Ghodsee v. City of Kent
| Decision Date | 18 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 82897-5-I |
| Citation | 508 P.3d 193 |
| Parties | Sina GHODSEE, an individual, through Litigation Guardian ad Litem, Joshua Brothers, Appellant, and Shahrbanoo Ghodsee, an individual, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF KENT, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, and King County, d/b/a King County Crisis and Commitment Services, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, 2775 Harbor Ave Sw, Third Floor Ste. C, Seattle, WA, 98126-2138, John Robert Connelly Jr., Samuel J. Daheim, Connelly Law Offices, Meaghan Maryanne Driscoll, Attorney at Law, 2301 N 30th St., Tacoma, WA, 98403-3322, for Appellant.
Andrew George Cooley, Keating Bucklin & McCormack, Inc. P.S., 801 2nd Ave. Ste. 1210, Seattle, WA, 98104-3175, Samantha Dara Kanner, King Co. Prosecutors Office, 1191 2nd Ave. Ste. 1700, Seattle, WA, 98101-2996, Daniel Louis Kinerk, King County Administration Bldg., 500 4th Ave. Ste. 900, Seattle, WA, 98104-2316, for Respondents.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶1 Sina Ghodsee appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of King County and the City of Kent. Ghodsee sued in negligence, alleging both government entities failed to exercise reasonable care in detaining him under the involuntary treatment act.1 Ghodsee fails to meet his burden of raising a material issue of fact as to each of the essential elements of negligence or demonstrate that the entities were not entitled to statutory immunity. Accordingly, summary judgment dismissal was proper and we affirm.
¶2 On Friday, June 23, 2017, Shahrbanoo Ghodsee2 contacted King County Crisis and Commitment Services (KCCCS) with concerns about her son, Sina Ghodsee. Shahrbanoo reported Ghodsee was not taking his medication, was "agitated" and "delusional," and she had left the home to stay elsewhere. Four days later, a "Designated Mental Health Professional" (DMHP)3 called to schedule an appointment for a team of DMHPs to meet with Shahrbanoo at the Ghodsee home. The DMHPs intended to interview Ghodsee pursuant to the involuntary treatment act (ITA), but were unsuccessful and eventually left the home after Ghodsee pointed "what appeared to be a table leg at [them] like a gun." They called the police; officers from the Kent Police Department (KPD) responded and attempted to make contact with Ghodsee, but were similarly unsuccessful and disengaged.4 On Thursday, June 29, a DMHP filed a Petition for Initial Detention (Non-Emergency) in King County Superior Court, which the court granted.
¶3 On Friday, June 30 and again on Saturday, July 1, a team of DMHPs and several officers from KPD went back to the Ghodsee home but were ultimately unable to detain Ghodsee. On Sunday, July 2, KPD was dispatched to the Ghodsee home after a neighbor called law enforcement concerned that Ghodsee was threatening someone and possibly carrying a rifle. The caller could not state with any certainty that he saw a gun, and KPD never observed a crime, so the officers eventually left without attempting to contact Ghodsee. The next week, on Friday, July 7, KPD officers formulated a plan to take Ghodsee into custody when he left his home to get groceries or cigarettes. Around midnight on July 9, the manager at a local grocery store called KPD to inform them Ghodsee was on site, but by the time officers arrived Ghodsee had left.
¶4 On Monday, July 10, KPD received two emergency calls from Ghodsee's neighbors, reporting Ghodsee had shot at the neighbor's occupied home. KPD responded and saw Ghodsee in the window of his home with a rifle raised, pointed in the direction of the officers. Two officers simultaneously fired, and Ghodsee disappeared from sight. Officers on the scene used a drone to see inside of the home, where they observed Ghodsee laying on the floor. Ghodsee was taken into custody. He sustained a gunshot wound to the head, surviving but suffering significant and life-changing injuries.
¶5 On May 28, 2020, Ghodsee, through a litigation guardian ad litem, and Shahrbanoo filed a civil complaint against the City of Kent (City). They later amended their complaint to add King County (County), doing business as KCCCS, as a defendant. On May 21, 2021, both defendants moved for summary judgment dismissal on the basis of the public duty doctrine and claims of statutory immunity. The motion was heard on June 18, 2021. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants on July 8, 2021. Ghodsee timely appeals.
¶6 This court reviews a summary judgment order de novo, engaging "in the same inquiry as the trial court." Wallace v. Lewis County., 134 Wash. App. 1, 12, 137 P.3d 101 (2006). Like the trial court, this court "review[s] all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," affirming if there are no genuine issues of material fact "and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dalen v. St. John Med. Ctr., 8 Wash. App. 2d 49, 57, 436 P.3d 877 (2019). A genuine issue of material fact exists if reasonable minds could differ on facts which control the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 58, 436 P.3d 877.
¶7 A negligence action contains four elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) injury, and (4) proximate cause. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wash.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). "If any of these elements cannot be met as a matter of law, summary judgment for the defendant is proper." Id.
¶8 Ghodsee first argues both entities owed him a duty of care. He contends the County owed him (1) a "take charge duty" under the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine, and (2) a duty to enforce the non-emergency detention order (NED) issued by the trial court. He asserts the City owed him a duty (1) to exercise reasonable care in discharging its responsibilities, and (2) to enforce the NED. This court reviews "the existence of a duty as a question of law" de novo.
Washburn v. City of Fed. Way, 178 Wash.2d 732, 753, 310 P.3d 1275 (2013). Duty is a "threshold issue." Mita v. Guardsmark, LLC, 182 Wash. App. 76, 83, 328 P.3d 962 (2014).
¶9 In evaluating the duty of a governmental entity, we must also consider the public duty doctrine. Washburn, 178 Wash.2d at 753–54, 310 P.3d 1275. To succeed in a negligence claim against a governmental entity, the plaintiff must demonstrate the government owed a duty to the individual plaintiff, rather than the public at large. Id. at 754, 310 P.3d 1275. "[A] duty to all is a duty to no one." J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 299, 303, 669 P.2d 468 (1983) (overruled on other grounds by Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wash.2d 174, 179–80, 759 P.2d 455 (1988) ). While similar to sovereign immunity, the public duty doctrine uniquely "recognizes the existence of a tort, authorizes the filing of a claim against a [government entity] and also recognizes applicable liability subject to some limitations." Id. This differs from sovereign immunity, which denies all liability. Id.
¶10 There are several exceptions to the public duty doctrine, which are "used as ‘focusing tools’ to determine whether the public entity had a duty to the injured plaintiff." Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 218, 822 P.2d 243 (1992). The four exceptions are (1) legislative intent, (2) failure to enforce, (3) rescue doctrine, and (4) special relationship. Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, 193 Wash.2d 537, 549 n.7, 442 P.3d 608 (2019) ;5 see also Cummins v. Lewis County, 156 Wash.2d 844, 853 n.7, 133 P.3d 458 (2006).
¶11 Ghodsee first argues the County owed him an individualized duty akin to the take charge duty or provider-patient special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. He specifically alleges the language and posture of the NED order created a take-charge-like relationship between Ghodsee and the DMHPs.6
¶12 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (Am. Law Inst. 1965), there is generally no duty to prevent a third party from harming another. If, however, "a special relation exists between the actor and the third person," there may be a duty to "control the third person's conduct." Id. One such special relationship arises when an actor "takes charge of a third person whom [they] know or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled," creating "a duty to exercise reasonable care." Id. at § 319. Our courts have held "this duty extends to self-inflicted harm." Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, 170 Wash.2d 628, 639, 244 P.3d 924 (2010). Our courts have recognized a special relationship, separate from a take charge duty, between mental health providers and patients under § 315 of the Restatement. See Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 426–27, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
¶13 In Estate of Davis v. Department of Corrections, the Washington State Supreme Court considered whether there was a special relationship between an individual on community custody and a mental health counselor who conducted "an initial assessment" to evaluate whether counseling would be beneficial to the person under supervision by the Department of Corrections. 127 Wash. App. 833, 837, 113 P.3d 487, 491 (2005). The court found there was no special relationship because the counselor met with the individual "only one time," to provide an initial assessment.
Id. at 842, 113 P.3d 487, 491. This brief interaction was "not a definite, established, and continuing relationship that would trigger a legal duty." Id.
¶14 Our Supreme Court then reviewed whether there was a special relationship between a mental health professional and patient in Volk v. DeMeerleer. There, the court held a psychiatrist and their outpatient client had a nine-year relationship which triggered a duty under § 315 of the Restatement. Volk, 187 Wash.2d 241, 274, 386 P.3d 254 (2016). More recently in Konicke v. Evergreen Emergency Services, P.S., ...
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