Gianetti v. Gerardi

Citation44 A.3d 911,52 Conn.Supp. 207
Decision Date23 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. CV–01–0384501–S.,CV–01–0384501–S.
CourtSuperior Court of Connecticut
PartiesCharles D. GIANETTI, M.D. v. Joseph Lucian GERARDI.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Charles D. Gianetti, pro se, the plaintiff.

Joseph Lucian Gerardi, pro se, Stamford, the defendant.

BELLIS, J.

FACTS

On March 11, 2002, the plaintiff, Charles D. Gianetti, filed a three count substitute complaint, in which he alleges causes of action for breach of an implied contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against the defendant, Joseph Lucian Gerardi. The dispute was sent to an attorney trial referee, who rendered his report on September 29, 2003.

In his report, the attorney trial referee found the following facts. The plaintiff, a physician, performed plastic surgery and other medical treatment on Tyler Kenney, a minor child who had been bitten by a dog. The defendant is an attorney who represented Tyler and his mother in a lawsuit related to Tyler's injuries. The plaintiff sent a bill in the amount of $6870, which bill is customary and reasonable for the services rendered, to both Tyler's mother and the insurance carrier for the dog's owner. Although the defendant requested a bill and medical records from the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not provide the defendant with those items. The plaintiff indicated to the defendant that he would only supply the bill and medical information if he received a letter of protection from the defendant.1 The defendant indicated to the plaintiff that if the plaintiff sent the defendant a bill, the defendant would submit it to the insurance carrier and provide a letter of protection for any reasonable bill to the extent that it was not paid by the insurance carrier. There was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant on the issues of payment and the supplying of medical information and a bill. The defendant advised the plaintiff that he would not be responsible for payment of the plaintiff's bill for services to Tyler.

With regard to count one of the complaint, the referee concluded that, because there was no meeting of the minds, there was no implied contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. With regard to count two, the referee concluded that the plaintiff did not prove unjust enrichment because there was no evidence of any benefit to the defendant nor was there evidence that the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for any such benefit. Finally, with regard to count three, the referee concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim of quantum meruit because there was no implied agreement or tacit understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding payment by the defendant for services rendered by the plaintiff. On the contrary, the referee concluded that there was a complete lack of agreement or understanding regarding that issue.

On March 9, 2004, the plaintiff filed an objection to the attorney trial referee's report.2 The plaintiff objects to the referee's findings that (1) there was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant on the issues of payment and the supplying of medical information and a bill and (2) the defendant advised the plaintiff that the defendant would not be responsible for payment of the plaintiff's bill. The plaintiff also argues that the referee's conclusions that the plaintiff failed to prove each of his three causes of action are incorrect. On August 12, 2010, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's objection.

DISCUSSION

“The report of ... [an] attorney trial referee shall state ... the facts found and the conclusions drawn therefrom....” Practice Book § 19–8(a). “A party may file objections to the acceptance of a report on the ground that conclusions of fact stated in it were not properly reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found, or that the ... attorney trial referee erred in rulings ... or that there are other reasons why the report should not be accepted....” Practice Book § 19–14. “The court shall render such judgment as the law requires upon the facts in the report. If the court finds that the ... attorney trial referee has materially erred in its rulings or that there are other sufficient reasons why the report should not be accepted, the court shall reject the report and refer the matter to the same or another ... attorney trial referee ... for a new trial or revoke the reference and leave the case to be disposed of in court.” Practice Book § 19–17(a).

“The factual findings of a [trial referee] on any issue are reversible only if they are clearly erroneous.... [A reviewing court] cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meadows v. Higgins, 249 Conn. 155, 162, 733 A.2d 172 (1999). “A reviewing authority may not substitute its findings for those of the trier of the facts.” Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc., 20 Conn.App. 420, 423, 567 A.2d 1250 (1989), cert. denied, 214 Conn. 804, 573 A.2d 318 (1990).

[T]he trial court may not retry the case ... [but] must review the referee's entire report to determine whether the recommendations contained in it are supported by findings of fact in the report.... [T]he trial court cannot accept an attorney trial referee's report containing legal conclusions for which there are no subordinate facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Lynch, 122 Conn.App. 686, 692, 1 A.3d 157 (2010). [B]ecause the attorney trial referee does not have the powers of a court and is simply a fact finder, [a]ny legal conclusions reached by an attorney trial referee have no conclusive effect.... The reviewing court is the effective arbiter of the law and the legal opinions of [an attorney trial referee] ... though they may be helpful, carry no weight not justified by their soundness as viewed by the court that renders judgment.... Where legal conclusions are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts found by the ... referee.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hees v. Burke Construction, Inc., 290 Conn. 1, 7, 961 A.2d 373 (2009).

OBJECTIONS TO THE REFEREE'S FINDINGS OF FACT

First, the plaintiff objects to the referee's finding that there was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiff and the defendant on the issues of payment and the supplying of medical information and a bill. The plaintiff does not elaborate on the reasons for this objection. In accordance with the standards set forth above, however, the court may not disturb the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Here, the evidence presented to the referee included a letter (plaintiff's exhibit I) dated May 29, 1996, from Alan Neigher, an attorney representing the plaintiff, to the defendant, in which Neigher states: “If you will send me a letter of protection, [the plaintiff] will immediately send to you his bill and medical records.... Please let me know if this is agreeable to you.” In a letter (plaintiff's exhibit C) dated June 28, 1996, from the defendant to Neigher, the defendant stated: “If [the plaintiff] wants to provide me with his bill and notes, and if the amount of the bill is reasonable for the services provided, I will submit them to the insurance carrier that is responsible for Tyler's bills. If any portion of the submitted bill is not paid, I will then provide [the plaintiff] with a letter of protection.” Finally, in another letter (plaintiff's exhibit E) to Neigher dated November 26, 1996, the defendant stated: “I thought the impasse was resolved. You had said that [the plaintiff] would rather not be paid (and have [Tyler's] claim proceed without his bills and notes) than to submit his bills and notes without first receiving a letter of protection. You said that [the plaintiff] had been burned too many times; and for him no payment was better than helping [Tyler's] claim. I informed [Tyler's mother] about this and she instructed me to proceed without [the plaintiff's] bills and notes.”

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the referee reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff, through his attorney, offered to send the bill to the defendant once the defendant had sent a letter of protection, but that the defendant stated in response that he would provide a letter of protection only once the plaintiff provided the bill, the defendant determined that it was reasonable and submitted it to the insurance carrier, and any portion of the bill was then unpaid. The referee also reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of the November 26, 1996 letter, that the parties were unable to resolve this impasse and come to any agreement for the plaintiff to submit a bill and be paid for it by the defendant. Accordingly, the referee's finding that there was no meeting of the minds on this issue was not clearly erroneous.

Next, the plaintiff objects to the referee's finding that the defendant advised the plaintiff that the defendant would not be responsible for payment of the plaintiff's bill. In support of his objection, the plaintiff simply states that “there is no supporting evidence for this statement.” Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the plaintiff's own exhibit F is a letter from the defendant to Neigher, in which the defendant stated: [O]ur agreement was that since [the plaintiff] refused to give me a bill, Tyler's claim would proceed without a bill submitted by [the plaintiff] and [the plaintiff] would not be paid.” Accordingly, there was evidence in the record to support the referee's finding, and that finding was not clearly erroneous.

OBJECTIONS...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Seals v. Havey
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Connecticut
    • 2 de fevereiro de 2016
    ...... Haven, Docket Number CV 05-4003241 S (November 9, 2006,. Taylor, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 300]; Gianetti v. Gerardi , 52 Conn.Supp. 207, 215, 44 A.3d 911 (2010); 133. Conn.App. 858, 38 A.3d 1211 (2012); Scharf v. Statewide. Grievance ......
  • Seals v. Havey
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Connecticut
    • 2 de fevereiro de 2016
    ...... Haven, Docket Number CV 05-4003241 S (November 9, 2006,. Taylor, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 300]; Gianetti v. Gerardi , 52 Conn.Supp. 207, 215, 44 A.3d 911 (2010); 133. Conn.App. 858, 38 A.3d 1211 (2012); Scharf v. Statewide. Grievance ......
  • State v. Deshawn D., No. 33504.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 26 de junho de 2012

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT