Gholson v. Benham, Case No. 3:14-cv-622-JAG
| Decision Date | 19 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14-cv-622-JAG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | JOYCE J. GHOLSON, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN BENHAM, et al. Defendant. |
In February 2013, the Hopewell Redevelopment and Housing Authority fired long-time employee Joyce Gholson. Gholson claims that her termination was the culmination of years of harassment and discrimination based on her race, color, gender, and age. She filed this law suit against the Authority, its commissioners, and various employees, alleging violations of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon review of the complaint, the Court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part.
The result of this opinion is the winnowing of Gholson's various claims. Stated simply, each type of discrimination—race, color, age, or gender—can move forward, but only under certain legal theories and against certain defendants. Gholson states valid claims for race, color, and age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA, but those claims may be brought against only the Housing Authority, not the individual defendants. She also states valid claims for race and gender discrimination under § 1983, but only against defendants Steven Benham, Kathryn Thompson, and Madelyn Madison-Hyde, not the Housing Authority or the other remaining individual defendants. The remaining allegations fail to state a claim due to the doctrines ofadministrative exhaustion, preemption, and municipal liability. Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
From 1992 until 2013, Joyce Gholson worked for the Hopewell Redevelopment and Housing Authority in a variety of positions. From 1993 to 2001, she worked without incident, first as a part-time "Fun Time" Aide and later as a full-time Resident Initiatives Coordinator. In 2001, the Authority promoted her to Community Services Coordinator, a position she held until 2011. In 2011, the Authority underwent an internal reorganization, part of which included the elimination of Gholson's position and the creation of the position Resident Services Manager. Gholson applied for this job, but the Authority instead hired her to the less senior position of Resident Services Specialist. She held this job until February 27, 2013, when the Authority terminated her employment, purportedly for performance concerns.
On March 27, 2013, Gholson filed an internal grievance with the Authority to complain about discriminatory treatment she faced throughout her employment, up to and including her termination. Settlement talks between the Authority and Gholson fell apart, and she ultimately withdrew her grievance. On July 27, 2013, she filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging race, color, and age discrimination in her termination. The EEOC issued a right to sue notice on June 19, 2014. Gholson filed her lawsuit in this Court on September 8, 2014.2
In the suit, Gholson names as defendants the Housing Authority, Executive Director Steven Benham, Chairman Linwood Crenshaw, Vice-Chairman Mike Mahaney, Commissioner John Jones, Commissioner Sheila Flowers, Commissioner Renee Broxie, and employees Madelyn Madison-Hyde and Kathryn Thompson. Because Gholson listed Benham twice on the defendant list, once "in his capacity as Executive Director" and a second time "for Hopewell Redevelopment and Housing Authority," the Court understands Gholson to be bringing claims against Benham in both his individual and official capacities. The remaining individual defendants are named in their individual capacities.
Gholson's complaint contains four counts. Count I asserts discrimination on the basis of gender, in violation of Title VII. Count II asserts discrimination on the basis of race, color, and gender, also in violation of Title VII. Count III asserts discrimination on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.3 Count IV alleges violation of her equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The defendants first raise Rule 10 as a basis to dismiss Gholson's complaint. As relevant here, Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties; the title of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (emphasis added). In Gholson's complaint, the defendants are listed as "Steven Benham, in his capacity as Executive Director of Hopewell Redevelopment and Housing Authority, et al." The defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed as to all the remaining unnamed defendants.
Less than a week after the Court docketed Gholson's complaint, she submitted a defendant list to allow the Clerk of Court to issue summons. (See Dk. No. 16.) The Clerk issued process to each defendant on the list, and the process included a summons, a copy of the complaint, and the defendant list. (See Dk. No. 6.) Each defendant received these documents. (See Dk. Nos. 8-9.) Although it is true that using et al. to indicate additional defendants without naming them in the complaint does not strictly comply with Rule 10, the formal requirements of the rule should not prevent a pro se complaint from moving forward when the defendants ultimately received notice. See Wojcicki v. Aiken Tech. College, 360 F. App'x 484, 487-88 (4th Cir. 2010) (); Chester v. Adams Auto Wash, Inc., 2014 WL 267095, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2014) ().
Because each defendant received the complaint and the defendant list indicating that the pro se plaintiff intended to include them as a defendant, the Court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 10(a).
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits terminating an employee because of that person's age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
The scope of a suit filed under Title VII and the ADEA is necessarily limited by the plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005). Chief among these is the requirement that a plaintiff first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and be issued a right to sue letter. Only then may the plaintiff pursue her claims in a federal court, and those claims must be limited to the claims properly brought to the EEOC's attention.
"Under Title VII and the ADEA, a civil action may be brought only 'against the respondent named in the charge.'" Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)) (emphasis added). This requirement puts the allegedly discriminatory employer on notice and allows "the EEOC to attempt reconciliation." Id. (citing Alvarado v. Bd. of Trustees of Montgomery Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir.1988)). Here, Gholson's EEOC charge names only the Hopewell Redevelopment and Housing Authority, so she may not pursue claims under Title VII or the ADEA against any other defendants. The Court therefore dismisses Counts I, II, and III as against the eight individual defendants.5
Further limiting the scope of Gholson's claims is the requirement that an aggrieved employee file her EEOC charge within the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (). Because Virginia is a "deferral" state, that period is 300 days. See Puryear v. Cnty. of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 2000) (); Lewis v. Norfolk S. Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (E.D. Va. 2003) (). If an employee waits to file her EEOC charge until after the statutory period has elapsed, her claims are time-barred and thus she cannot file suit over them.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the deadline for filing an EEOC charge and, thus, preserving the right to sue in federal court can be equitably tolled under certain limited circumstances. See Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Equitable tolling generally applies when some outside force prevents the employee from filing her claim or shetook good-faith but ineffective steps to file her claim within the statutory period. See Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (). Equitable tolling will not apply, however, in situations "where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving [her] legal rights." Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. Nothing in her complaint indicates that Gholson was prevented by the Housing Authority from either recognizing pre-termination discrimination or pursuing a claim with the EEOC before her termination, so equitable tolling will not apply here.
Gholson filed her EEOC charge on August 29, 2013. Counting back 300 days from that date, she may pursue only claims of discrimination beginning November 2, 2012. The only...
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