Getty Oil Co. v. Corbin

Decision Date18 May 1983
Docket NumberNo. 16868,16868
Citation653 S.W.2d 342
PartiesGETTY OIL COMPANY, et al., Appellants, v. Ira C. CORBIN and wife, Berneice Corbin, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Walter Clay Cooke, Corpus Christi, for appellants.

Jay R. Sorrell, Pearsall, William R. Anderson, Jr., Corpus Christi, for appellees.

Before CANTU, TIJERINA and DIAL, JJ.

OPINION

TIJERINA, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order by the trial court denying appellants' pleas of privilege.

Ira and Berneice Corbin, appellees, are the owners of a 905.8 acre tract of land in Frio County, Texas. Appellees brought suit against appellants, alleging that appellants own working interests in an oil, gas and mineral lease covering the tract of land in question, and that appellants had failed to explore and develop the leased tract. All appellants filed pleas of privilege to be sued in the county of their residence or principal office. Appellees filed controverting pleas to each plea of privilege, claiming proper venue was in Frio County.

Appellants advance two points of error, contending that appellees, as a matter of law, failed to state a cause of action for the recovery of an interest in land or for damages sufficient to sustain venue in Frio County under article 1995(14). 1 Secondly, the corporate appellants contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's implied findings pursuant to article 1995(23). The record reflects that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor were they filed by the court. When no findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, the trial court judgment implies all necessary fact-findings in support of its judgment. Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.1979).

Appellants and appellees both cite Roach v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 574 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1978, no writ) as authority for the requirements to establish venue under article 1995(14). The statute requires that a suit to recover an interest in land or damages thereto be brought in the county where the land is located. Two venue facts must be established under subdivision (14): (1) the location of the land and (2) the nature of the plaintiff's claim, which is determined by the rights asserted and the relief sought in plaintiff's pleadings. Roach v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., supra at 202. Appellant does not dispute that the land in question is located in Frio County, thus we need only determine the nature of appellees' claim. See Hudgins v. Krawetz, 558 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1977, no writ).

The nature of the suit is an important venue fact and the allegations in the petition, which may be elaborated on in the controverting affidavit, are determinative of whether the nature of the suit complies with the statute; this determination is one of law for and by the court. See Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Lehmann, 544 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1976, writ dism'd); American Mayflower Moving & Storage Services v. Malmberg, 500 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1973, no writ). Further, alternative allegations are sufficient for the purpose of maintaining venue. Bee County Cooperative Association v. Dominy, 489 S.W.2d 418, 421-22 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1972, no writ).

Appellees' original petition alleges that the lease in question, which is filed of record, has a primary term of five (5) years, which has elapsed. The petition alleges that two producing wells have been drilled, but that appellants have not conducted any additional development in the three years prior to the filing of suit. Appellees contend in their petition that appellants' failure to additionally explore and develop the leased premises violates covenants contained in the lease and violates the "reasonably prudent operator" standard governing such oil and gas leases. The prayer for relief requests damages for failure to develop, and termination of the lease as to all acreage except that acreage connected with the two existing producing wells. Alternatively, appellees request that the court set a time limit on further development. Appellees' controverting plea asserts a cause of action under subdivision (14) of article 1995, pleading that the lawsuit against appellants is based in part on damages to realty situated in Frio County, Texas. The controverting plea further asserts that the cause of action is in part a suit for the recovery of an interest in land.

The term "damages to land" as used in subdivision (14) of the venue statute means injury to the possession, the freehold or the estate. Richter v. Plains National Bank of Lubbock, 440 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1969, writ dism'd). If an individual who has parted with an interest in land seeks to recover the interest by attempting to avoid the contract under which the land was lost, the suit is for the recovery of land and falls within the provisions of subdivision (14). Leonard v. Carter, 389 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1965, writ dism'd). Additionally, if the instrument conveying the interest in land is filed of record, and for that reason would cloud title, a suit attacking the instrument would be one to remove an incumbrance upon title to the land. DRG Financial Corp. v. Wade, 577 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ); Leonard v. Carter, supra at 148.

Guided by the authorities discussed above, our review of appellees' pleadings leads us to conclude that they have pled a cause of action within the ambit of subdivision (14). Our review is restricted to the nature or character of the suit, and is not directed to the question of whether a cause of action exists in fact. See Sammons v. Manning, 400 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1966, writ dism'd). Although appellants urge that this Court's decision in Batex Oil Co. v. La Brisa Land & Cattle Co., 352 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1961, writ dism'd), requires us to hold that appellees' cause of action fails to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (14), Batex can be distinguished. The "precise question" facing this Court in Batex was "whether or not appellees' allegation that the lease has terminated by reason of cessation of production in paying quantities, was made in good faith or only for the purpose of maintaining venue." Batex Oil Co. v. La Brisa Land & Cattle Co., supra at 771. Finding no claim of bad faith allegations, we hold that appellees' pleadings meet the requirements of subdivision (14). Point of error number one is overruled. In light of our holding, we need not address appellants' second point of error.

The order of the trial court is affirmed.

CANTU, Justice, dissenting.

The disposition made by the majority is without legal basis and I must respectfully dissent.

Appellees' original petition alleged facts which reveal that the nature of the lawsuit was to cancel an existing oil, gas and mineral lease for breach of implied and express covenants contained in the lease agreement. More specifically, appellees sought damages alleged to have been sustained as a result of appellants' failure to develop the leased premises. Additionally, relying upon an alleged breach of the covenant to explore the leased premises, appellees prayed for an order requiring appellants to specifically perform the covenant to develop the premises within a time to be designated by the court.

Only in the event that appellants failed to develop the premises within a period to be specified do appellees request the court for an order releasing and terminating appellants' "interest in the lease as to all portions of the subject property except the actual proration unit around each then producing well." A reading of appellees' petition thus reveals that the purpose of the suit is to recover damages for breach of the covenant to develop, to obtain specific performance of the covenant to develop and to obtain a declaration that the leased premises have not been reasonably explored, with a prayer for cancellation of the lease in the event that appellants have not developed the premises within time limitations to be set by the court.

In response to the petition of appellees, each appellant filed his plea of privilege seeking transfer of the suit to his county of residence. It is admitted in appropriate pleas of privilege that appellants Natural Gas Management Company, Amoco Production Company, Getty Oil Company, Inc., and Alpha Twenty-One Corporation, are either Texas corporations or corporations doing business in Texas with registered agents residing other than in Frio County. It is not disputed that appellants Leo Vesenmeir, Jr., Richard Phillips, Trustee, and W.B. Yarborough, are individuals.

Appellees' controverting plea to the plea of privilege of each corporate appellant alleges that the cause of action is based in part on damages to realty situated in Frio County and partly on a suit for the recovery of an interest in real estate situated in Frio County. Each controverting plea to the pleas of privilege of each corporate appellant invokes subdivisions 14 and 23 of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964).

Appellees' controverting plea to the plea of privilege of each individual appellant alleges that the cause of action is based upon the same theories as relied upon against the corporate appellants. However, only subdivision 14 of article 1995 is invoked against these appellants.

The controverting pleas incorporate by attachment and reference the original petition of appellees. Nothing in the controverting pleas contain further elaboration on the nature of the lawsuit which may serve to elucidate on the applicability of subdivision 14 of article 1995. The applicability of subdivision 14 must therefore, be evidenced from the petition itself without benefit of elaboration from any other source if the trial court's ruling is to be...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Moriarty v. Williams, 08-87-00324-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 4, 1988
    ...libel and slander. Alternate allegations are sufficient for the purpose of maintaining venue. Getty Oil Company v. Corbin, 653 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1983, cause dismissed as moot). Appellee ClayDesta is a corporation and, as such, suit against it "may be brought in the county in......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT