Ghebreselassie v. Coleman Sec. Service

• Decision Date: 07 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 911,No. 86-6490,I,911,86-6490
• Citation: 829 F.2d 892
• Parties: 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,222, 2 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1399 Abraham GHEBRESELASSIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLEMAN SECURITY SERVICE; Ronald Farwell; Herman Hendricks; Parking Concepts, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, California Teamsters Public, Professional and Medical Employees Localnternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Intervenor, and California Teamsters Public, Professional and Medical Employees Localnternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant-Cross-Claimant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 892

829 F.2d 892

126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,222,

2 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1399

Abraham GHEBRESELASSIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLEMAN SECURITY SERVICE; Ronald Farwell; Herman Hendricks; Parking Concepts, Inc., Defendants-Appellees California Teamsters Public, Professional and Medical Employees Local No. 911, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Intervenor and California Teamsters Public, Professional and Medical Employees Local No. 911, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Defendant-Cross-Claimant.

No. 86-6490.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 4, 1987.

Decided Oct. 7, 1987.

James L. Brown, Supkoff and Brown, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant Ghebreselassie.

Robert Berchan, Booth, Mitchel, Strange & Smith, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees Coleman Sec. Service, Ronald Farwell, and Herman Hendricks.

Elaine Holland, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee Parking Concepts.

Robert D. Vogel, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-counter-claimant-intervenor California Teamsters Public, Professional and Medical Employees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WALLACE, BEEZER and HALL, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Ghebreselassie appeals the district court's order vacating an arbitration award and its order granting summary judgment in his action alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement, wrongful termination, defamation, negligence, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We reverse the order vacating the arbitration award and the summary judgment on Ghebreselassie's claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. We affirm the summary judgment with respect to Ghebreselassie's other claims.

I

The City of Los Angeles Department of Airports (department) entered into a contract to have Parking Concepts, Inc. (employer) operate its airport parking lots. The employer hired Ghebreselassie as a parking lot cashier at one of these airport parking lots. The employer entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters Union Local 911 (union) which governed the terms and conditions of Ghebreselassie's employment.

The department hired Coleman Security Service, Inc. (investigators) to investigate the airport parking lot cashiers to determine whether any were engaging in theft through "ticket manipulation." The investigators used the following procedure. Two investigators in separate cars would exit an airport parking lot directly behind each other. The first investigator would present a "test ticket" to the cashier and pay the required parking fee. The test ticket would be several days old and require a large payment, therefore presenting a tempting target for manipulation by a cashier. The second investigator would present a "follow-up ticket"--an ordinary ticket obtained from the ticket dispensing machine. Both investigators would record the serial numbers from the tickets, the amount of money paid, and a description of the cashier.

The parking lot gate arms would not open unless the cashier had placed the customer's ticket in the cash register where a validation number was imprinted on it. Therefore, if the cashier properly handled the two tickets, they would be stamped with sequential validation numbers. On the other hand, if the cashier substituted a small fee ticket for the large fee test ticket and pocketed the difference between the two fees, the test ticket would not appear. The cashiers were required to turn in all tickets and money collected during their shift. The department's auditor would complete the investigation by looking for the follow-up ticket and then looking for the test ticket which should be located immediately before the follow-up ticket.

The investigators performed this procedure on Ghebreselassie. The department's auditor determined that the "test ticket" was missing and provided this information to the investigators. The investigators then prepared a preliminary investigation report and presented it to the Los Angeles Police Department. The city prosecutor filed a criminal charge against Ghebreselassie. That same day, the employer terminated Ghebreselassie for alleged ticket manipulation. Ghebreselassie was acquitted of the criminal charge.

Ghebreselassie filed suit in California state court against the employer and the investigators (the company and two of its employees) alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and wrongful discharge. The union filed a grievance with the employer which proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator found that Ghebreselassie was dismissed without just cause but denied a remedy because the grievance had not been timely filed by the union. Ghebreselassie then amended his complaint adding the union as a defendant and alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation in the handling of his grievance. The union removed the action to the federal district court.

The district court granted the union's motion to vacate the arbitration award, but denied the union's motion for summary judgment on the fair representation claim. The district court granted the motions for summary judgment brought by the employer and the investigators on the tort and wrongful discharge claims, and entered judgment in favor of those defendants pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ghebreselassie appeals the orders vacating the arbitration award and granting summary judgment with respect to all of his claims against the employer and the investigators except invasion of privacy. His claim against the union alleging breach of its duty of fair representation is still pending in the district court.

II

The district court granted the employer's summary judgment motion on Ghebreselassie's claim for wrongful discharge on the ground that it was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. Ghebreselassie does not dispute the court's conclusion that section 301 governs his wrongful discharge claim, but argues that the allegations in his complaint state a valid claim under section 301 and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

Section 301 claims are founded on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (Caterpillar ); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). Where, as in the present case, a state law claim falls within the scope of section 301, it is subject to "complete preemption"--"any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Caterpillar, 107 S.Ct. at 2430. Based on the complete preemption doctrine, Ghebreselassie contends that his wrongful discharge claim stated a valid claim under section 301.

The employer responds, however, that the complete preemption doctrine has only been applied at the request of a defendant who seeks to recharacterize a state law claim as one arising under federal law in order to remove a state court action to federal court. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.1980). In this case, removal jurisdiction was based on the fair representation claim against the union, not on the theory that Ghebreselassie's wrongful termination claim arose under section 301. Therefore, the employer argues, because Ghebreselassie framed his wrongful termination claim under state law and because none of the defendants have moved to recharacterize it as a federal law claim, it must be considered as framing only a state law claim. The employer then concludes that because the state law claim is preempted, Ghebreselassie is not left with any properly pleaded claim based on his alleged termination without just cause.

The employer's argument, although plausible, is flawed in two respects. First, preemption is a doctrine derived from the supremacy clause of the Constitution which bars states from enacting laws that interfere with federal law. See In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 817 F.2d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir.1987). Although section 301 of the LMRA may preempt or nullify certain aspects of state law, it does not cause any factual allegations in a complaint to disappear. After a court has determined that a certain state law is preempted, a separate question may remain as to whether the complaint's factual allegations state a claim under federal law or under non-preempted state law. Therefore, although section 301 preempts California's wrongful discharge law as applied to Ghebreselassie's complaint, it does not preempt Ghebreselassie's allegations.

Second, a properly pleaded claim in federal court need not specify under which law it arises. A complaint need only set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "No technical forms of pleading ... are required." Id. rule 8(e)(1). For example, a claim for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not need to mention that Act or even that the claim is intended to arise under federal rather than state law. See id. rule 84 appendix, form 14. A plaintiff who desires to invoke a district court's federal question jurisdiction may have to allege that a claim arises under federal law to satisfy the requirement that the complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." Id. rule...