Gholston v. Board of Pardons and Paroles
| Decision Date | 28 May 1993 |
| Citation | 627 So.2d 945 |
| Parties | Ronald M. GHOLSTON v. BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES. AV92000283. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Ronald Marcus Gholston, pro se.
No brief for appellee.
In 1989, Ronald M. Gholston, while on parole following a murder conviction, was arrested for allegedly violating a condition of his parole; namely, that he not possess firearms. Following a hearing, the Board of Pardons and Paroles (the Board) revoked Gholston's parole.
Gholston, alleging due process violations by the Board, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court, requesting that his parole revocation be set aside. The trial court granted Gholston's petition for writ of certiorari and ordered the Board to conduct a parole revocation hearing which complied with applicable law. The Board was ordered to then report to the trial court the result of such hearing.
In October 1992, the Board filed a "Report of Compliance" with the trial court, stating that the Board conducted another parole revocation hearing as ordered and, as a result, the parole of Gholston was revoked. Consequently, the Board requested the trial court to dismiss Gholston's action, with prejudice, as moot. The trial court did so, and Gholston appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in December 1992. The Court of Criminal Appeals transferred Gholston's appeal to this court.
In his brief, Gholston argues, pro se, that he was denied certain minimum due process rights in the revocation of his parole by the Board. For this proposition, Gholston cites Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and lists in his brief the following as the minimum due process rights which must be met in order to revoke parole:
"(a) a final revocation hearing (the parole court) within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody on the claimed violation; (b) disclosure of the evidence to be used against the parolee; (c) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation; (d) a decision supported by the evidence presented at the parole court; and (e) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reason(s) for revocation."
Gholston claims that none of these requirements was met in his case, and he also claims that he was unlawfully imprisoned on his alleged parole violation charge. Gholston's contention as to unlawful imprisonment stems from a claim that his parole revocation hearing was delayed unreasonably and that, as a result, he was prejudiced. For this contention, Gholston cites Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and lists in his brief three ways, based on Barker, in which an accused could be prejudiced by an unreasonable delay in his hearing: Later in his brief, Gholston argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The appellate jurisdiction of this court is set out in Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-10, as follows:
"The court of civil appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $10,000.00, all appeals from administrative agencies other than the Alabama public service commission, all appeals in workmen's compensation cases, all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption and child custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases."
Nowhere within this statute do we find authority for the Court of Civil Appeals to review decisions of the Board. Although § 12-3-10 provides that this court has jurisdiction over appeals from administrative agencies, our supreme court has held that "the parole board is a legislative agency and not subject to the ... Alabama Administrative Procedure Act...." Ex parte Baldwin County Commission, 526 So.2d 564, 566 (Ala.1988). Furthermore, the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, in Ala. Code 1975, § 41-22-3(3), excludes actions of the Board from its provisions for judicial review. See also, Sellers v. State, 586 So.2d 994 (Ala.Cr.App.1991).
In Ellard v. Alabama Board of Pardons & Paroles, 824 F.2d 937 (11th Cir.1987), the Eleventh Circuit Court of...
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Collins v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, CR-03-0285.
...is by a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. See Gholston v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 627 So.2d 945 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). The Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of a writ of a certiorari attacking......
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McConico v. ALABAMA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
...an administrative agency.2 See Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So.2d 255 (Ala.Crim.App.2002); Gholston v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 627 So.2d 945 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). By contrast, the writ of habeas corpus was traditionally not available until an inmate was entitled to immed......
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Beck v. ALABAMA BD. OF PARDONS AND PAROLES
...administrative, agency. See Ex parte Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So.2d 255 (Ala.Crim.App. 2002); Gholston v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 627 So.2d 945 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). Thus, this Court ordinarily has the authority to review appeals involving decisions of the In the instant case......
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Ray v. Mitchem, No. 07-11474 Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir. 4/3/2008)
...direct appeal procedure through which the Parole Board's decision to revoke parole can be challenged. See Gholston v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 627 So.2d 945, 947 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). Instead, a prisoner must challenge his parole revocation by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in t......