Gianetti v. Gerardi
Citation | 44 A.3d 911,52 Conn.Supp. 207 |
Decision Date | 23 December 2010 |
Docket Number | No. CV–01–0384501–S.,CV–01–0384501–S. |
Court | Superior Court of Connecticut |
Parties | Charles D. GIANETTI, M.D. v. Joseph Lucian GERARDI. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Charles D. Gianetti, pro se, the plaintiff.
Joseph Lucian Gerardi, pro se, Stamford, the defendant.
On March 11, 2002, the plaintiff, Charles D. Gianetti, filed a three count substitute complaint, in which he alleges causes of action for breach of an implied contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against the defendant, Joseph Lucian Gerardi. The dispute was sent to an attorney trial referee, who rendered his report on September 29, 2003.
In his report, the attorney trial referee found the following facts. The plaintiff, a physician, performed plastic surgery and other medical treatment on Tyler Kenney, a minor child who had been bitten by a dog. The defendant is an attorney who represented Tyler and his mother in a lawsuit related to Tyler's injuries. The plaintiff sent a bill in the amount of $6870, which bill is customary and reasonable for the services rendered, to both Tyler's mother and the insurance carrier for the dog's owner. Although the defendant requested a bill and medical records from the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not provide the defendant with those items. The plaintiff indicated to the defendant that he would only supply the bill and medical information if he received a letter of protection from the defendant.1 The defendant indicated to the plaintiff that if the plaintiff sent the defendant a bill, the defendant would submit it to the insurance carrier and provide a letter of protection for any reasonable bill to the extent that it was not paid by the insurance carrier. There was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant on the issues of payment and the supplying of medical information and a bill. The defendant advised the plaintiff that he would not be responsible for payment of the plaintiff's bill for services to Tyler.
With regard to count one of the complaint, the referee concluded that, because there was no meeting of the minds, there was no implied contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. With regard to count two, the referee concluded that the plaintiff did not prove unjust enrichment because there was no evidence of any benefit to the defendant nor was there evidence that the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for any such benefit. Finally, with regard to count three, the referee concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of quantum meruit because there was no implied agreement or tacit understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding payment by the defendant for services rendered by the plaintiff. On the contrary, the referee concluded that there was a complete lack of agreement or understanding regarding that issue.
On March 9, 2004, the plaintiff filed an objection to the attorney trial referee's report.2 The plaintiff objects to the referee's findings that (1) there was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant on the issues of payment and the supplying of medical information and a bill and (2) the defendant advised the plaintiff that the defendant would not be responsible for payment of the plaintiff's bill. The plaintiff also argues that the referee's conclusions that the plaintiff failed to prove each of his three causes of action are incorrect. On August 12, 2010, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's objection.
“The report of ... [an] attorney trial referee shall state ... the facts found and the conclusions drawn therefrom....” Practice Book § 19–8(a). “A party may file objections to the acceptance of a report on the ground that conclusions of fact stated in it were not properly reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found, or that the ... attorney trial referee erred in rulings ... or that there are other reasons why the report should not be accepted....” Practice Book § 19–14. Practice Book § 19–17(a).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadows v. Higgins, 249 Conn. 155, 162, 733 A.2d 172 (1999). “A reviewing authority may not substitute its findings for those of the trier of the facts.” Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc., 20 Conn.App. 420, 423, 567 A.2d 1250 (1989), cert. denied, 214 Conn. 804, 573 A.2d 318 (1990).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Lynch, 122 Conn.App. 686, 692, 1 A.3d 157 (2010). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hees v. Burke Construction, Inc., 290 Conn. 1, 7, 961 A.2d 373 (2009).
First, the plaintiff objects to the referee's finding that there was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant on the issues of payment and the supplying of medical information and a bill. The plaintiff does not elaborate on the reasons for this objection. In accordance with the standards set forth above, however, the court may not disturb the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Here, the evidence presented to the referee included a letter (plaintiff's exhibit I) dated May 29, 1996, from Alan Neigher, an attorney representing the plaintiff, to the defendant, in which Neigher states: In a letter (plaintiff's exhibit C) dated June 28, 1996, from the defendant to Neigher, the defendant stated: Finally, in another letter (plaintiff's exhibit E) to Neigher dated November 26, 1996, the defendant stated:
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the referee reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff, through his attorney, offered to send the bill to the defendant once the defendant had sent a letter of protection, but that the defendant stated in response that he would provide a letter of protection only once the plaintiff provided the bill, the defendant determined that it was reasonable and submitted it to the insurance carrier, and any portion of the bill was then unpaid. The referee also reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of the November 26, 1996 letter, that the parties were unable to resolve this impasse and come to any agreement for the plaintiff to submit a bill and be paid for it by the defendant. Accordingly, the referee's finding that there was no meeting of the minds on this issue was not clearly erroneous.
Next, the plaintiff objects to the referee's finding that the defendant advised the plaintiff that the defendant would not be responsible for payment of the plaintiff's bill. In support of his objection, the plaintiff simply states that “there is no supporting evidence for this statement.” Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the plaintiff's own exhibit F is a letter from the defendant to Neigher, in which the defendant stated: “[O]ur agreement was that since [the plaintiff] refused to give me a bill, Tyler's claim would proceed without a bill submitted by [the plaintiff] and [the plaintiff] would not be paid.” Accordingly, there was evidence in the record to support the referee's finding, and that finding was not clearly erroneous.
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Seals v. Havey
...... Haven, Docket Number CV 05-4003241 S (November 9, 2006,. Taylor, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 300]; Gianetti v. Gerardi , 52 Conn.Supp. 207, 215, 44 A.3d 911 (2010); 133. Conn.App. 858, 38 A.3d 1211 (2012); Scharf v. Statewide. Grievance ......
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Seals v. Havey
...... Haven, Docket Number CV 05-4003241 S (November 9, 2006,. Taylor, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 300]; Gianetti v. Gerardi , 52 Conn.Supp. 207, 215, 44 A.3d 911 (2010); 133. Conn.App. 858, 38 A.3d 1211 (2012); Scharf v. Statewide. Grievance ......
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