Geyer Roofing, Inc. v. Roofers Local 30B
| Decision Date | 04 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 88-1667(SSB). |
| Citation | 736 F. Supp. 573 |
| Parties | GEYER ROOFING INC., Plaintiff, v. ROOFERS LOCAL 30B, UNITED UNION OF ROOFERS, WATER PROOFERS AND ALLIED WORKERS, AFL-CIO, and The Joint Conference Board of Local 30B, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Capehart & Scatchard, P.A. by Joseph F. Betley, Mt. Laurel, N.J., Attorneys for plaintiff Geyer Roofing, Inc.
Markowitz & Richman by Regina C. Hertzig, Richard H. Markowitz, Mt. Laurel, N.J., for defendant Roofers Local 30B.
Presently before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment. This motion requires an analysis of the degree of deference due a decision rendered by a board acting under color of a collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff filed suit on April 7, 1988, alleging a breach of a collective bargaining agreement in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq. The crux of the complaint is that defendant interfered with plaintiff's contract with Irwin & Leighton, Inc. for the construction of a commercial roof in Lumberton, New Jersey (hereinafter the "CVS Wharehouse job"). Roofers Local 30B, United Union of Roofers, Water Proofers and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO (hereinafter "Local 30B") intervened because plaintiff was engaged in the construction of a commercial roof at the lower residential roofing prices. The dispute was submitted to the Joint Conference Board (hereinafter the "JCB"), pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in place between plaintiff and Local 30B. The JCB ruled that the CVS Wharehouse job was not governed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. After this decision, Irwin & Leighton terminated its contract with plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that the JCB decision was a fraud and that the entire process was to punish George Geyer (hereinafter "Geyer"), president of Geyer Roofing Inc. (hereinafter "Geyer Roofing"), for his testimony against the union in the trusteeship proceedings in United States v. Local 30, 686 F.Supp. 1139 (E.D.Pa.1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.1989) (hereinafter "Local 30"). Local 30B argues that the JCB decision was reached pursuant to the method of dispute resolution selected by the parties, and therefore must be accorded a wide measure of deference. Plaintiff asserts that the JCB resolution is not entitled to any deference because it was the product of fraud and deceipt. These contentions require an extensive review of the factual background, as viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party.
Plaintiff is a roofing contractor engaged almost exclusively in the commercial roofing business. Amended Verified Complaint at 4. Within a few months of the commencement of operations in the early spring of 1983, Bob Crosley, a representative of Local 30B, approached Geyer and told him that he had better sign a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Deposition of G. Geyer at 15. Geyer responded that he was not interested in joining the union. Testimony of George Geyer in Local 30, reported at 686 F.Supp. 1139 (E.D.Pa.1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1989), at 784 (hereinafter "Testimony of G. Geyer"). In the fall of that year, the tires of one of plaintiff's trucks were punctured. Testimony of G. Geyer at 785.
In August, 1984, when plaintiff had finished roughly fifty percent of the work at the "Freelance Site," vandals damaged a part of the unfinished roof, stuffed roof drains with shirts, destroyed cans of roofing cement, and stole a generator. Testimony of G. Geyer at 787-790.1
After further contact with the union, Geyer agreed to a meeting in the spring of 1985 with Joseph Kinkade and Gary McBride, two union representatives. Geyer described this meeting in his deposition as follows:
We talked about the problems that I had been having, such as, the Freelance job and the fact that they were continuing to, the union was, continuing to call me periodically about joining them. We talked about another roofer by the name of Bill Hargrove, who was non-union. At which point Joe said, we're going to kill him. And I felt very intimidated and we discussed whether or not I should sign up with the roofers union, at which time I agreed that I would.
Deposition of G. Geyer at 21. George Geyer further stated at his deposition that there was some slight discussion of the kind of work that Geyer Roofing performed:
I don't recall talking about sizes of jobs. I know I recall Joe handed me this blue book and right on it it said residential and I said to him, I don't do residential work. Why are you asking me to sign this? And he said that's the agreement we have for you to come into the union. And I didn't question it further. But as far as size of jobs, I don't remember discussing that. I told him I did commercial roofing work strictly, nothing but.
The relations between plaintiff and the union improved once plaintiff had signed the collective bargaining agreement. Although occasionally someone from the union would call to inquire about a commercial job plaintiff was performing, Geyer would refer the caller to Kinkade, and he would encounter no further problems. Plaintiff adhered to the wage rates set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, and submitted the appropriate contributions to the union pension, welfare, industry, and vacation funds.
Geyer was not alone in finding himself confused as to the dichotomy between commercial and residential roofing unions. As Judge Bechtle found:
The structure of the Roofers Union is that Local 30, the older part of the Union, is intended to cover commercial work, whereas Local 30B is intended to cover residential non-commercial work. This organizational form, however, has been rearranged and exceptions have often been made so that in some cases the exceptions swallowed the rule. Thus many contractors have been and remain confused as to whether they are expected by the Union to use Local 30B members or Local 30 members. Hopefully the newly elected leaders of the Union can clear up this confusion created by the old corrupt regime.
Local 30, 686 F.Supp. at 1163 (emphasis in original), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.1989).
On December 27, 1987, Geyer testified against the union in the civil RICO action pending in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Some flavor of Geyer's testimony in that case can be gleaned from the following factual finding:
In the case of non-Union roofer George Geyer ("Geyer"), for example, the Roofers Union relied exclusively on sabotage of Geyer's vehicles, extensive vandalism to a roof, theft of equipment, and a threat that "There is no way you are going to do that job as a non-union contractor" from business agent Joseph Kinkade.
Id. at 1150, aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1989).
On January 4, 1988, plaintiff entered into the CVS Wharehouse project contract with Irwin & Leighton, Inc. Exhibit C to Amended Verified Complaint. After complaints and threats of picketing from the union failed to bring a halt to plaintiff's work on the CVS Wharehouse project, Amended Verified Complaint at 6, Local 30B called for a JCB arbitration pursuant to Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement.2
On February 23, 1988, the JCB convened to resolve the dispute. Prior to the meeting, Gary McBride, a union business agent, told Geyer the result of the JCB decision would be that Geyer would be found to be wrong, and that he "`was going to be thrown off the Irwin and Leighton job.'" Deposition of G. Geyer at 81 Ga 86.
The JCB was composed of Joseph Crosley, Thomas Pedrick, and Ed Gregory, the employer representatives, and Eugene Fleming, Joseph Spitzer, and Joseph Karas, the three roofing contractors association representatives. According to the court's decision in the trusteeship proceeding, Crosley was not eligible for office, 686 F.Supp. at 1161-62 (fact-finding 134), 1170, aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.1989), and Pedrick had been a member of the "SWAT Team" sent to terrorize recalcitrant employers. Id. at 1159 (fact-finding 116), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.1989). Gregory was a criminal defendant to a complaint filed by Geyer. Deposition of Ed Gregory at 116.
Philip Cimini, a union business agent, presented the union's case, and an attorney presented plaintiff's case. Cimini was the recommended subject of a state criminal investigation. Local 30, 686 F.Supp. at 1161 (fact-finding 131), aff'd, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.1989).
On March 11, 1988, the JCB rendered its decision finding that the collective bargaining agreement did not apply to the CVS Wharehouse job. The effect of that decision, plaintiff claims, is that he was thrown off the CVS Wharehouse job.
The standard for granting summary judgment is a stringent one. A court may grant summary judgment only when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c); see Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir.1983). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact the court must view all doubt in favor of the nonmoving party. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1091, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 79 L.Ed.2d 910 (1984); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.1972). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Recent Supreme Court decisions mandate that "a motion for summary judgment must be granted unless the party opposing the...
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