El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi
Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 3057 EDA 2019,3057 EDA 2019 |
Citation | 260 A.3d 944 |
Parties | Adil EL-GHARBAOUI d/b/a Adeal General Contractors, Appellant v. Adebowale AJAYI and Jibola Ajayi |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Musa Amin Jan, Gulph Mills, for appellant.
Joseph Dominic DiGuglielmo, Elverson, for appellee.
Appellant, Adil El-Gharbaoui d/b/a Adeal General Contractors, appeals from the November 27, 2019 judgment1 entered upon a non-jury verdict in favor of Adebowale Ajayi and Jibola Ajayi, husband and wife, (collectively, "the Ajayis") in the amount of $24,942.22.2 We affirm the judgment, in part, and vacate the judgment, in part, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3
A prior panel of this Court summarized the factual history as follows:
Adil El-Gharbaoui v. Adebowale and Jibola Ajayi , 2018 WL 1528354, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (extraneous capitalization omitted). On appeal, this Court affirmed, in part, the portion of the judgment for unpaid work in the amount of $22,000.00, and vacated, in part, the portion of the judgment awarded for interest, attorney's fees, and costs in the aggregate amount of $19,500.00.5 Id. at *4.
Following the prior appeal in which Appellant successfully defended his mechanics' lien claim for unpaid labor and materials but lost his recovery for attorney's fees and an award of interest, Appellant filed a new complaint on February 28, 2017, against the Ajayis alleging a breach of contract claim under CASPA and seeking, inter alia , attorney's fees, interest, and penalties. Based upon the judgment obtained in the mechanics' lien action, Appellant claimed the Ajayis were collaterally estopped from contesting the facts and legal contentions underlying his contractual claims. Upon completion of a two-day non-jury trial, the trial court, on January 29, 2019, rejected Appellant's claim pursuant to CASPA and entered a verdict in favor of the Ajayis on their counterclaim alleging that Appellant violated HICPA and UTPCPL.6 See Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1/29/19, at 7. Consequently, the trial court awarded the Ajayis attorney's fees in the amount of $9,942.22 for successfully defending against Appellant's CASPA action and awarded the Ajayis $15,000.00 in damages for their counterclaim. Id.
On February 8, 2019, Appellant filed a post-trial motion. While Appellant's post-trial motion remained unresolved, and before Appellant filed a notice of appeal, the trial court, on June 24, 2019, ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellant subsequently filed on July 16, 2019. On September 24, 2019, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. After Appellant filed a praecipe for entry of judgment, judgment was entered on November 27, 2019.7 This appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Appellant's Brief at 3 (extraneous capitalization omitted).9
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court's rejection of his breach of contract claim seeking attorney's fees and penalties pertaining to his mechanics' lien judgment on grounds that CASPA was not applicable in the instant matter.10
Appellant's issue requires this Court to interpret the CASPA statute to determine its applicability in the case sub judice . Our standard of review for such claims is well-established.
When determining the meaning of a statute, a court must construe the words of that statute according to their plain meaning. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a) [.] When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, they are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a) [.] It is only when the statute is unclear that the court may embark upon the task of ascertaining the intent of the legislature. Absent a definition, statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and plain everyday sense, and popular meanings of such words must prevail.
Zimmerman v. Harrisburg Fudd I, L.P. , 984 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 2009) (, )appeal denied , 606 Pa. 651, 992 A.2d 890 (2010).
CASPA [is] a comprehensive statute enacted in 1994 to cure abuses within the building industry involving payments due from owners to contractors, contractors to subcontractors, and subcontractors to other subcontractors. The underlying purpose of CASPA is to protect contractors and subcontractors and to encourage fair dealing among parties to a construction contract. The statute provides rules and deadlines to ensure prompt payments, to discourage unreasonable withholding of payments, and to address the matter of progress payments and retainages. Under circumstances prescribed in the statute, interest, penalt[ies], attorney['s] fees[,] and litigation expenses may be imposed on an owner, contractor[,] or subcontractor who fails to make payment to a contractor or subcontractor in compliance with the statute.
Zimmerman , 984 A.2d at 500-501 ( ); see also Nippes v. Lucas , 815 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2003) ( ). "CASPA provides that when a contractor or subcontractor performs, he[, or she,] is entitled ‘to payment from the party with whom the contractor or subcontractor has contracted.’ " Scungio Borst v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers , 106 A.3d 103, 106 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc ), quoting 73 P.S. § 504, aff'd , 636 Pa. 621, 146 A.3d 232 (2016) ; see also 73 P.S. § 507.
CASPA applies to all construction contracts that involve "[a]n agreement, whether written or oral, to perform work on any real property located within this Commonwealth" with the exception of construction contracts involving public works projects11 and "improvements to real property [that consists] of six or fewer residential units which are under construction simultaneously." See 73 P.S. § 515 ( ); see also id. at § 502 (...
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