Ghent v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 23 February 1932
• Citation: 114 Conn. 415,159 A. 94
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: GHENT v. STEVENS et al.

159 A. 94

114 Conn. 415

GHENT v. STEVENS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 23, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Newell Jennings Judge.

Action by William J. Ghent, administrator of the estate of William J. Ghent, Jr., against Burr E. Stevens and others to recover damages for death of plaintiff's decedent, claimed to have been caused by negligent operation of an automobile. The case was tried to the jury. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Michael J. Quinn, John V. O'Brien, and Philip Troup, all of New Haven, for appellant.

James W. Carpenter, of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

AVERY, J.

A verdict was returned by the jury, after the trial of this case, in favor of the defendants, and the plainfiff appealed claiming that the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and in its instructions to the jury.

The plaintiff's decedent was riding, as a guest, in an automobile owned and operated by Thomas Hellyer in a southerly direction on the main highway from Hartford to Middletown. The Hellyer car ran into an automobile proceeding in the same direction, owned by the defendant Burr E. Stevens, and driven by his son, the defendant Edward B. Stevens. The roadway at this point is concrete pavement, twenty feet wide. On the east side is a trolley track, four feet from the edge of the cement; on the west side a shoulder from eight to ten feet in width. It was about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, June 14, 1929. As the two automobiles were proceeding towards Middletown, the Stevens car approached a line of traffic proceeding in the save direction. At the head of this line was a team, and following the team two automobiles, which were caused to slow down by the team; and, as the Stevens car approached those ahead, the latter slowed down, and the Stevens car was obliged to come to an abrupt stop. The Hellyer car, which was behind that of Stevens, crashed into the latter, and the plaintiff's decedent was thrown out, striking on the pavement, and received injuries from which he subsequently died.

It was the claim of the plaintiff that, as the defendant's automobile approached the traffic ahead, it turned out to the left to pass those preceding, and, when it had partially turned into the north-bound lane of traffic, was compelled, by an automobile coming from the south in the opposite direction, to turn back into its previous position; and, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant turned back without warning and so suddenly that the driver of the Hellyer car was unable to stop, and crashed into the Stevens automobile, whereby the plaintiff's decedent was thrown out and killed.

On the other hand, the defendant claimed that, as he approached the traffic ahead, he signalled with his hand and gradually slowed down, that, when a short distance to the rear of the car preceding him, that car suddenly stoped, and he thereupon stopped, and that the Hellyer car crashed into him. The defendant driver denies that he was attempting to pass the traffic ahead to the left; his claim being that the accident was wholly caused by the negligence of Hellyer in failing to have his car under control and in crashing into the defendant's car when there was abundant opportunity to pass it to the right on the shoulder of the road.

Inasmuch as there is abundant evidence to substantiate the defendant's claim as to the cause of the accident, the court did not err in refusing to set aside the verdict. Indeed, from our examination of the evidence, it would appear that the jury might reasonably have concluded that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of the operator of the car in which the plaintiff's decedent was riding. It was broad daylight on a clear day. The road was straight, and the driver of the Hellyer car, following that of the defendant, had a full view of the defendant's car and of the traffic ahead, and had abundant opportunity either to have stopped his car if under reasonable control or to have turned out to the right and avoided the accident. Moreover, the physical facts were not such as to preclude the jury from accepting the evidence of the defendant as to the way in which the accident happened.

In instructing the jury, the court at one point, through obvious inadvertence, referred to " negligence" as " an intentional failure to perform a legal duty." This is assigned as error by the plaintiff, but an examination of the charge in its entirety, on the meaning of negligence, makes it clear that the jury could not have been misled by this single inaccuracy of statement. Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 453, 138 A. 365; Gans v. L. Olchin & Co., Inc., 109 Conn. 164, 169, 145 A. 751, 63 A.L.R. 428; Sortito v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 108 Conn. 163, 170, 142 A. 808; De Lucia v. Polio, 107 Conn. 437, 438, 140 A. 733.

In discussing proximate cause, the court stated that the phrase " substantial factor" has some resemblance to the phrase " reasonable doubt" as used in criminal cases, in that the two words themselves perhaps give as clear an idea of what they mean as all the discussion which is indulged in with reference to them. This could not have given the jury to understand, as the appellant claims, that the plaintiff must establish his case, in order to succeed, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Fairly construed, the reference is susceptible of no other meaning than that the term " substantial factor" is so clear as to need no expository definition. Evidently the court had in mind what we said in Pilon v. Alderman, 112 Conn. 300, 301, 152 A. 157: " It is doubtful if the expression is susceptible of a definition more understandable than the simple and familiar words it employs."

Error is assigned, in that the court stated that, in judging the conduct of the defendant, the jury should try to place themselves, as far as possible, in his...