Giangrieco v. Susquehanna Cnty.
| Decision Date | 13 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-817 |
| Parties | MICHAEL GIANGRIECO, Plaintiff, v. SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Hon. John E. Jones III
Presently pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss in the above-captioned case, one filed by Defendants Elizabeth Arnold ("Defendant Arnold") and Judith Herschel ("Defendant Herschel") (together, the "Individual Defendants") (Doc. 19), and the other by Defendant Susquehanna County (Doc. 21) (together, the "Motions to Dismiss"). Also included with the Individual Defendants' motion is a Motion for a More Definitive Statement. The motions have been fully briefed (Docs. 20, 22, 26-29) and are ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Motions to Dismiss shall be granted, and the Individual Defendants' Motion for a More Definitive Statement shall be denied.
In accordance with the standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss, the following facts are derived from Plaintiff's complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to him.
Plaintiff Michael Giangrieco is an attorney who initially served as the solicitor of Susquehanna County from 1996 to 2008. (Doc. 1, at ¶ 10). After a two-year stint as a Susquehanna County Commissioner, Plaintiff Giangrieco "was again asked to be the Susquehanna County solicitor" in January 2017. (Id.). The instant dispute arises from events that took place during Plaintiff's latter term as solicitor.
Defendants Arnold and Herschel are both Susquehanna County Commissioners and, according to Plaintiff, are political allies. (Id., at ¶¶ 7-8, 28). Defendant Arnold has served as Commissioner since 2016, while Defendant Herschel was elected in November 2019 for a term that began in January 2020. (Id., at ¶¶ 7-8).
Sometime during Defendant Arnold's first term, Plaintiff "spoke to her repeatedly about actions she was taking that were not only contrary to Susquehanna [County] policy, but potentially exposed Susquehanna County to liability and did ultimately cause the county liability." (Id., at ¶ 11). Plaintiff avers that these conversations were not part of his job duties as solicitor because anotherattorney—one hired by Susquehanna County's insurance company—was handling the litigation and allegedly "had the responsibility to control [Defendant] Arnold's actions related to litigation against Susquehanna County." (Id., at ¶ 12). Nevertheless, "[o]ut of an abundance of caution," Plaintiff has not detailed exactly what was spoken during these conversations with Defendant Arnold because "[s]ome of the speech involved potentially could be construed as legal advice." (Id., at ¶ 13).1
At some point thereafter, two Susquehanna County employees sued Defendants Arnold and Susquehanna County, and these lawsuits allegedly related to those (undisclosed) actions by Defendant Arnold. (Id., at ¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges that the attorney hired by Susquehanna County's insurance company subsequently asked him and others to lie in documents responsive to an EEOC complaint and likewise asked Plaintiff to change a previously drafted statement to better "protect" Defendant Arnold. (Id., at ¶¶ 14-18). According to Plaintiff, his refusal to lie"infuriated" Defendant Arnold "because he would not lie to help cover up her actions." (Id., at ¶ 19).
Approximately two years later, in 2019, the Susquehanna County elections board received complaints relating to then-candidate Defendant Herschel's allegedly improper campaign finance statements. (Id., at ¶¶ 20-21). Plaintiff was involved with the election board hearing concerning these complaints and allegedly made statements "about whether [Defendant] Herschel's financial statement filings were improper or what the remedy should be." (Id., at ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Herschel "took offense" at Plaintiff's "involvement," and that she "vowed to get even with him." (Id., at ¶ 23).
During the 2019 election for Susquehanna County Commissioners, Defendant Arnold won re-election and Defendant Herschel won a seat for her first term. (Id., at ¶¶ 26-27). After getting sworn in as Commissioners, one of their first official acts was a vote to "terminate" Plaintiff as Susquehanna County solicitor, which carried by a vote of 2-1. (Id., at ¶¶ 33-35). Plaintiff alleges that his termination was connected to the Individual Defendants' "vow[s]" to get even with him for his prior speech, and that they had collectively "pledged" to "get rid of the testosterone in the courthouse." (Id., at ¶¶ 23, 29-30). Plaintiff alleges their conduct arose to a "brazen" conspiracy to terminate his employment. (Id., at ¶¶ 31-32).
Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 19, 2020, alleging four counts against all three Defendants: Count I alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim, Count II alleges unlawful discrimination and/or retaliation under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1421 et seq., Count III brings a claim for gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Count IV alleges a state law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Doc. 1). The Individual Defendants and Defendant Susquehanna County each filed Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 19 and 21), along with briefs in support (Docs. 20 and 22) on August 3, 2020. The Individual Defendants also included a Motion for More Definitive Statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). (Doc. 20). Plaintiff filed briefs in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss on August 13, 2020 (Docs. 26 and 27), to which the Individual Defendants and Defendant Susquehanna County separately replied on August 26 (Docs. 28 and 29). For the reasons that follow, we shall grant the Motions to Dismiss and deny the Motion for More Definitive Statement.
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider only the allegations in the complaint, as well as "documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, . . . and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case." Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirement of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, "in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint attacked by Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that defendant's liability is morethan "a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later formalized in Iqbal, a district court must first identify all factual allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded for purposes of resolving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Next, the district court must identify "the 'nub' of the ... complaint - the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]." Id. Taking these allegations as true, the district judge must then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id.
However, "a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). Rule 8 "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Id. at 234.
To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege two things: "(1) that the activity in question is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action." Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2006). Concerning the first prong, a public employee's speech is protected under the First Amendment "when (1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not have 'an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public' as a result of the statement he made." Id. at 241-42 (q...
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