Geyer v. State
| Decision Date | 13 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-8702-CR-64,49A02-8702-CR-64 |
| Citation | 531 N.E.2d 235 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Jon GEYER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Ferd Samper, Samper Hawkins Atz & Greuling, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Jon Geyer appeals his conviction and sentence for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated resulting in death, a class C felony. 1 Geyer raises three issues:
1. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence the blood alcohol report?
2. Is the evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction?
3. Did the trial court err in recommending his driving privileges be suspended for five (5) years?
We affirm the conviction but reverse and remand for correction of a sentencing error.
On January 5, 1986, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Officer Ellen Crenshaw of the Indianapolis Police Department arrived at the scene of a one-car accident "involving a very large light pole" (Record at 75) in the 3900 block of North Moeller Road. Crenshaw arrived within ten minutes after receiving the dispatch. Kevin Crowley was pinned in the passenger side of the wreckage. Jon Geyer was trapped behind the steering wheel. The damage to the vehicle was so extensive both parties had to be cut from the wreckage. There was no ice or other obstruction in the vicinity of the collision.
Officer Crenshaw spoke to Geyer when he was inside the medic ambulance. At that time she detected a strong odor of alcohol in the vehicle and observed Geyer's eyes were bloodshot. Officer Crenshaw arrived at the hospital approximately forty-five (45) minutes after Geyer. She advised Geyer of the implied consent law. He consented to a blood test. Officer Crenshaw observed the blood being withdrawn and took custody of the vial at approximately 9:30 p.m., about two hours after the accident. She then transported the vial to the property room of the Indianapolis Police Department where it was placed in a refrigerator. The chemist who tested the contents of the vial obtained it from the property room refrigerator on January 8, 1986. He conducted a gas chromatograph test and determined the concentration of ethyl alcohol in the sample was 0.158 percent. However, the chemist was unable to testify as to Geyer's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident. He explained that not knowing variables such as the type of alcoholic beverage consumed, the type and amount of food in Geyer's stomach and Geyer's body mass prevented any extrapolation.
Geyer argues the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit 7, his blood analysis report, into evidence because the tested substance was destroyed. 2 However, this error is not preserved for appeal because State's Exhibit 7 was received into evidence without a contemporaneous objection. 3 Jarrett v. State (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 882.
Next, Geyer argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. The elements of driving under the influence causing death are that the defendant
1) operate a motor vehicle
2) while under the influence of alcohol such that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of faculties to such an extent as to endanger any person, 4 and
3) his act results in the death of another person. 5
The evidence that Geyer was found pinned behind the wheel of the crashed automobile supports the reasonable fact finder's conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Geyer was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. In addition, the evidence supports that same fact finder's reasonable conclusion Geyer was impaired when he was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. The vehicle struck a large light pole with sufficient force that the pole cracked and trapped the occupants in the front seat. The street was free of ice or any other obstruction which might have contributed to the accident. In addition, there was no "evidence ... any other vehicles [were] involved in this accident." Record at 85. A reasonable fact finder could conclude from this evidence that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the vehicle was operated at high speed on a city street and, accordingly, that the accident occurred as a result of a driver whose thought and action were impaired to the extent persons were endangered.
The evidence of Geyer's bloodshot eyes and the subsequent blood alcohol eliminate other potential explanations for the impaired conduct evidenced by the circumstances of the accident. While the evidence is that the known blood alcohol content cannot establish Geyer's blood alcohol content at the time of the accident, it does establish the fact that a substantial amount of alcohol was present in Geyer's blood approximately two hours before the blood sample was drawn and, accordingly, supports the inference that alcohol was the source of the impairment. Tyner v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 444; Smith v. State (1986), Ind.App., 502 N.E.2d 122, trans. denied. Thus, evidence of impairment and...
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Kremer v. State
... ... Accordingly, proof that the defendant's condition rendered operation of the vehicle unsafe is sufficient to establish endangerment. Id ... Convictions of operating while intoxicated may be supported by circumstantial evidence. See Geyer v. State (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 235, 237, reh'g denied, trans. denied (holding that evidence that an accident which occurred on a street free of obstruction after the vehicle was operated at a high rate of speed, coupled with evidence showing bloodshot eyes and .158% BAC, was sufficient to ... ...
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