Giambra v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1983
• Citation: 315 Pa.Super. 231,461 A.2d 1256
• Parties: James GIAMBRA and Theresa Giambra, his wife, Appellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY and Insurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1256

461 A.2d 1256

315 Pa.Super. 231

James GIAMBRA and Theresa Giambra, his wife, Appellants, v. AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY and Insurance Placement

Facility of Pennsylvania.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 9, 1983.

Filed May 13, 1983.

Reargument Denied July 22, 1983.

Joseph A. Lakowski, Pittston, for appellants.

Paul A. Barrett, Scranton, for Aetna, appellee.

Patrick J. O'Connor, Philadelphia, for Insurance, appellee.

Before BROSKY, WIEAND and CIRILLO, JJ.

BROSKY, Judge:

This action was commenced by appellants who seek compensation under fire insurance policies issued by appellees for damage to the Giambras' building. It is undisputed that the building, located in Pittston, Pennsylvania, was damaged in the amount of $159,541. At issue before us is appellants' contention that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to put before the jury certain defenses raised by appellees. Appellees had raised the defenses that they were not obligated to compensate appellants for their loss on the grounds that the fire which damaged the building was set by appellants, or was procured by them; and/or that they were not liable because appellants had submitted false and fraudulent insurance claims to the companies. We find that the trial court properly denied the motions for new trial and judgment n.o.v. made by appellants and therefore affirm.

We note at the outset that an order either granting or refusing to grant a new trial will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error of law. Rusidoff v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 251 Pa.Super. 208, 380 A.2d 451 (1977). Motions for judgment n.o.v. should be entered only in clear cases, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of the verdict winner, considering the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. Steward v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Miller v. Checker Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975).

In assessing appellants' claim that there was insufficient evidence to put the aforementioned defenses before the jury, we have been guided by principles enunciated by this court in Ruttenberg v. Fire Insurance Co., 122 Pa.Super. 363, 186 A. 194 (1936). In that case, we explained:

The defense that the fire was caused directly or indirectly by the insured was an affirmative one, and the burden was therefore on the defendants to prove that the fire was set, or was caused to be set, by the insured. It was not necessary that the proof be beyond a reasonable doubt as is necessary when such a charge is made against a defendant in a criminal case. Proof of insured's fraudulent connection with the cause of the fire by a preponderance of the evidence was sufficient.... There was no eyewitness in the instant case who saw the insured set fire to his building. The verdict therefore must be supported by circumstances in evidence from which the jury may infer legitimately that the insured burned, or caused to be burned, his store, building and dwelling. Hence the vital question on this appeal is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendants, is sufficient to sustain the conclusion of the jury that the insured set the fire, or that he caused it to be set. If the evidence fairly and reasonably justifies the verdict, it must be sustained. (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 365, 186 A. at 195. See also Greenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 427 Pa. 494, 235 A.2d 582 (1967), as to the preponderance of the evidence standard.

Although the burden of proving arson in a case like the present one is not so heavy as in criminal cases, (see Ruttenberg, supra), we have been further guided by a discussion of arson in criminal cases.

In Commonwealth v. DiNicola, 308 Pa.Super. 535, 454 A.2d 1027 (1982), we explained, citing Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 Pa. 436, 123 A.2d 435 (1956), that

It is not necessary, however, to speculate as to a possible or even probable motive, since it is elementary that, while motive may be an important factor, it is not incumbent on the Commonwealth, in order to make out a case, to prove the existence of any motive, much less of an adequate one.... All that is required is that the evidence being circumstantial, the circumstances proved should be such as reasonably and naturally to justify an inference of guilt of the accused.... (Citations omitted.)

At ----, 454 A.2d at 1032.

We similarly reject the notion that motive must be proved as a separate element, in civil cases ¹ although it may, of course, form part of the circumstances from which it is inferred that the subject party has caused the fire. (See discussion with the fire was inferred in Ruttenberg, supra.)

In Ruttenberg, supra, we explained,

In a question of circumstantial evidence, the proof derived from the circumstances is a question of natural presumption and is to be found by the jury. The strength of this proof depends on the probability resulting from the facts.... It is the right of the party to have this submitted to the jury, unless it be so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Id. at 369, 186 A. at 196-197.

We find no error in the decision of the trial court to submit appellee's defenses to the jury. Both defenses revolved around the claim of the insurance companies that appellants were responsible for the fire.

The office building damaged was purchased as an investment by appellants on January 24, 1979 for $36,000. The building and land on which it was situated were...