Getz v. the Boeing Co.

Decision Date02 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–15284.,10–15284.
Citation11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9710,80 Fed.R.Serv.3d 136,654 F.3d 852,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11589
PartiesDeborah GETZ, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Kristofer D.S. Thomas; Rodney Thomas, individually and as surviving heir of decedent, Kristofer D.S. Thomas; Mary Duffman, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent, Scott E. Duffman; Sophia Duffman, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Scott E. Duffman, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Mary Duffman; Christine Vaughn, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent, Travis R. Vaughn; Brad Vaughn, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent, Travis R. Vaughn; Heather Vaughn, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent, Travis R. Vaughn; Taylin Vaughn, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Travis R. Vaughn, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Heather Vaughn; Jill Garbs, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Ryan Garbs; Doug Garbs, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent, Ryan Garbs; Paul Wilkinson, individually and as surviving heir of decedent Adam Wilkinson; Felicia Wilkinson, individually and as surviving heir of decedent Adam Wilkinson; Tyffanie Wilkinson, individually and as surviving heir of decedent Adam Wilkinson; Carson Wilkinson, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Adam Wilkinson, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Tyffanie Wilkinson; Robert J. Quinlan, individually and as surviving heir of decedent John Quinlan; Kathleen T. Quinlan, individually and as surviving heir of decedent John Quinlan; Julie Quinlan, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent John Quinlan; Keely Quinlan, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent John Quinlan, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Julie Quinlan; Madeline Quinlan, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent John Quinlan, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Julie Quinlan; Erin Quinlan, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent John Quinlan, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Julie Quinlan; Hershel McCants, Sr., individually and as a surviving heir of Hershel McCants, Jr.; Goldie Murphy, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Hershel McCants, Jr.; Shannon McCants, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Hershel McCants, Jr.; Trevor McCants, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Hershel McCants, Jr., by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Shannon McCants; Kylie McCants, a minor, individually and as a surviving heir of decedent Hershel McCants, Jr., by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Shannon McCants; Jordan Lanham; Jerry Goldsmith; Ryanne Noss, individually and as spouse of Scot Noss; Timothy Brauch; Chris Trisko; Mark Daniel Houghton; Chuck Isaacson; Brenda Isaacson, individually and as spouse of Chuck Isaacson, Plaintiffs–Appellants,v.The BOEING COMPANY, a corporation; Honeywell International, Inc., a corporation; Goodrich Pump and Engine Control Systems, Inc., a corporation; at Engine Controls Ltds.; Does, 1 through 200, inclusive, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Thomas J. Brandi, Daniel Dell'Osso (argued), and Brian J. Malloy, the Brandi Law Firm, San Francisco, CA, for the appellants.Steven S. Bell (argued), Charles W. Mulaney, and Kathleen M. O'Sullivan, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA, for appellee the Boeing Company.Joanna E. Herman, James W. Huston (argued), William V. O'Connor, and Greg Reilly, Morrison & Foerster, San Diego, CA, for appellee Honeywell International, Inc.Alan H. Collier (argued) and Mark R. Irvine, Fitzpatrick & Hunt, Tucker, Collier, Pagano, Aubert, Los Angeles, CA, for appellee Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc.Michael A. Hession and Kevin R. Sutherland (argued), Clyde & Co., San Francisco, CA, for appellee AT Engine Controls Ltd.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Claudia A. Wilken, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 4:07–cv–06396–CW.Before: J. CLIFFORD WALLACE, JOHN T. NOONAN, and RICHARD R. CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case arises from the tragic February 2007 crash of an Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment helicopter in Afghanistan. Plaintiffs, who include those injured and the heirs of those killed in the crash, appeal from the district court's dismissal of AT Engine Controls (ATEC) for lack of personal jurisdiction and from the court's summary judgment in favor of The Boeing Company (Boeing), Honeywell International, Inc. (Honeywell), and Goodrich Pump and Engine Control (Goodrich). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I.

In February 2007, an Army-operated MH–47E Chinook helicopter crashed in the Kabul Province of Afghanistan. The helicopter was transporting military personnel to Bagram Airbase when it encountered snow, rain, and ice. Then, without warning, one of the Chinook's engines suddenly shut down, and the aircraft crashed. Eight servicemen were killed and fourteen were severely injured.

Two investigations into the cause of the crash revealed that it occurred after one of the helicopter's two engines suddenly flamed out. An initial Army investigation suggested that the aircraft's engine control system—the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC)—unexpectedly shut down, causing the engine to fail. According to investigators, the engine's Digital Electronic Control Unit (DECU)—the onboard computer that controls fuel flow to the engine—malfunctioned due to some kind of electrical anomaly.

A second investigation, conducted primarily by the manufacturers of the MH–47E, suggested that the crash occurred for a different reason. According to these investigators, the aircraft's engine flamed out because it ingested an inordinate amount of water and ice during the inclement weather. This investigation further suggested, however, that the flameout might have been avoided if the MH–47E's ignition system had been equipped with a continuous or automatic relight feature, which would have allowed the engine to restart automatically in the event of a water- or ice-induced flameout.

Six months after the crash, Plaintiffs filed an action against the contractors that designed and manufactured the allegedly defective aircraft. These contractors include: Boeing, which designed the helicopter's airframe; Honeywell, which designed and built the engines (including the ignition system); Goodrich, which designed the FADEC and was responsible for the DECU; and ATEC, a British company that designed the hardware and software for the DECU.

Initially, Plaintiffs sought relief in California state court, alleging that defendants were liable on theories of product liability, negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. Boeing, however, quickly removed the action to federal court pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), which allows federal officers and agents to remove state-law claims to federal court by asserting a federal defense.

In a series of written orders, the district court rejected each of Plaintiffs' claims. First, in a March 10, 2009 order, the district court ruled that it lacked personal jurisdiction over ATEC. Then, in January 2010, the district court granted summary judgment to Boeing, Honeywell, and Goodrich (collectively the Contractors). Getz v. Boeing Co., 690 F.Supp.2d 982 (N.D.Cal.2010). According to the district court, Plaintiffs' state-law claims against the Contractors were preempted by the government contractor defense. Id.

II.

In resolving Plaintiffs' appeal, we turn first to the district court's dismissal of ATEC, the British company, for lack of personal jurisdiction. According to Plaintiffs, ATEC is subject to personal jurisdiction in California pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). This Rule, which is commonly known as the federal long-arm statute, permits federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that lacks contacts with any single state if the complaint alleges federal claims and the defendant maintains sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole. Rule 4(k)(2), titled Federal Claim Outside StateCourt Jurisdiction,” provides:

For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if:

(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and

(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.

The only question presented here is whether Plaintiffs satisfy the first part of Rule 4(k)(2). That is, do any of their claims against ATEC—pure state-law claims for product liability, negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium—arise under federal law?

Until now, we have not examined the precise parameters of the arising-under-federal-law element of Rule 4(k)(2). We need not, however, navigate through uncharted terrain without a compass. Here, the commentary to the Rule and the well-reasoned decisions of our sister circuits agree that Rule 4(k)(2)'s reach is limited to substantive federal claims.

First, the commentary explains that Rule 4(k)(2) was enacted to “correct [ ] a gap in the enforcement of federal law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2), Advisory Committee Note. Under the former rules for service of process, federal courts looked to state law, even in federal question cases, whenever a federal statute was silent about the proper mechanism for service. Id.; see also Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 111, 108 S.Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (recognizing the predecessor rule's limitations). As a result, foreign defendants having sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole, but not satisfying the applicable state long-arm statute, would...

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