Giangiulio v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp.

Decision Date14 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. 1-03-2179.,1-03-2179.
Citation850 N.E.2d 249
PartiesDebra GIANGIULIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INGALLS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Joseph L. Planera & Assoc., Chicago Heights (John P. Brattoli, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elmore, De Michael, Ashack & Daudish, Oak Forest (Joseph E. Daudish, Joseph J. De Michael, James T. Ashack, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.

Justice NEVILLE delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an interlocutory appeal filed by the defendant, Ingalls Memorial Hospital (Ingalls), pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308), from an order that granted the plaintiff's, Debra Giangiulio, motion to compel discovery and required Ingalls to answer certain interrogatories and to produce an object. Ingalls argues that the information and the object sought to be discovered by the plaintiff were protected from disclosure by the physician-patient privilege (735 ILCS 5/8-802 (West 2002)), the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002)), section 8-2102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, commonly known as the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101, 8-2102 (West 2002)) and privacy rules and regulations created under the authority granted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 through 164 (2005)). The trial court certified the following question for our review:

"[W]hether the Defendant Hospital is prohibited from responding to the Plaintiff's discovery requests pursuant to the Physician-Patient Privilege (735 ILCS 5/8-802), the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/3), the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2102) and the Privacy Rule set forth in Pub.L. 104-191, 45 C.F.R. Parts 160-164."1

The Appellate Court granted Ingalls' Rule 308 Petition for Leave to Appeal. 155 Ill.2d R. 308.

BACKGROUND

On July 11, 2001, Giangiulio filed her first amended complaint against Ingalls. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was the victim of a criminal assault; that she was attacked by another patient during her stay at the hospital; and that Ingalls was negligent in preventing the attack by a third party. The alleged attacker was not named as a party defendant in Giangiulio's complaint.

Before filing her first amended complaint, on April 10, 2001, Giangiulio served Ingalls with 22 interrogatories and with a demand for production of nine documents, objects or tangible things. In its answers to the interrogatories, Ingalls objected to interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 as follows:

"2. State the full name, address, and telephone number of the `JANE DOE' alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint.

ANSWER: Objection. INGALLS HOSPITAL will not be producing any documents, records, information or tangible objects relating to `JANE DOE.' See Exhibit `A' attached hereto for the basis for the refusal to provide these records.

3. State the full name, address, and telephone number of all doctors, physicians, nurses, and any other staff who were treating the `JANE DOE' alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint.

ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory # 2 above.

* * *

5. State the full name, address, and telephone number of the Defendant's employee or staff member who assigned the `JANE DOE' to Room 417E.

ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory # 2 above.

* * *

7. State the full name, address, and telephone number of all staff members who took and retrieved the knife from the `JANE DOE' alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint.

ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory # 2 above.

8. State the full name, address, and telephone number of the patient assigned to Room 417E, bed number 2 on the date of the accident alleged in the Complaint.

ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory # 2 above.

* * *

10. State the period of time which "JANE DOE" alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint was a patient at Defendant's facility immediately preceding the date of the accident.

ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory # 2 above."

As indicated in its answer, Ingalls attached Exhibit "A" to its response to the interrogatories and demand for production. Exhibit "A" was a letter addressed to plaintiff's counsel (John Brattoli) in which Ingalls' counsel explained the bases for the hospital's refusal to answer. Ingalls' refusal to disclose the information was based on the following: the attorney-client and work product privileges in Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) (166 Ill.2d R. 201(b)(2)); the physician-patient privilege in section 8-802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8-802 (West 2002)); sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 of the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101, 8-2102 (West 2002)); and the Mental Health and Developmental Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq.)

In her request for production entitled "demand for production," Giangiulio requested certain documents, objects or tangible things. In request "f", Giangiulio sought production of the knife that Jane Doe allegedly had in her possession which was later taken from her by Ingalls' staff members. Ingalls objected to request "f" as follows:

"f. The knife which the `JANE DOE' alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint has in her possession and which was later taken from her by Defendant's staff members.

RESPONSE: See response to (e) above."

In (e), Ingalls made the following response:

"RESPONSE: Objection. INGALLS HOSPITAL will not be producing any documents, records, information or tangible objects relating to `JANE DOE.' See Exhibit `A' for the basis for the refusal to provide these documents."

It should be noted that in support of the objections to the requests to produce, Ingalls attached a copy of the same letter to plaintiff's counsel that it used in its answers to the interrogatories. In the letter, Ingalls identifies the same bases for its objections.

Thereafter, Giangiulio filed a motion to compel responses to written discovery. Giangiulio argued that interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10 are permitted by case law and not barred by privilege. Giangiulio further argued that Ingalls should be ordered to respond to paragraph "f" of her demand for production, wherein she requested the knife. Giangiulio argued that the knife had nothing to do with the medical or psychiatric ailment for which Jane Doe was being treated, so the production of the knife would not violate the Confidentiality Act.

Ingalls responded to the motion by reiterating its position that the information sought in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 is protected by the physician-patient privilege. 735 ILCS 5/8-802 (West 2002). Ingalls also responded that the Confidentiality Act prevents it from revealing the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10. 740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002). Ingalls further argued that the knife sought in request to produce "f" has no bearing on the ultimate question of the hospital's liability in this case. Also, information regarding the knife would be protected by either the physician-patient privilege, the Confidentiality Act and/or the Medical Studies Act. Ingalls made the same argument with respect to requests to produce "e" and "h". Request "e" sought medical bills, records, notes, reports, statements, doctors' notes, nurses' notes, radiological reports, and any other documents regarding Jane Doe's care and treatment. Request "h" sought receipts, notes, records, reports, incident reports, investigation reports, accident reports, files, documents and bills related to the attack. We note that Ingalls objected to requests for production "e", "f" and "h" based upon the privileges delineated in its Exhibit "A." However, we also note that Giangiulio's motion to compel only requested that the trial court order the production of the knife which was requested in request "f", but did not seek to compel production of the document in requests "e" and "h".

In a supplemental response to Giangiulio's motion to compel, Ingalls objected on the basis of HIPAA. Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 through 164 (2005).

On July 18, 2003, the trial court entered an order that granted Giangiulio's motion to compel responses to her interrogatories and compelled production of the object requested in demand "f." The trial court also found, pursuant to Rule 308, that there was a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Ingalls' petition for leave to appeal was granted by the appellate court.

ANALYSIS

Giangiulio initially argues that Ingalls should be deemed to have waived any objection to the interrogatories and demands for production that were sent to Ingalls on April 10, 2001. According to Supreme Court Rule 213(d), the discovery was to be answered within 28 days. 177 Ill.2d R. 213(d). Ingalls' response was not received until January 13, 2003. As a result, Giangiulio argues Ingalls' objections should be deemed waived for failure to file those objections within 28 days.

Giangiulio also argues that, because Ingalls made no argument in its opening brief with respect to interrogatories 4, 6, 14, 15 and 16, the trial court's ruling on those should be affirmed. Giangiulio insists that it is for the court, not the defendant, to determine whether the privilege actually attaches. Giangiulio argues that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(e)(7), eff. October 1, 2001), points not argued are waived.

Ingalls responds that questions concerning the timeliness of its responses to the discovery requests are beyond the scope of the certified question forming the sole basis of this appeal. Ingalls argues that none of its objections should be deemed waived because...

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