Giammattei v. Egan.
Decision Date | 02 August 1949 |
Citation | 68 A.2d 129,135 Conn. 666 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | GIAMMATTEI v. EGAN. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Wynne, Judge.
Proceeding for unemployment benefits by Angelo Giammattei against John J. Egan, Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act. The unemployment commissioner for the third district found the plaintiff eligible to receive unemployment compensation and an appeal was brought by the defendant to the Superior Court and tried to the court. From a judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the unemployment commissioner, the defendant appeals to the Supreme Court of Errors.
Error and case remanded with direction.
Harry Silverstone, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, was William L. Hadden, Attorney General, for appellant.
James F. Rosen, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Nathan Rubin, New Haven, for appellee.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.
The plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment benefits. He worked for a single employer from March 22, 1948, to June 15, 1948, and earned $52 for the week ending March 27 and a total of $892.12 between that date and June 15, the date of separation from employment. His wages for the week ending March 27 were paid to him on April 2 by check. Section 1389i of the 1947 Supplement to the General Statutes, Rev.1949, § 7507, provided: ‘An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week, only if it shall have been found that * * * (3) he has been paid wages during the base period of his current benefit year in an amount at least equal to two hundred and forty dollars, including only wages with respect to which contributions have been paid or are payable, some part of which amount has been paid in at least two different calendar quarters of such base period.’ The administrator denied the claim for benefits on the ground that all of the wages had been paid in one calendar quarter only. The plaintiff's appeal was sustained by a commissioner, and the present appeal was taken to the Superior Court by the administrator. It was there dismissed, and the administrator appealed to this court.
The Superior Court agreed with the commissioner's conclusion that ‘paid,’ as used in the above quotation from the statute, means ‘payable’ and that the plaintiff had wages payable to him in two different calendar quarters and hence was eligible to receive unemployment compensation. In common usage, ‘paid’ does not mean ‘payable.’ ‘Paid’ is the past tense of the verb ‘to pay,’ and ‘wages paid’ are wages that actually have been paid. ‘Payable’ is an adjective, and ‘wages payable’ are wages that have not yet been paid but may, can or should be paid, that is, wages which are justly due. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). In a case of this character, however, we are called upon to look beyond the literal meaning of the words to the history of the law, its language, considered in all its parts, the mischief the law was designed to remedy, and the policy underlying it. Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78, 81, 20 A.2d 455.
In the Unemployment Compensation Act as originally enacted at a special session of the General Assembly in 1936, the basis for the unemployment compensation tax was ‘wages payable,’ as it was in the federal Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 639, § 901, 42 U.S.C. § 1101, (1940) 42 U.S.C.A. § 1101. An employer subject to the act was required to pay contributions ‘equal to * * * per cent of the wages payable by him with respect to employment.’ General Statutes, Sup.1937, § 805d(a), Sup.1939, § 1336e(a). In August, 1939, Congress amended the federal Unemployment Tax Act and changed the basis for the federal tax from ‘wages payable’ to ‘wages paid.’ 53 Stat. 1387, § 608, § 1600, Int.Rev.Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1600, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1600. Thereafter, during the 1941 session, the General Assembly similarly amended the Connecticut act so that the employer subject to the act was required to pay contributions ‘equal to * * * per cent of the wages payable by him with respect to employment in 1938, 1939 and 1940, and equal to * * * per cent of the wages paid by him with respect to employment after 1940.’ Sup.1941, § 711f. Unemployment compensation benefits are related to contributions by employers. Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, supra, 128 Conn. at page 82, 20 A.2d at page 458. Accordingly, the 1941 change in the basis of contributions resulted in two other changes, one in the benefit base and the other in the minimum qualifying wage provisions of the act. So long as contributions were computed on the basis of ‘wages payable,’ benefits were likewise computed on the basis of wages payable, that is, ‘wages earned.’ Sup.1937, § 807d(b), Sup.1939, § 1338e(e, f). When the basis of contributions was changed to ‘wages paid,’ the benefit base was changed to ‘wages paid.’ Sup.1941, § 716f, last paragraph, § 717f. It would be logical for the General Assembly to provide that since the payment of contributions is not required until the wages have been paid, the benefit rights to the employee based on such wages should not accrue until the wages have been paid, that is, until the wages have become taxable.
Corresponding changes were made in the minimum qualifying wage provision. Prior to 1941, this provision was expressed in terms of wages payable, that is, wages earned. Sup.1937, § 808d(a)(3), Sup.1939, § 1339e(a)(3). In 1941, it was changed to require as one of the conditions of benefit eligibility that the employee ‘has been paid’ wages to a certain amount. Sup.1941, § 718f(a)(3). In 1945 the section was amended to change the amount of qualifying wages from $144 to $240. Sup.1945, § 964h. In 1947 it was further amended, to prevent any individual from obtaining benefits in two successive benefit years without some intervening employment, by adding the requirement that some part of the qualifying wages must have been paid in at least two different calendar quarters. Sup.1947, § 1389i. In both amendments the words ‘has been paid’ were retained.
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