During the violent struggle between the victim and Geter, the victim's three-year-old son was awoken by his mother's screams.

After the rape, Geter got a butcher knife. He stabbed the victim in the neck eight to twelve times. Geter then cut the victim from her elbow to her wrist so that she would bleed faster and die. When the victim still had not died, Geter finally choked her to death. The victim's three-year old son witnessed the brutal murder of his mother. Before leaving the victim's home, Geter passed by the victim's son and told him to be a good boy.

On April 30, 2003, Geter was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment as a juvenile offender on June 23, 2003. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Geter's conviction and sentence on October 13, 2004. Geter's three subsequent postconviction motions were denied by this Court without discussion, on October 28, 2005, September 2, 2009, and May 12, 2010, respectively. Geter now files this 3.800 motion seeking postconviction relief on the basis of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The issue before this Court is whether Miller applies retroactively to postconviction proceedings involving a juvenile homicide offender whose conviction of first-degree murder and sentence to life imprisonment was final prior to the Miller decision. We conclude that under Florida law, Miller cannot be applied retroactively to Florida postconviction proceedings where the life sentence was already final when Miller was rendered. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order that denied Geter's motion for postconviction relief.

Recently, the Supreme Court in Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2461, held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment precludes juvenile homicide convictions that mandate a life sentence without first considering “mitigating factors of youth.” The Supreme Court explained that under Eighth Amendment guarantees, “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 2475 (emphasis added). Thus, the determination in Miller focuses on a new procedure for criminal sentencing. Id. As the Supreme Court clarified, [o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime, as for example, in [Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ] or [Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ].2 Instead [ Miller ] mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. Clearly and unequivocally, the Supreme Court distinguished between the substantive determinations of a categorical bar prohibiting a “penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime,” as in Roper and Graham, and the procedural determination in Miller that merely requires consideration of mitigating factors of youth in the sentencing process. Id.

In determining whether Florida law allows retroactive application, we must first consider the content of Miller itself. See Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Barrios–Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868, 871 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The Supreme Court's language in Miller did not explicitly state whether or not Miller should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, [t]o determine whether a new rule applies retroactively to final cases in postconviction proceedings, ... courts in Florida conduct a retroactivity analysis under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980).” Hernandez, 61 So.3d at 1150 (citation omitted); see also State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399, 403 (Fla.2011). Long ago, the Witt Court rejected “in the context of an alleged change of law, the use of postconviction relief proceedings to correct individual miscarriages of justice or to permit roving judicial error corrections, in the absence of fundamental and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding.” Witt, 387 So.2d at 929 (footnote omitted). In limiting the scope of postconviction relief, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that [t]o allow non-constitutional claims as bases for post-conviction relief is to permit a dual system of trial and appeal, the first being tentative and nonconclusive. Id. at 929–30. Our justice system could not accommodate such an expansion; our citizens would never tolerate the deleterious consequences for criminal punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.” Id. at 928–29.

As Witt explains,

[H]istory shows that most major constitutional changes are likely to fall within two broad categories. The first are those changes of law which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties. This category is exemplified by Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), which held that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult woman is forbidden by the eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. The second are those changes of law which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of [Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) ] and [Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) ]. Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335[, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799] (1963) ], of course, is the prime example of a law change included within this category.3Id. at 929 (footnotes omitted); see also Barrios–Cruz, 63 So.3d at 871;State v. Barnum, 921 So.2d 513, 519 (Fla.2005).

In contrast, [o]n the opposite end of the spectrum are ‘evolutionary refinements in the criminal law’ which, according to Witt, are not applied retroactively.” Barnum, 921 So.2d at 519 (quoting Witt, 387 So.2d at 929). Such refinements “include those ‘affording new or different standards for the admissibility of evidence, for procedural fairness, for proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters.’ Id. (quoting Witt, 387 So.2d at 929). Notably, [e]mergent rights in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this genre, do not compel an abridgement of the finality of judgments.” Witt, 387 So.2d at 929;see also Barnum, 921 So.2d at 519. The Florida Supreme Court warned that if these refinements were applied retroactively, such an impact would “destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit.” Witt, 387 So.2d at 929–30 (footnote omitted).

In applying Witt to the present case, Miller is evaluated to determine whether it (a) emanates from [the Supreme Court of Florida] or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance.” Hernandez, 61 So.3d at 1150 (quoting Witt, 387 So.2d at 931);see also Barnum, 921 So.2d at 524;Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So.2d 728, 730 (Fla.2005). The first two of the three elements are clearly met because Miller is a United States Supreme Court decision that is constitutional in nature. Accordingly, the question becomes whether Miller is a development of fundamental significance.

The Florida Supreme Court has proscribed three factors in assessing whether a constitutional determination is a development of fundamental significance. See Witt, 387 So.2d at 926;Barrios–Cruz, 63 So.3d at 871;see also Chandler, 916 So.2d at 730 (noting that these factors should be used to evaluate whether the constitutional determination is procedural rather than substantive in nature). This assessment includes analysis of: (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of a retroactive application of the new rule.” Witt, 387 So.2d at 926 (citations omitted); see also Barrios–Cruz, 63 So.3d at 871;Chandler, 916 So.2d 728. Ensuring that the legal development is a constitutional determination of fundamental significance prevents mere “evolutionary refinements” from being applied retroactively. See Witt, 387 So.2d at 929;Barnum, 921 So.2d at 526. As addressed below, a review of the three factors reveals that Miller is not a development of fundamental significance.

A. Purpose to be Served

First, the purpose to be served by Miller is a procedural change in law that provides for a new process in juvenile homicide sentencing. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471 (noting that Miller mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process before imposing life sentence). Like other decisions that have declined to retroactively apply constitutional determinations, Miller...

To continue reading

Request your trial
57 cases
  • People v. Wilder
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • February 26, 2015
    ... 412 P.3d 686 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Terrance WILDER, Defendant–Appellant. Court of Appeals No. 12CA0066 Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I. ... State v. Duncan, No. CR–13–0879, 185 So.3d 487, 2014 WL 4387707 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 5, 2014) ; Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ; Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). ¶ 67 In addition, the majority ......
  • Williams v. State, CR–12–1862.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • April 4, 2014
    ......5 Intermediate courts of appeal in Florida and Michigan have also determined that the rule announced in Miller is not a retroactive substantive rule. See Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375, 385 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) ("Accordingly, Miller does not warrant retroactive application to Florida juvenile homicide offenders whose convictions and sentences were final as of June 25, 2012, the date Miller was issued."); People v. Carp, 298 Mich.App. 472, 538, 828 ......
  • State v. Mantich
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • February 7, 2014
    ......         2. See, In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.2013) (en banc); Holland v. Hobbs, No. 5:12CV00463–SWW–JJV, 2013 WL 6332731 (E.D.Ark. Dec. 5, 2013); Johnson v. Ponton, No. 3:13–CV–404, 2013 WL 5663068 (E.D.Va. Oct. 16, 2013) (memorandum opinion); Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla.App.2012); State v. Tate, No.2012–OK–2763, 130 So.3d 829, 2013 WL 5912118 (La. Nov. 5, 2013); People v. Carp, 298 Mich.App. 472, 828 N.W.2d 685 (2012); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.2013); Com. v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa.2013); Craig v. Cain, ......
  • Ex parte Maxwell
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • March 12, 2014
    .......         [424 S.W.3d 67] Jon Evans, Austin, TX, for Applicant. Lisa Stewart, Assistant District Attorney, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, TX, for the State. OPINION COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which MEYERS, PRICE, JOHNSON and ALCALA, JJ., ...State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn.2013); People v. Carp, 298 Mich.App. 472, 828 N.W.2d 685, 711–14 (2012, pet. granted); Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375, 385 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012).          21. In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282–83 (3d Cir.2013) (per curiam) ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Miscellaneous
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books The Florida Criminal Cases Notebook. Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • April 30, 2021
    ...change in law. Gonzalez v. State, 101 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) agreeing with and adopting reasoning in Geter v. State , 115 So. 3d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) rejected by Toye v. State , 133 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) When defendant, who was 17 when he committed his crimes in 1985, is r......
  • Juvenile life without parole post-Miller: the long, treacherous road towards a categorical rule.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 91 No. 2, February - February 2014
    • February 1, 2014
    ...N.E.2d 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (retroactive); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (not retroactive); Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (not retroactive). There is similar disagreement among the federal courts. Compare In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT