Gholston v. State

• Decision Date: 16 April 1993
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: Ex parte State of Alabama. (Re Charles Lee GHOLSTON v. STATE). 1911302

Page 719

620 So.2d 719

Ex parte State of Alabama (Re Charles Lee GHOLSTON v. STATE).

1911302

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 16, 1993.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Beth Jackson Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

John Edmond Mays, Decatur, for respondent.

INGRAM, Justice.

The State of Alabama, on petition for writ of certiorari, asks this Court to review two issues: (1) whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it compelled Charles Lee Gholston to stand trial in a prison uniform; and (2) whether this Court should overrule Wigley v. State, 456 So.2d 339 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), which the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on in holding that the same felony conviction for attempted murder could not be used both to prove that Gholston was a person convicted of a crime of violence in possession of a pistol and to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Felony Offender Act as a prior felony conviction.

FACTS

Gholston was convicted of (1) menacing, § 13A-6-23, Ala.Code 1975; and (2) unlawful possession of a pistol by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence, § 13A-11-72(a), Ala.Code 1975. The charges were based upon incidents that occurred while Gholston was on a three-day pass from the Decatur Work Release Center, where he was serving a 25-year sentence for attempted murder. He received a 6-month sentence on the menacing charge and a 10-year sentence on the unlawful possession charge; the sentences were to run concurrently.

At the time of this trial, Gholston was an inmate with the Department of Corrections, serving his sentence for the attempted murder. Gholston appeared for trial in a prison jumpsuit. In a pretrial motion, he asked the trial court to allow him to change into civilian clothes. The trial court denied that motion.

During this trial the State offered proof of Gholston's previous conviction for attempted murder as proof that he had been convicted of a crime of violence. Gholston was convicted under § 13A-6-23 and § 13A-11-72(a). The trial court then enhanced his sentence under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, based on his prior conviction for attempted murder, which was his only prior felony conviction. Gholston appealed. All judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the trial court had committed reversible error when it compelled Gholston to appear at trial in prison clothes. The Court of Criminal Appeals, therefore, reversed Gholston's conviction.

The majority opinion went further, to hold that the same felony conviction, for attempted murder, could not be used both to convict Gholston of unlawful possession of a pistol and also to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Felony Offender Act. Judges Bowen and Montiel dissented from that portion of the majority's opinion. This Court granted the State's petition for the writ of certiorari.

ISSUE I

The State argues that the facts of this case are such that the jurors would necessarily know from the evidence that Gholston was an inmate at the time of the trial. Therefore, the State argues that although Gholston was compelled to appear in prison clothing, he was not prejudiced because the evidence showed that Gholston was incarcerated. Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P., states that no judgment will be reversed unless "the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights."

The Court of Criminal Appeals held:

"The state cannot compel a defendant to stand trial while dressed in prison clothes. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). There, the Supreme Court stated that 'the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes....' 425 U.S. at 513 . However, not every instance where a defendant stands trial in prison garb is a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of the harmless error rule. This court, in interpreting Estelle v. Williams, has ruled in several cases that the defendant is not prejudiced by wearing prison clothing at trial where the evidence would necessarily and unavoidably inform the jury of the defendant's "....

status as an inmate. George v. State, 423 So.2d 335 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Jacques v. State, 409 So.2d 876 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), aff'd 409 So.2d 885 (Ala.1982)....

"The defendant in Jacques v. State, was being tried for escape from prison.... [T]he nature of the offense necessitates that the jury be informed of the defendant's status as an inmate. In affirming Jacques's conviction we wrote:

" 'The defendant was not prejudiced by any failure on the part of the State to provide him with other clothes. In saying this, we do not recommend that even in such a case a convict should not be dressed with appropriate clothes throughout his trial, clothing distinctly different from his prison clothes.'

"409 So.2d at 880. (Emphasis added.)

"In the case at hand, the appellant was not being tried for an offense which necessitated that the jury be informed that he was presently an inmate. There is a danger that the jury will convict, upon general principles, an inmate. The presumption of innocence is in danger of 'going out the window' in such a circumstance. Therefore, his constitutional rights were infringed when the jury was allowed to see him in prison clothing."

Gholston v. State, 620 So.2d 715, 716 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).

We adopt the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals as to this issue and hold that Gholston is entitled to a new trial.

ISSUE II

We now turn to Issue II. We must determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that Gholston's previous conviction for attempted murder could not be used as an element of the crime charged, i.e., the crime of being a person convicted of a crime of violence in possession of a firearm, § 13A-11-72(a), Ala.Code 1975 (hereinafter that crime will be referred to as "unlawful possession"), and for the purpose of enhancement under the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9. A violation of § 13A-11-72(a) is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. See § 13A-11-84(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Nunnery v. State, 410 So.2d 444, 448 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), held that unlawful possession of a pistol by a person convicted of a crime of violence is a felony. The Habitual Felony Offender Act applies in all cases where the criminal defendant has a prior felony conviction. See § 13A-5-9(a). Because this issue concerns a question regarding the sentence Gholston will receive if convicted on retrial, and because this issue is likely to arise on retrial, it seems appropriate for this Court to address whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly decided this issue even though we have now, in dealing with Issue I, affirmed the judgment reversing Gholston's conviction.

Our resolution of this issue requires interpretation of several sections of the Alabama Criminal Code. The fundamental rule to be applied in construing any statute is that this Court has a duty to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. This intent may be discerned from the language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and the goal sought to be obtained. Ex parte Holladay, 466 So.2d 956 (Ala.1985). Section 13A-1-6, Ala.Code 1975, provides, "All provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in section 13A-1-3." The "purposes stated in section 13A-1-3" include:

"(1) To proscribe conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual and/or public interests;

"(2) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the punishment authorized upon conviction;

"(3) To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state that constitute each offense;

"(4) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each "(5) To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection; and

"(6) To prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses."

In addition to these statutorily defined purposes, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the purpose of the prohibition against unlawful possession, § 13A-11-72, is "to protect the citizens of this State from the actions of that class of persons, who by their past acts, have shown themselves unsuitable and unfit to own and possess pistols." Mason v. State, 39 Ala.App. 1, 5, 103 So.2d 337, 341 (1956), aff'd, 267 Ala. 507, 103 So.2d 341 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 934, 79 S.Ct. 323, 3 L.Ed.2d 306 (1959). The purpose of the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, is " 'to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time.' " Lidge v. State, 419 So.2d 610, 614 (Ala.Cr.App.) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)), cert. denied, 419 So.2d 616 (Ala.1982). Cognizant of these guidelines for interpreting statutes, we turn to the specific question on appeal: whether the legislative intent behind § 13A-5-9, § 13A-11-72(a), and § 13A-11-84(a) was that a single felony conviction not be used both to prove a necessary element of the offense of unlawful possession of a pistol by a person convicted of a crime of violence and to enhance that sentence upon conviction.

The opinion of the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals, following Wigley v. State, 456 So.2d 339 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), held that Gholston's...